

# ART AND ANTHROPOLOGY FOR A SUSTAINABLE WORLD\*

TIM INGOLD\*\*

**Abstract:** Both art and anthropology, this chapter proposes, are future-oriented disciplines, united in the common task of fashioning a world fit for coming generations to inhabit. The first step in establishing this proposition is to show how the objectives of anthropology differ from those of ethnography. Anthropology, it is argued, establishes a relation with the world that is correspondent rather than tangential, that prioritises difference over alterity, and that places presence before interpretative contextualisation. The second step is to rethink the idea of research — to show how, as an open-ended search for truth and a practice of correspondence, research necessarily overflows the bounds of objectivity. Art and anthropology, then, and not natural science, are exemplary in the pursuit of truth as a way of knowing-in-being. The third step is to show that only if it is conceived in this way can research be conducive to the processes of renewal on which our collective futures depend. Thus research as correspondence is a condition for sustainability. But sustainability is nothing if it is not of everything. We have to begin, therefore, with the idea of everything as a plenum, in which each apparent addition is really a reworking. The chapter concludes with some reflections on the proposed synergy of art and anthropology for education, democracy and citizenship.

**Keywords:** art; anthropology; research; education; democracy; citizenship.

---

\* This article is the text of the keynote address, presented to the Royal Anthropological Institute Conference on *Art, Materiality and Representation*, at the British Museum, London, on 1<sup>st</sup> June 2018. I am especially grateful to the RAI, and to the organisers, for giving me the honour of addressing the conference. Much of the thinking behind my presentation was developed within the project *Knowing From the Inside: Anthropology, Art, Architecture and Design*, funded by an Advanced Grant from the European Research Council (323677-KFI, 2013-18). I am grateful to participants in the project for ideas and inspiration, and to the Council for its support.

\*\* Department of Anthropology, School of Social Science, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen AB24 3QY, Scotland, UK. Email: tim.ingold@abdn.ac.uk. Tim Ingold is Emeritus Professor of Social Anthropology at the University of Aberdeen. He has carried out ethnographic fieldwork in Lapland, and has written on environment and social organization in the circumpolar North, on evolutionary theory in anthropology, biology and history, on the role of animals in human society, on language and tool use, and on environmental perception and skilled practice. He is currently exploring issues on the interface between anthropology, art, architecture and design.

**Resumo:** A arte e a antropologia, segundo este capítulo propõe, são disciplinas orientadas para o futuro, unidas na tarefa comum de criar um mundo adequado para as próximas gerações habitarem. O primeiro passo para estabelecer essa proposta é mostrar como os objetivos da antropologia diferem dos objetivos da etnografia. A antropologia, segundo aqui se defende, estabelece uma relação com o mundo que é mais de correspondência do que tangência, que dá prioridade à diferença em relação à alteridade e coloca a presença antes da contextualização interpretativa. O segundo passo é repensar a ideia de pesquisa — para mostrar como, como busca aberta à verdade e como uma prática de correspondência, a pesquisa ultrapassa necessariamente os limites da objetividade. Assim, a arte e a antropologia, e não as ciências naturais, são exemplares na busca da verdade como uma maneira de conhecer-enquanto-ser. O terceiro passo é mostrar que somente se concebida dessa maneira a pesquisa poderá conduzir aos processos de renovação dos quais o nosso futuro coletivo depende. Assim, a pesquisa entendida como correspondência é uma condição da sustentabilidade. Mas a sustentabilidade não vale nada se não se referir a tudo. Temos que começar, portanto, pela ideia de tudo como algo pleno, em relação ao qual cada adição aparente é realmente uma reformulação. O capítulo conclui com algumas reflexões sobre a sinergia entre arte e antropologia que propõe, tendo em vista a educação, a democracia e a cidadania.

**Palavras-chave:** arte; antropologia; pesquisa; educação; democracia; cidadania.

«Art does not reproduce the visible but makes visible». So declared that most anthropological of artists, Paul Klee, in his *Creative Credo* of 1920<sup>1</sup>. In this chapter I want to propose two things. First, I contend that Klee's Credo applies just as well to anthropology as it does to art. It is no more for anthropology than for art to hold a mirror to reality. It is rather to enter into the relations and processes that give rise to things so as to bring them into the field of our awareness. Secondly, only so long as these relations and processes carry on can the world offer a sustainable abode for its inhabitants. «Form is the end, death», as Klee put it; «form-giving is life»<sup>2</sup>. I hold that the commitment of anthropology, as of art, must be to the reality of a world of life, one that is never finally formed but ever in formation. To establish these twin propositions, I shall proceed in three stages. I begin by reimagining the discipline of anthropology as fundamentally a speculative and experimental endeavour, oriented as much to the future as to the past, but by the same token, radically distinct in its objectives from ethnography. I then go on to consider what we mean by research. I shall argue that research has been diminished by its assimilation to the protocols of positive science, and that it is for art and anthropology to demonstrate its true promise. Finally, I return to the theme of sustainability, and to the question of how to imagine a world with room for everyone and everything. To do so, I argue, we must approach it, as artists and anthropologists do, from within. I shall conclude by reflecting on the implications of the proposed synergy of art and anthropology for education, democracy and citizenship.

---

<sup>1</sup> KLEE, 1961: 76. In the original German, Klee wrote: «Kunst gibt nicht das Sichtbare wieder, sondern macht sichtbar». This lends itself to translation in many ways; the one I use here comes from the English-language version of his notebooks.

<sup>2</sup> KLEE, 1973: 269.

## JOINING THE CONVERSATION

Ostensibly, the disciplines of art and anthropology face in opposite directions: the first dedicated to describing and comparing forms of life as we find them; the second to the invention of forms never before encountered. This has not always been so, however. It was, after all, the Dutch masters of the seventeenth century, practitioners of what has aptly been called «the art of describing»<sup>3</sup>, who set the standards of observational accuracy and depictive fidelity, in their painterly compositions, which ethnographers would seek to emulate, three centuries later, in the medium of words, in effect by substituting verbal «thick description» for the opacity of oils<sup>4</sup>. But these standards hold little appeal to an art of the contemporary that is nothing if not speculative. We are inclined nowadays to judge a work as art not by the accuracy of its depiction but by the novelty of its conception. Yet no practice of art could carry force that was not already grounded in careful and attentive observation of the lived world. Nor, conversely, could anthropological studies of the manifold ways along which life is lived be of any avail if not brought to bear upon speculative inquiries into what the possibilities of life might be. Thus far from the one looking only forward and the other only back, contemporary art and anthropology have in common that they *both* observe *and* speculate. Their orientations are as much towards human futures as towards human pasts: these are futures, however, that are not conjured from thin air but forged in the crucible of collective lives. I contend that for both art and anthropology, the aim is — or at least should be — to join *with* these lives in the common task of fashioning a world fit for coming generations to inhabit.

