

Metaphorical exemplification and expression

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Introduction

Nelson Goodman suggested that artistic expression is metaphorical exemplification (1968, Ch2). Critics felt his account did more to change the subject than provide an account of expression (Beardsley 1978: 102-104; Vermazen 1986: 203-204 e.g.), and few recent accounts of expression find a central place for Goodman's thoughts (but see Textor 2008 and van der Berg 2012). Those criticisms are a bit off the mark, in my opinion, even though Goodman failed to offer a fully convincing account of expression. My goal in this paper is to explain what Goodman gets right and wrong, and offer a new suggestion about how to think about the relationship between exemplification and expression. Throughout, the goal is to get as far with a Goodman-inspired proposal as one can get.

The first two sections review Goodman's accounts of exemplification and expression in turn. Exemplification happens when something calls attention to, or refers to, some of its own features, like a tailor's swatch of fabric showing you color, weight, and weave. Expression is a metaphorical sort of exemplification, as when a piece of music seems joyful. It's metaphorically joyful, and calls attention to that fact about itself. Section three shows that, by Goodman's lights, three phenomena ought to count as metaphorical exemplification, even

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though Goodman only discusses one of them. Section four considers expressive phenomena in nature, as a way of motivating the varieties of metaphorical exemplification that Goodman failed to discuss. Then section five shows how Goodman's account misses the mark: all kinds of metaphorical exemplification admit some examples that seem like expression, and others that do not. But the distinction between the expressive and non-expressive examples is neatly captured by recognizing that in expression it is as though some features of an object are indicating the presence of others. Section six articulates this thought by identifying expression with a specific mechanism by which exemplification might be achieved: exemplification by proxy. This proposal does justice to the insightful aspects of Goodman's proposal while also remedying its shortcomings. Goodman's account, though problematic, turns out to be much richer and more useful than has previously been noticed.

1. Exemplification as symbolization

Exemplification is «an important and widely used mode of symbolization in and out of the arts» (Goodman 1968: 52). Colloquially, an exemplar is a good instance of something, singled out as being so. In effect, something functions as a sample of a kind, and, by Goodman's lights, functioning as a sample is a sort of symbolization. In brief, «Exemplification is possession plus reference.» (1968: 53) Possession because something can't be an instance of a larch without being a larch. Reference because when something exemplifies being a larch it is calling attention to, or, for Goodman, «referring to», one of its features, namely being a larch. Catherine Elgin suggests that «An exemplar highlights, underscores, displays, or conveys some of its features...» (2002: 7). And Goodman, in a letter to Monroe Beardsley, said that when exemplifying, one is «emphasizing, calling attention to, showing forth...I use "reference" for the general relation of symbolization...» (quoted in Beardsley 1975: 25). It's a real worry that Goodman is a bit too vague about how calling attention to something figures in his account of exemplification (see Textor 2008 for a helpful discussion), but it's not central to our concerns here.

Exemplars, colloquially, are *good* instances of kinds, but Goodman doesn't build that into his definition. For all we are told, something can function as a sample of a kind without being a particularly good example of it. Put your car through the compactor and it ceases to be a good instance of a Corolla, though it remains, arguably, a Corolla. The crushed mess can, under the right circumstances, function as a sample Corolla by calling attention to its Corollahood. Car dealerships want excellent sample Corollas, so they might not use the crushed ones you offered them for the showroom floor. Goodness matters later on, but for now we can put the issue to one side.

Possession is insufficient for exemplification because the larch can have mass, or be made largely of water, without in any way calling attention to those features it possesses. Arguably, most larches, minding their own business in the northern woods, don't in any way call attention to any of their features. There is no reference. Reference in Goodman's broad sense is necessary, but insufficient, because the expression «being a larch» refers to being a larch without being an exemplar of a larch.

Exemplification differs from ordinary examples of representation like words and images. No one expects words like «car» or pictures of cars to be cars, so possession is not required. And while words and images represent cars, Goodman's view was that they refer to individuals, not to features or predicates. With exemplification, we have «a difference of direction» (Goodman 1968: 50) in that the exemplar refers to the predicate, like «car», or the feature of being a car, rather than to any specific car. There is much of interest to be said about exemplification and how it might differ from ordinary representation, but for now it suffices to have the general picture in mind. Goodman's suggestion was that exemplification can partly explain expression, specifically artistic expression, and that is our focus going forward.