This task, I believe, is the most pressing and critical for our times. How ought we to live, so that there can be life for those that come after us? It is not as though anyone already has the answers. Human ways of life — of doing and saying, thinking and knowing — are not handed down on a plate; they are neither preordained nor ever finally settled. Living, we could say, is the never-ending process of figuring out how to live, and harbours at every moment the potential to branch along different ways, no one of which is any more normal or natural than any other. Every way, then, is in the nature of a communal experiment. It is no more a solution to the problem of life than is the path a solution to the problem of how to reach a destination as yet unknown. But it is an *approach* to the problem. Anthropology, as I speak for it here, is a field of study that takes upon itself to learn from as wide a range of approaches as it can; one that seeks to bring to bear, on this problem of how to live, the wisdom and experience of *all* the world's inhabitants, whatever their backgrounds, livelihoods, circumstances and places of abode<sup>5</sup>. Of course, were I a practising artist rather than a professional anthropologist,

<sup>3</sup> ALPERS, 1983.

<sup>4</sup> The idea of «thick description» comes from the philosopher Gilbert Ryle (1971), and was famously introduced into anthropology by Clifford Geertz (GEERTZ, 1973: 6). On the comparison with oil painting, see INGOLD, 2011: 222).

<sup>5</sup> INGOLD, 2018a.

I might well be thinking along parallel lines. I might even want to make the same claims for art that I have just championed for anthropology. After all, is art not also an experimental inquiry into the conditions and possibilities of life? Does it not also pose the question of how to live? I have no wish to be deflected into the academically specious exercise of distinguishing what is art from what is not. I do however think it is worth enumerating the principles upon which art and anthropology might potentially converge.

These, in my view, are fourfold. The first is *generosity*. This means listening and paying attention to what others do and say, receiving with good grace what is offered rather than seeking by subterfuge to extract or elicit what is not. Enshrined in the principle of generosity is an ontological commitment, to give back what we owe to others for our own intellectual, practical and moral formation, indeed for our very existence as beings in a world. The second principle is *open-endedness*. An inquiry that is open-ended seeks not to arrive at final solutions that would bring life to a close but to reveal ways along which it can keep going. Far from rendering the world habitable for some to the exclusion of others, it is about making room for everyone and everything, both now and for the indefinite future. That is what I mean by a sustainable world, and I shall return to it. The third principle is *comparison*. It is to recognise that no approach to life is the only possible one, and that for every approach you take, others could be taken which lead in different directions. Thus the question «why this direction rather than that?» is always uppermost in our minds. The final principle calls on us to be *critical*, for we cannot be content with things as they are. By common consent, the organisations of production, distribution, governance and knowledge that have dominated the modern era have brought the world to the brink of catastrophe. In finding ways to carry on, we need all the help we can get. But no-one — no science, no philosophy, no indigenous people — already holds the key to the future if only we could find it. We have to make that future together. And this can only be achieved through conversation.

In short, where art joins with anthropology is in making a conversation of human life itself<sup>6</sup>. Not all art, of course, is anthropological in its orientation or philosophy, nor is it invariably signed up to the four principles I have just enumerated. But of art that is anthropological we can say that it, too, is generous, open-ended, comparative and critical<sup>7</sup>. Such art does not take a stand, or adopt an offensive or defensive posture towards others. It does not impose itself, or seek to intimidate by shock and awe. It does not set out to make a statement. It is inquisitive rather than interrogative, offering a line of questioning rather than demanding answers; it is attentional, rather than fronted by prior intentions, modestly experimental rather than brazenly transgressive, critical but not given over to critique. Joining *with* the forces that give birth to ideas and things, rather than seeking to

---

<sup>6</sup> INGOLD 2018b: 158.

<sup>7</sup> Here and in what follows, I am returning to, and extending, an argument originally set out in INGOLD, 2018c: 65-8.

express what is already there, it conceives without being conceptual. Art that is anthropological is curious; it rekindles care and longing, allowing knowledge to grow from the inside of being in the conversations of life. Like a living, breathing body, what art takes in, it also gives out. It is vividly present yet intimately enmeshed with its surroundings. To echo Klee's *Credo*, it does not reproduce the sensible, but makes sensible. That's why practices like walking, drawing, calligraphy, instrumental music, dance, ways of making and working with materials — ways that tend to get bracketed at the «craft» end of the spectrum — are exemplary for me. Artists engaging in these practices come closest, in my view, to doing anthropology, even if they do not self-consciously present their work as such.

But what of anthropologists themselves? Are they doing anthropology in the sense I have outlined, of calling on the wisdom and experience of people everywhere in the task of fashioning a common future? Have they joined the conversation? For the most part — at least until recently — I fear they have not. In a conversation, lines twist around one another as they go along, both answering and being answered to in a relation of what I have called correspondence<sup>8</sup>. The majority of practising anthropologists, however, have preferred to come at other lives along a tangent, momentarily aligning with them only to veer aside into the stance of interpretation and analysis. This is the stance of ethnography. Thus whereas anthropology carries on a *correspondent* relation with the world, ethnography's relation is *tangential*. Its objective is not to study *with* people but to make studies *of* them. It is to listen to what they have to say, and to observe what they do, for what it tells us about them. Now I am not saying that ethnographic studies are wrong; indeed they have added immeasurably to the library of human knowledge. But their objectives are not those of anthropology, and to conflate the two is to the detriment of both. For where anthropology seeks to open up to coeval lives and differing ways of being, and to bring them into dialogue with our own, ethnography's aim is to wrap them up into an account that transports us into a world whose contrived otherness leaves ours intact. As Stuart McLean has recently put it, the effect of collapsing anthropology into ethnography is to downsize questions of ontology, by confining them within the explanatory or interpretative horizons of «society», «culture» or «history»<sup>9</sup>.

Now art, too, can be either tangential or correspondent. A tangential art seeks to describe what it sees: such, indeed, was the art of the Dutch master-painters to which I have already referred. It touches the world only to draw away and put it in the frame. This is an aspiration shared by the ethnography for which it set a precedent. But an art that is truly anthropological — that makes sensible, in Klee's terms, rather than reproducing the already sensed — is one that joins *with* the forces and flows of an ever-forming world.

---

<sup>8</sup> INGOLD, 2017.

<sup>9</sup> MCLEAN, 2017: 147-55.

It is, in short, an art of correspondence. Yet most contemporary art that self-consciously presents itself as anthropological has taken ethnography to be the glue that holds art and anthropology together. The resulting unions have been ill-matched, to say the least, for the very reasons that render art compatible with anthropology also make it *incompatible* with ethnography. An art that is speculative and experimental, that explores the possibilities of being through open-ended conversation and comparison, cannot meet the standards of accuracy, of empirical depth and detail, expected of ethnography. Conversely, an ethnographic stance that gazes rearwards, to capture the already sensed in all its richness and complexity, cannot simultaneously join in the forward-going process by which the past — in the inimitable words of Henri Bergson — «gnaws into the future and... swells as it advances»<sup>10</sup>. Moreover, contemporary art's embrace of ethnography brings in train two preoccupations that do much to undermine its anthropological promise. Already spelled out over twenty years ago by the art historian Hal Foster<sup>11</sup>, these are first, an obsession with alterity, and second, an insistence on placing everything in its social, cultural and historical context.

Let me begin with the problem of alterity. Anthropologists like to impress their friends with stories of their encounter with what they call «radical alterity». For some it is almost a badge of honour that confers the right to speak of otherness — of its political force or transgressive potential — with an authority denied to their less seasoned or adventurous cousins. It is a badge that many artists, consumed by what Foster calls «ethnographer envy», would dearly love to wear. This does beg the question, however, of how «other» the people have to be in order that their alterity should count as radical. The phrase «radical alterity» in fact comes from the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. It connotes an ethical stance which requires you to let others into your presence, to be themselves, without entertaining any preconceptions about the kinds of selves they are, and without in any way prejudging the terms in which you might begin to engage or converse with them<sup>12</sup>. Thus otherness, at least initially, is *absolute*. It cannot admit to differences of degree, such that some people are more other than others. Yet in the very instant that anthropologists introduce society, history or culture into their conception of alterity, this absoluteness is compromised. For to say that people are of another social background, historical provenance or cultural tradition than one's own is immediately to encompass their difference within the horizons of an imposed frame. There are people of our kind, and people of this other kind. We are setting them, the others, a priori, on

---

<sup>10</sup> BERGSON, 1911: 5.

<sup>11</sup> FOSTER, 1995.

<sup>12</sup> The key passage is perhaps the following: «Pluralism implies a radical alterity of the other, whom I do not simply *conceive* by relation to myself, but *confront* out of my egoism. The alterity of the Other is in him and not relative to me; it *reveals* itself. But I have access to it proceeding from myself and not through a comparison of myself with the other. I have access to the alterity of the Other from the society I maintain with him, and not by quitting this relation in order to reflect on its terms». (LEVINAS, 1979: 121, original emphases).

the opposite side of a frontier between worlds, ours and theirs. And this, of course, is to prejudge how we engage with them.

That people are different goes without saying. But does their otherness make them so? Which comes first, alterity or difference? For Levinas, alterity is given from the start. But I am more inclined to the contrary view, which we owe to Gilbert Simondon and — after him — Gilles Deleuze, namely that otherness is ever-emergent from within the matrix of relations within which all are immersed *ab initio*. That is to say, it is a function of ontogenesis, the becoming of being<sup>13</sup>. Here, differentiation is prior, alterity derivative. We are dealing, then, not with a world of beings radically other to one another, as with Levinas, but with a world of becomings that, like voices in a conversation, are ever differentiating themselves from one another even as they emerge and go along together. Karen Barad<sup>14</sup> calls this «*cutting together-apart*». People are different, then, not because they belong to other worlds but because they are fellow travellers with us in the *same* world, a world — nonetheless — of inexhaustible and interminable differentiation<sup>15</sup>. Ethnography, however, predisposes its practitioners to put alterity ahead of difference. There is, in what is often called the «ethnographic encounter», an inherent *schizochrony* — to borrow a term from Johannes Fabian<sup>16</sup>. In an encounter marked as ethnographic, we turn our backs on people even as we open out to them. This, in effect, is to convert others into surrogates for an idealised project of the anthropological or artistic self. It leads to the coding of difference as manifest identity and of otherness as outsidership. And as Foster intimates, this can be but a prelude for a politics of tangentialism that places others on the margins, rather than one of correspondence in which all can join on an equivalent footing<sup>17</sup>.

This marginalisation of others is further compounded by the insistence on placing them in context. This, too, is to put them into the frame, and in so doing to neutralise the force of their presence. What applies to people, here, applies equally to what they do and make: to performances and works of art. The ethnographic impulse is always to subject them to analysis. Thus understood and accounted for, disarmed and embedded, laid to rest, we are no longer troubled to attend to them or to what they have to tell. Their contextualisation does not bring them *forth* to be themselves, but refers them *back*, to what Alfred Gell<sup>18</sup> has called the «complex intentionalities» of which they are alleged

---

<sup>13</sup> SIMONDON, 1993, equated this becoming of being, or *ontogénèse*, with the process he otherwise called «individuation». For Deleuze, it leads to an insistence on the distinction between difference and diversity: «Difference is not diversity. Diversity is given, but difference is that by which the given is given, that by which the given is given as diverse» (DELEUZE, 1994: 222).

<sup>14</sup> BARAD, 2014.

<sup>15</sup> INGOLD, 2018b.

<sup>16</sup> FABIAN, 1983: 37.

<sup>17</sup> FOSTER, 1995: 303.

<sup>18</sup> GELL, 1996: 37.

to be the material expression. Gell's view — to my mind entirely mistaken — is that for any work to qualify as *art*, it must be possible to trace a chain of causal connections, in reverse, from the final product to the initial intentions that motivated its production. It is then the specific job of the anthropologist-as-ethnographer to provide an «interpretative context»<sup>19</sup> that unlocks the significance of the work by revealing the intentions that lie behind it. It is to join with the masters of contextualisation, the art historian and the critic, as self-appointed gatekeepers to meaning. For anthropology to join with the *practice* of art, however, is to proceed in precisely the opposite direction. It is to engage in what Tobias Rees<sup>20</sup> has recently called «the subtle art of decontextualization». This is an art not of extraction but of *unwrapping*, of peeling away the layers of interpretative context so as to restore the work to presence, in a world that is ours as well, so that we can once again feel its force, and correspond with it.

## RESEARCH AS EXPERIMENTAL PRACTICE

I would like now to turn to the second part of my argument. This is about the call of research, and about what happens to research in anthropology when its vocation is aligned with that of art. Nowadays, of course, the default setting for research is science. Thus the researcher is presumed to be a scientist unless proven otherwise. And scientific research is normally taken to be a specialised mode of inquiry dedicated to testing hypotheses through the collection and analysis of data under controlled conditions, and to the advance of theory through conjecture and refutation. Even where practice deviates from these ideals, any scholar who purports to be engaged in a project of research is still expected to explain what it is intended to show, how the work will be carried out, and the anticipated contribution of its results to knowledge. Anthropologists have always felt uneasy about these expectations, knowing full well that the destination of their research can never be known in advance, that the conditions under which it is carried out are largely beyond their control, and that it never really reaches any conclusion. They worry obsessively about what counts as «anthropological knowledge», and what it means to produce it. By the standards of science, anthropological research looks weak indeed. Yet anthropologists are still inclined to dress their inquiries in a scientific garb, masking conversation as elicitation, experiences of life as data for analysis, lessons learned as final results. As for artists, who find increasingly that they have to present what they are doing as research in order to access the institutional and financial support on which they depend, to present and justify their work as research takes an even greater stretch of credibility. Must they pretend to behave like scientists? If so, what are they trying to

---

<sup>19</sup> GELL, 1996: 36.

<sup>20</sup> REES, 2018.



find out, and what kinds of knowledge do they think their art can contribute that science cannot?

My aim in what follows is to reset the default. I want to show that art, and not science, is exemplary in the practice of research, and that anthropology could do well by explicitly following art's example. Instead of expecting artists and anthropologists to be doing science, we should put the boot on the other foot. The onus should be on scientists to explain how what they are doing, in the harvesting and analysis of data, and in its industrial conversion into knowledge products, can conceivably be regarded as research. If scientists were really researchers, would we not expect them to act more like artists, or at least like anthropologists? Rather than seeking to hold the world to account, or to extract its secrets through force or deception, research would then mean going along with it, entering into its relations and processes and following their evolution from the inside. Some scientists, of course, are already doing this, but they remain a dissenting minority, swimming against the currents of the mainstream. Of scientists, it seems that these dissenters alone have absorbed the lesson that Alfred North Whitehead taught almost a century ago, in his *Turner Lectures* of 1919, namely that «there is no holding nature still and looking at it»<sup>21</sup>. For them, as indeed for artists and anthropologists, research is an experimental practice, but one in which every experiment is not just an action done but an experience undergone, leaving neither the experimenter nor the things touched by it unchanged. Both have moved on, along with the world of which they are intrinsically part. In this, each move both doubles up on what was done before, but is yet an original intervention that invites a double in its turn.

This, after all, is what the word «research» literally means: it is a second search, an act of searching again. To search again is not to repeat, exactly, what you did before. Between one search and the next there is always a differential. It is like walking the same path, or playing the same piece of music, over and over. No walk, no performance, can ever be identical to what went before. Every step is a new beginning. Or to adopt a handy distinction from Gilles Deleuze and his collaborator, Félix Guattari, research is a process not of iteration but of *itineration*<sup>22</sup>. It carries on, as life does, not closing in on solutions but ever opening to new horizons. As you move, so does what you seek. But you press on undeterred, driven by a desire that seems as insatiable, and indeed as imperative, as the will to live. You call it curiosity. But you could also call it care, for both words are derived from the same Latin root, *curare*. It is about looking after, tending to things. Research, then, is not a technical operation, a particular thing you do in life, for so many hours each day. It is rather a way of living curiously — that is, with care and attention. As such, it pervades everything you do. And what are you looking for, that so evades your grasp?

---

<sup>21</sup> WHITEHEAD, 1964: 14-15.

<sup>22</sup> DELEUZE & GUATTARI, 2004: 410.

What is it that always escapes, always overflows your most determined attempts to pin things down, and ever recedes beyond the horizon of conceptualisation? I want to argue that this slippery, fugitive and ineffable quality is *truth*. In a world that is sustainable research never ends because it is, most fundamentally, a search for truth.

For many today, truth is a scary word, better kept inside quotation marks. It conjures up terrifying images of the violent oppression wreaked, in the name of truth, by those who have appointed themselves as its worldly ambassadors. We should not, however, blame truth for the wrongs committed in its name. The fault lies in its totalisation; its conversion into a monolith that stands eternal like a monument, timeless and fully formed. This rests on a delusion, on the part of its self-appointed guardians, that they are themselves *above* truth, that they are the masters of it, and truth theirs to command. Human history is studded with delusional projects of this kind, each catastrophic for those subjected to it, and each ultimately smothered by the sands of time. Research, to the contrary, rests on the acknowledgement that we can never conquer truth, any more than we can conquer life. Such conquest is for immortals. But for us, mortal beings, truth is always greater than we are, always beyond what — at any moment — can be physically determined or grasped within the categories of thought. Truth is inexhaustible. Wherever or whenever we may be, we can still go further. Thus research affords no final release into the light. Remaining ever in the shadows, we stumble along with no end in sight, doggedly following whatever clues afford a passage<sup>23</sup>. This is hardly conducive to optimism, to the belief — common among theorists of progress — that the best of all worlds is only just around the corner, pending one or two final breakthroughs. But while it may not be optimistic, research is always hopeful. For in converting every closure into an opening, every apparent solution into a new problem, it is the guarantor that life can carry on, of its sustainability. For this very reason, research is a primary responsibility of the living<sup>24</sup>.

Now if research, as I maintain, is the pursuit of truth, and if truth ever exceeds the given, then there must always be more to research than the collection and analysis of data. It must go beyond the facts. The fact stops us in our tracks, and blocks our way. «This is how it is», it says to us, «proceed no further!» But even if the facts of a case may be incontrovertibly established, its truth lives on. This is not to suggest that truth lies *behind* the facts, calling for a superior intelligence armed with theoretical power-tools capable of breaking through the surface appearances or ideological mirrors that deceive the rest of us into thinking that we can already tell reality from illusion. We have no need of theorists with heavy duty equipment to clear the obstacles. Nor is it to suggest that truth lies *within* the facts, as some kind of unfathomable essence that will forever

---

<sup>23</sup> LEWIS, 2011: 592.

<sup>24</sup> INGOLD, 2018c: 71-4.

hide from us, sunk into itself, as self-proclaimed advocates of so-called «object-oriented ontology» like to tell us<sup>25</sup>. It is rather to insist that what appear to us, in the first instance, as stoppages turn out, when we search again — that is, in our *re*-search — to be openings that let us in. It is as though the fact rotated by ninety degrees, like a door on opening, so that it no longer confronts us face-on but aligns itself longitudinally with our own movements. And where the fact leads, we follow. «Come with us», it says. What had once put an end to our search then reappears, in *re*-search, as a new beginning, a way into a world that is not already formed, but itself undergoing formation. It is not that we have broken through the surface of the world to discover its hidden secrets. Rather, as the doors of perception open, and as we join *with* things in the relations and processes of their formation, the surface itself vanishes.

The truth of this world, then, is not to be found «out there», established by reference to the objective facts, but is disclosed from within. It is indeed the very matrix of our existence as worldly beings. We can have no knowledge of this truth save by being in it. Knowing-in-being, in short, is of the essence. This conclusion will of course be anathema to those who hold that true knowledge of the world can be had only by taking ourselves out of it and by looking at it from a distance. For them, objectivity is the very hallmark of truth. It is indeed understandable that in a world where facts often appear divorced from any kind of observation, where they can be invented on a whim, propagated through mass media, and manipulated to suit the interests of the powerful regardless of their veracity, we should be anxious about the fate of truth. To many, it seems that in this era of post-truth, we are cast adrift without an anchor. We are right to insist that there can be no proper facts without observation. But we are wrong, I believe, to suppose that observation stops at objectivity. For to observe, it is not enough merely to look at things. We have to join with them, and to follow. And it is precisely as observation goes beyond objectivity that truth goes beyond the facts. This is the moment, in our observations, when the things with which we study begin to tell us how to observe. In allowing ourselves into their presence rather than holding them at arm's length — in attending to them — we find that they are also guiding our attention. Attending to these ways, we also respond to them, as they respond to us. Research, then, becomes a practice of correspondence, and of care. It is a labour of love, giving back what we owe to the world for our own existence as beings within it.

Research as correspondence, in this sense, is not just what we do but what we undergo. It is a form of experience. For in experience, things are *with* us in our thoughts, dreams and imaginings, and we with them. It is here, I believe, that we can begin to see where science can align with art, and indeed with anthropology. It means calling into

---

<sup>25</sup> Advocates of object-oriented ontology have been vociferous and prolific, and a large literature has grown up around it. A useful summary can be found in Harman, 2011.

question the division between fact and fantasy, truth and illusion, which has underpinned the development of science ever since the days of Francis Bacon and Galileo Galilei<sup>26</sup>. «Let us learn to dream», declared the chemist August Kekulé, in a lecture to celebrate his discovery of the structure of the benzene molecule, «then perhaps we shall find the truth. But let us beware of publishing our dreams till they have been tested by waking understanding»<sup>27</sup>. For Kekulé, and for the majority who think like him, if science needs art it is to fantasise, to give the mind freedom to roam, to come up with novel ideas. But only when tested against the facts can ideas born of the imagination lay any claim to truth. Now were research only about the establishment of such truth claims, then indeed, it would admit to neither imagination nor experience in its experimental operations. But if truth lies *beyond* the facts, then science can become research only insofar as it is willing to forgo objectivity and follow the way of art, and of anthropology, into a correspondence that unites experience and imagination in attending to a world that also attends to us. It would be for science, too, to join in the pursuit of truth as a way of knowing-in-being, through practices of curiosity and care. Therein, I contend, lies the proper vocation of research.

## THE SUSTAINABILITY OF EVERYTHING

I now turn to the third part of my argument. I mean to show that only if it is conceived as a conversation, or as a practice of correspondence, can research be conducive to the continuation of those relations and processes, of world-formation or renewal, on which our collective futures depend. In short, research as correspondence is a condition for *sustainability*. For many of us, I admit, the notion of sustainability has been devalued by overuse, and compromised through its co-option by powerful interests whose overriding concern has been for their own survival in a world of ever more intense competition for dwindling planetary resources. Yet I believe it is a notion we cannot do without, and that to give up on it would be tantamount to the abandonment of our responsibility towards coming generations. The challenge, then, is to give meaning to a term that paradoxically combines the idea of an absolute limit with the limitlessness of carrying on forever. Real sustainability, I argue, begins at the moment when the doors of perception swing open, when objectivity gives way to the search for truth, or finality to renewal, whereupon what appears from the outside as a limit opens up from within into a space of growth, movement and transformation, to limitless possibility, or in a word, to *everything*. Sustainability cannot be of some things and not others; it can countenance no boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. It must be of everything, or it is nothing. What kind of everything, then, can always surpass itself, always have room

---

<sup>26</sup> INGOLD, 2013a.

<sup>27</sup> The citation is from an English translation of Kekulé's address by BENFEY, 1958.

for more, without at any moment appearing partial or incomplete? What follows is my attempt at an answer.

For those of us educated into the ways of modern science, our inclination is to conclude with everything rather than to begin from it. And we can reach a conclusion, we think, only by adding things up. We add and we add: numbers of people, numbers of species, numbers of objects of this or that kind, numbers of characters on the page, numbers of stars in the sky, numbers of cells in the body, numbers of atoms in a pinhead. We are bamboozled by numbers, many of a magnitude that defy comprehension. But to add things up, they have first to be broken off from the processes that gave rise to them, from the ebbs and flows of life. You must be able to tell where one thing ends and another begins. The world must be rendered discontinuous. We soon discover, however, that some things are difficult if not impossible to enumerate. Try counting clouds in the sky, waves in the ocean, trees in the woods, fungi. The difficulty is that these things are always forming and dissolving, growing and decomposing, appearing at some times to merge, at other times to break up. Take clouds, for example. Clouds are not discrete objects, suspended in the sky. They are rather folds of the sky itself — moisture-laden formations of the turbulent and crumpled mass of atmospheric air<sup>28</sup>. Waves, too, are folds, ever-forming at the surface where the ocean, in its intercourse with the sky, is whipped up by the wind. You could perhaps count waves as they wash up upon the shore, much as you could count footsteps, breaths or heartbeats. But what would they amount to? A life, perhaps, with breaths, steps and heartbeats; all eternity with the waves. Counting would not be adding up a world but the rhythm of time passing.

With trees and fungi, addition is just as impracticable. Who can say how many trees there are in a wood? True, you could measure up, as foresters do, estimating the number and volume of trunks in the stack when a plot is felled. But in so doing you have already, in your mind's eye, cut each and every tree from all that nourishes it and gives it life: the soil, the fungi that wrap around its roots, the air and sunlight that fuel its growth. And to count fungi is merely to enumerate the fruiting bodies, ignoring the underground mesh of the mycelium from which they spring. But is it really any different with people? Are they any easier to add up than clouds, waves, trees and fungi? Can you arrive at everybody by counting heads? The head, after all, is part of a body that, topologically, is not a closed container but an open vessel, its surfaces so intricately infolded that it is practically impossible to distinguish its interior and exterior regions. Normally, we see only one part of every person — namely, the fleshy part. The part we don't see is the breath, the air we inhale and exhale, and without which we could not live. Like trees in the wood, people intermingle with one another — they «go in and out of each other's

---

<sup>28</sup> INGOLD, 2015: 90.

bodies», in Maurice Bloch's<sup>29</sup> beguiling phrase — even as they breathe the air. And their voices, carried on the breath and permeating the atmosphere, mingle also, sometimes joining, as in the unison of song, sometimes splitting apart as they «lift-up-over» one another without ever separating into discrete sounds<sup>30</sup>. You may, through an act of differential attention, be able to tell one voice from another, to split them along the grain of their becoming. But you cannot count them up.

In the correspondence of voices — in the conversation — everyone, like everything, is an intermingling: not a totality, arrived at by the addition of its individual elements, but what I shall call a *plenum*. The plenum is not a space filled up to capacity with things. It is fullness itself. The things we find there — as we have seen with clouds, waves, trees and people — emerge as folds, ever-forming by way of the turbulence of lively materials. We have many words to describe the plenum: world, cosmos, nature, earth. But does the world contain holes that remain to be filled? Are there gaps in the cosmos, voids in nature, empty spaces in the earth? We might regard a patch of ground as a site on which to build. It must first be cleared of obstructions like trees and boulders, foundations must be dug, materials gathered and assembled. To clear the ground, however, is not to leave a void but to smooth it out, as when you remove a crease from a fabric. And to build is not to refill the space but once again to crease the ground, pressing it into the rising forms of walls and the vault of the roof. Thus *every infill is, in reality, a reworking*, a doubling up that introduces a kink, twist or knot into the very fabric of the earth. To put it in the terms of physicist David Bohm<sup>31</sup>, the order of the plenum is *implicate*. In the implicate order, according to Bohm, «everything is enfolded into everything»<sup>32</sup>. Things that to our senses might appear solid, tangible and visibly stable — a building here, a tree or a boulder there, each occupying its particular region of space or moment in time — are truly but the envelopes of the spatiotemporal «holomovement» wherein everything is formed.

I would like to take Bohm's insight one step further, however, to argue that the order of the plenum is not so much implicate as *complicate*. Whereas implication connotes a folding inward, from side to side, complication carries the sense of folding forward — that is, of things convoluting longitudinally, braiding or plaiting along the lines of their own growth and movement. This is material folding on itself as it goes along<sup>33</sup>. As it does so it endlessly overflows any formal envelopes within which it may appear temporarily to have been pulled aside or detained. The plenum, then, is limitless, not because its capacity can always be increased, but because it forever carries on.

---

<sup>29</sup> BLOCH, 2012: 120.

<sup>30</sup> FELD, 1996: 100.

<sup>31</sup> BOHM, 2002.

<sup>32</sup> BOHM, 2002: 225. Bohm's *Wholeness and the Implicate Order* was first published in 1980.

<sup>33</sup> In *The Fold*, his study of Leibniz and the Baroque, Deleuze depicts matter thus as a maelstrom of vortices within vortices, yielding an «infinitely porous, spongy or cavernous texture... caverns endlessly contained in other caverns» (DELEUZE, 1993: 5).

We do not ask the ocean whether it has room to accommodate a few more waves; nor does the ocean respond like an overbooked hotelier: «Unfortunately we are full up». For the waves are ever forming, even as they break on the shore. The plenum, in short, belongs to time; perhaps, indeed, it *is* time. Everything, in the sense of the plenum, is not an ultimate conclusion, not the sum total when all is added up, but pure beginning. Let us recall Whitehead's words: «there is no holding nature still and looking at it». For Whitehead, nature was always self-surpassing, or in a word, *concretent*<sup>34</sup>. «Con» literally means together, «crescent» means undergoing creation rather than already created. In a concretent world, then, everything is perpetually undergoing creation together: trees growing together in the wood, people living together in society, their voices carrying on together in conversation. This does not mean, of course, that the plenary world is only half-formed, or incomplete. For incompleteness can only be judged in relation to a state of finality. In the plenum, by contrast, nothing is final, and every ending is an unfinished.

To return to my theme of sustainability, and to the question with which I began: how can we imagine a world that is sustainable for everyone and everything, for now and evermore? William James, in a lecture delivered in 1908, already gave a hint as to the answer. We have to think of the world, he said, as a pluralistic universe, or in short, as a *pluriverse*<sup>35</sup>. The pluriverse is not many rather than one, a collection of separate worlds rather than a singular universe. It is rather one in its openness, in its admission to infinite differentiation — that is, in its multiplicity. This world, as James put it, is «not rounded in and closed», like a globe, but «strung along», ever ramifying along the multiple kinks, creases and folds of emergent form<sup>36</sup>. For Arturo Escobar, writing for us today but with acknowledgement to James, sustainability is precisely about designing for a pluriverse — in his words, for «the Earth as a living whole that is always emerging out of the manifold biophysical, human, and spiritual elements that make it up»<sup>37</sup>. Far from ending with the world as a totality, joined up and complete, this would be a practice of design that begins with the world as a plenum whose very mode of existence lies in the perpetual unfinishedness of things, in the digestion of ends and their extrusion into pure beginning. And at the threshold, turning endings into beginnings, easing the passage of things from old life to new, stands the figure of the designer, the maker or the artist<sup>38</sup>. In design for a pluriverse, sustainability is not about the preservation of form. It is about the continuity of life.

The contrast between this view and the mainstream, science-based rationale of sustainability could not be more extreme. For the aim of the latter is to harness or capture the power of world-renewal, and to put it to use in the production of so-called

---

<sup>34</sup> WHITEHEAD, 1929: 410.

<sup>35</sup> JAMES, 2012.

<sup>36</sup> JAMES, 2012: 170.

<sup>37</sup> ESCOBAR, 2011: 139; ESCOBAR, 2018.

<sup>38</sup> INGOLD, 2015: 120-123.

renewables. This is to turn beginnings into endings, the transformative power of a living earth into goods and services for human consumption. In the rationale of sustainable development, the world is understood not as a plenum to be inhabited but as a totality to be managed, much as a company manages its portfolio, by balancing the books. At the point of balance, the supply of renewables precisely matches consumer demand. Now in theory, if the world and everything in it could be poised on this point, then it could be kept forever in a state of dynamic equilibrium. Sustainability, however, would then have been bought at the expense of putting life and history permanently on hold. The future could be no more than a protraction of the present. To design for such a future would, indeed, be self-defeating. If our predecessors had succeeded in designing a sustainable world, what future would remain for us, save to fall in line with their already imposed imperatives? Alternatively, were it to fall to us to design sustainability for our successors, then they in turn would become mere users, or consumers, tied to the implementation of a design already made for them. Design, it seems, *must* fail if every generation is to look forward to a future that it can call its own: that is, for every generation to begin afresh, to be a new generation. To adapt a maxim from the environmental pundit Stewart Brand: all designs are predictions; all predictions are wrong<sup>39</sup>.

This hardly sounds like a formula for sustainable living. The sustainability of everything, I have argued, is about keeping life going. Yet design based on the science of sustainability seems intent on bringing life to a stop, by specifying moments of completion when things fall into line with prior projections. If design brings predictability and foreclosure to a life-process that is inherently open-ended, then is it not the very antithesis of life? Remember Klee: «form is the end, death... Form-giving is life»<sup>40</sup>. How, then, can we think of design as part of a process of life whose outstanding characteristic is not that it tends to a limit but that it *carries on*? To do so, we will have to think differently of the world and of our place in it. Let me remind you of my earlier observation, that in the plenum every apparent infill is really a reworking. What goes for building in the plenum also goes, as I have shown, for research. The claim of scientific research — that it aims to fill the gaps in understanding — rests on a logic of addition, on the idea that our knowledge of the world, though currently incomplete, will ultimately add up to a totality. But for an itinerant practice of research that follows the ways of the world from within, there are no gaps to fill. Every journey, as we have seen, is both an original movement and a doubling up, a reworking, in which we differentiate emergent phenomena even as we join with them. It is, to recall the words of Karen Barad, a «cutting together-apart». To research the plenum, as she writes in another context, is to

---

<sup>39</sup> BRAND, 1994: 75, see INGOLD, 2013b: 233.

<sup>40</sup> KLEE, 1973: 269.



become «part of the world in its differential becoming»<sup>41</sup>. Experienced thus, as a way of life, research continually surpasses itself. It is not an addition but a concrescence.

## EDUCATION, DEMOCRACY AND CITIZENSHIP

With that, we can return to anthropology, and to art. I have just three final points to make concerning, respectively, education, democracy and citizenship. First, research in art, as in anthropology, would be mere solipsism — a gratuitous journey of self-discovery — were it not more fundamentally a practice of education. It is incumbent on us to give to the coming generation in return for the gift we have received, in our own formation, from the past. The commitment of education, as John Dewey taught more than a century ago, is to the *continuity of life*<sup>42</sup>. This however is to take the meaning of education quite literally, as a way of «leading out» (from the Latin *ex*, meaning «out» plus *ducere*, «to lead»), a de-positioning or exposure, the aim of which is not to furnish every student with a destiny in life but rather to undestine and unfinish, so that each can begin anew. In the words of educational philosopher Jan Masschelein, it is to seek after truth: «not the truth about the real, but the truth that comes out of the real... in the experience»<sup>43</sup>. It is for art as it is for anthropology to offer experience as an imaginative opening to truth. This does not amount to a programme of emancipation, or for transforming the world. Art and anthropology, in their educational mission, are rather touchstones for the world's transformation of itself. This transformation, as we have seen, unfolds along multiple pathways. It is, in essence, a conversation. Like life, conversations carry on; they have no particular beginning point or end point, no-one knows in advance what will come out of them, nor can their conduct be dictated by any one partner. They are truly collective achievements. But they are potentially life-changing for all involved.

Let us think of the art of sustainability, then, as a conversation, embracing not only human beings but all the other constituents of the living world — from non-human animals of all sorts to trees, rivers, mountains, and the earth. This brings me to my second point, namely, that the conversation is not only processual and open-ended but fundamentally democratic. I do not mean democracy in the sense of a head-count, which sorts everyone into those with common or opposed interests. In a sustainable democracy — one with room for everyone and everything, now and forever — people cannot be counted, and nor can things. Yet in their conjoint action and affective resonance, they constitute a public. As Jane Bennett writes, after Dewey, «publics are groups of bodies with the capacity to affect and be affected»<sup>44</sup>. Whether human or non-human, these are bodies in correspondence, not yet separated from their voices or from medium

---

<sup>41</sup> BARAD, 2007: 185.

<sup>42</sup> DEWEY, 1966: 2.

<sup>43</sup> MASSCHELEIN, 2010: 285.

<sup>44</sup> BENNETT, 2010: 101. Dewey's essay, *The public and its problems*, was first published in 1927 (DEWEY, 2012).

in which they mix and mingle. In the democratic conversation, each has something to give, something to contribute, precisely because all are different. Together they comprise what Alphonso Lingis<sup>45</sup>, in an apt turn of phrase, calls «the community of those who have nothing in common». My third point follows from this. It concerns citizenship. For within a democratic community that is open-ended and unbounded rather than closed in the defence of common interests, citizenship arises not as a right or entitlement, given from the start, but as something you have to work at. This is the work of commoning, not the discovery of what you have in common to begin with, but the imaginative act of casting your experience forward, along ways that join with others in carrying on a life together. Only then can citizenship be truly sustainable. The road to sustainability, in short, lies in correspondence<sup>46</sup>.

Art and anthropology, I suggest, potentially afford new ways of thinking about democracy and citizenship — ways that could give hope to future generations. At the present juncture, however, they have been pushed to the margins, above all by the relentless expansion of big science, aided and abetted by multinational corporations and neoliberal globalisation. And with them has gone the question from which all inquiry must begin and indeed from which I began this lecture: how ought we to live? Big science is not interested in this question because it believes it can already deliver the answers, or if not already, then within the not too distant future. These answers offer totalising solutions that would fix the planet, once and for all, for the benefit of humanity. But mega-projects of geoeengineering, were they ever implemented, will not secure the sustainability of everything but more likely its opposite, the ultimate extinction of life. When the dinosaurs went extinct, it was the small mammals that inherited the earth, among them the weasel. Perhaps the most famous weasel in history will turn out to be the one that bit through an electric cable, putting the largest machine ever built — CERN's large hadron collider — out of action for a week<sup>47</sup>. The collider is perhaps the greatest expression of scientific hubris we have yet seen, dedicated as it is to discovering the final truth of the universe, one that will leave us mortals with no place to be. It is the delusional project of our time, truly a machine for the end of the world. But when big science collapses — as it is bound to do, along with the global economy that sustains it — art and anthropology, like that famous weasel, will hold the future in their hands. We must be ready for it.

---

<sup>45</sup> LINGIS, 1994.

<sup>46</sup> INGOLD, 2017: 14-15.

<sup>47</sup> The animal in question was in fact a beech marten, a member of the weasel family. This attack, on 29<sup>th</sup> April 2016, was in fact only the first. A few months later, on 21<sup>st</sup> November, another marten struck. Instantly electrocuted on contact with the 18,000 volt cable, the animal's singed body was recovered and put on display at the Rotterdam Natural History Museum. See <<https://www.theguardian.com/science/2017/jan/27/cerns-electrocuted-weasel-display-rotterdam-natural-history-museum>>.

## REFERENCES

- ALPERS, S. (1983) — *The art of describing: Dutch art in the seventeenth century*. London: Penguin.
- BARAD, K. (2007) — *Meeting the universe halfway*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- (2014) — *Diffractioning diffraction: cutting together-apart*. «Parallax», 20 (3), p. 168-187.
- BENFEY, O. T. (1958) — *August Kekulé and the birth of the structural theory of organic chemistry in 1858*. «Journal of Chemical Education», 35, p. 21-23.
- BENNETT, J. (2010) — *Vibrant matter: a political ecology of things*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- BERGSON, H. (1911) — *Creative evolution*, trans. A. Mitchell. London: Macmillan.
- BLOCH, M. (2012) — *Anthropology and the cognitive challenge*. Cambridge, UK; Cambridge University Press.
- BOHM, D. (2002) — *Wholeness and the implicate order*. London: Routledge.
- BRAND, S. (1994) — *How buildings learn: what happens to them after they're built*. New York: Penguin.
- DELEUZE, G. (1993) — *The fold: Leibniz and the baroque*. Trans. T. Conley. London: Athlone.
- (1994). *Difference and repetition*. Trans. P. Patton. New York: Columbia University Press.
- DELEUZE, G.; GUATTARI, F. (2004) — *A thousand plateaus: capitalism and schizophrenia*, trans. B. Massumi. London: Continuum.
- DEWEY, J. (1966) — *Democracy and education: an introduction to the philosophy of education*. New York: Free Press.
- (2012) — *The public and its problems: an essay in political inquiry*. M. L. Rogers, ed. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- ESCOBAR, A. (2011) — *Sustainability: design for the pluriverse*. «Development», 54 (2), p. 137-40.
- (2018) — *Designs for the pluriverse: radical interdependence, autonomy and the making of worlds*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- FABIAN, J. (1983) — *Time and the other: how anthropology makes its object*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- FELD, S. (1996) — *Waterfalls of song: an acoustemology of place resounding in Bosavi, Papua New Guinea*. In FELD, S.; BASSO, K. H., eds. — *Senses of place*. Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research, p. 91-135.
- FOSTER, H. (1995) — *The artist as ethnographer?* In *The Traffic in Culture: Refiguring Art and Anthropology*. MARCUS, G. E.; MYERS, F. R., eds. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, p. 302-309.
- GEERTZ, C. (1973) — *The interpretation of cultures*. New York: Basic Books.
- GELL, A. (1996) — *Vogel's net: traps as artworks and artworks as traps*. «Journal of Material Culture» 1 (1), p. 15-38.
- HARMAN, G. (2011) — *The road to objects*. «Continent», 3 (1), p. 171-179.
- INGOLD, T. (2011) — *Being alive: essays on movement, knowledge and description*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- (2013a) — *Dreaming of dragons: on the imagination of real life*. «Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute», (N. S.) 19, p. 734-752.
- (2013b) — *Designing environments for life*. In *Anthropology and nature*. In HASTRUP, K., ed. Abingdon: Routledge, p. 233-246.
- (2015) — *The life of lines*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- (2017) — *On human correspondence*. «Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute», (N. S.) 23, p. 9-27.
- (2018a) — *Anthropology: why it matters*. Cambridge: Polity.
- (2018b) — *One world anthropology*. «HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory», 8 (1/2), p. 158-171.
- (2018c) — *Anthropology and/as education*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- JAMES, W. (2012) — *A pluralistic universe [1909]*. Auckland, NZ: The Floating Press.

- KLEE, P. (1961) — *Notebook*. In SPILLER, J., ed.; MANHEIM, R., trans. — volume 1: *the thinking eye*. London: Lund Humphries.
- (1973) — *Notebooks*. In SPILLER, J., ed.; MANHEIM, R., trans. — volume 2: *the nature of nature*. London: Lund Humphries.
- LEVINAS, E. (1979) — *Totality and infinity: an essay on exteriority*. Trans. Lingis, A. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- LEWIS, T. E. (2011) — *Rethinking the learning society: Giorgio Agamben on studying, stupidity, and impotence*. «Studies in Philosophy and Education» 30, p. 585-599.
- LINGIS, A. (1994) — *The community of those who have nothing in common*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- MASSCHELEIN, J. (2010) — *The idea of critical e-ducational research – e-ducating the gaze and inviting to go walking*. In Ed. GUR-ZE'EV, I. — *The possibility/impossibility of a new critical language of education*. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, p. 275-291.
- MCLEAN, S. (2017) — *Fictionalizing anthropology: encounters and fabulations at the edges of the human*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- REES, T. (2018) — *After ethnos*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- RYLE, G. (1971) — *The thinking of thoughts: what is "le penseur" doing?* In *Collected essays*. Vol. 2 London: Hutchinson, p. 480-496.
- SIMONDON, G. (1993) — *The genesis of the individual*. In Eds. CRARY, J.; KWINTER, S. — *Incorporations*. New York: Zone, p. 297-317.
- WHITEHEAD, A. N. (1929) — *Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- (1964) — *The concept of nature*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.