2. Expressing as metaphorically exemplifying

In its most basic sense, expressing is pressing out, and so similar to extruding, exuding, and expelling. More figuratively, the term captures a way of showing one's mental states. Crying is a way of

expressing sadness, and saying «I believe it is 2am» expresses a belief about the time. Core cases of expression in this sense all involve a kind of success. Just as something cannot exude what it doesn't possess, you cannot express sadness, or a belief about the time, unless you have such mental states. Indeed, exemplary cases of expression are often things people do outside of their conscious control. You jump and scream when you are startled, or the pain contorts your face. When communicating, acts like saying «I believe it is 2am» or even crying, in the right contexts, are under our control, and thus open to being used to misdirect. You put on a contrite face, though you aren't sorry, or dissemble when saying it's 2am so the guests will think they have overstayed and leave. A major challenge for any account of expression in this communicative sense is accommodating this disconnect between possession and expression that is absent from unintentional cases (Kulvicki 2008).

Yet farther out one finds artistic expression. The symphony expresses sadness, the painting foreboding, a poem joy. We might express foreboding without feeling any such thing, but paintings *never* feel that way, symphonies are never sad, or poems joyful, at least not literally. Such artifacts have no feelings. But they are artifacts, and so products of intentional, communicative impulses of their makers.

Some have sought to explain artistic expression as one might explain expressions like the utterance «I think it's 2am.» They are products of makers, and as such they are akin to the outward signs of inner states like utterances and facial contortions (Tolstoy 1996; Croce 1922, Collingwood 1938). Goodman had many reasons for being unhappy with that suggestion, and the weight of the literature has been on his side (see, e.g. Langer 1953; Beardsley 1958; Hampshire 1971; Stecker 1984; Vermazen 1986; Davis 2003; Abell 2013). This simplest of accounts, according to which artifacts can be extensions of an individual's expressive apparatuses, is deeply unpopular.

Goodman suggested that artistic expression is a kind of symbolization, one that works on a model derived from exemplification. When an expression seems apt despite literal inaptness it might be being used metaphorically. The symphony is not literally sad, but perhaps metaphorically so. When such features are noticed, an artifact «highlights, underscores, displays, or conveys» those features, as Elgin

(2002: 7) put it. In that sense, perhaps the artwork exemplifies sadness, joy, or a sense of foreboding, though not literally. For Goodman,

What is expressed is metaphorically exemplified. What expresses sadness is metaphorically sad. And what is metaphorically sad is actually, but not literally sad, *i.e.*, comes under a transferred application of some label coextensive with «sad».

Thus what is expressed is possessed, and what a face or picture expresses need not (but may) be emotions or ideas the actor or artist has, or those he wants to convey, or thoughts or feelings of the viewer or of a person depicted... (Goodman 1968, 85)

The poem is not literally joyful. How could it be? Somehow, it seems joyful, though. Perhaps, then, it is metaphorically joyful, and to the extent that it calls attention to that fact about itself, the poem exemplifies joy. Being metaphorically joyful is being «actually, but not literally» joyful, and this is why it seems apt to say that the poem exemplifies joy.

Possession plus reference is the formula for exemplification. Metaphor is a kind of use, and so available for any term or phrase (see, e.g. Stern 2000, Camp 2006). Literal uses of «exemplification» impute literal possession of features and literal reference to them. That suggests that there are three ways to use «exemplification» metaphorically. The artifact «metaphorically possesses and literally refers, literally possesses and metaphorically refers, or metaphorically possesses and metaphorically refers».

Goodman only considers the first of these, but the others raise interesting questions. Are all three candidates for being accounts of artistic expression? Do we have a disjunctive account, or do these options compete? It's easy to suggest that the second is a non-starter, since so many cases of artistic expression lack literal possession. But that isn't enough to reject the option as part of an account of expression, if we can make sense of metaphorical reference. And does noticing this reveal any shortcomings or virtues of Goodman's attempt to unpack expression as a kind of symbolization?

3. Using «reference» metaphorically

When an expression is used metaphorically, «a term with an extension established by habit is applied elsewhere under the influence of that habit; there is both departure from and deference to precedent.» (Goodman 1968, 71) A term, with its own norms for literal use, is deployed in a new manner. The new deployment is at odds with the norms for literal use, but is nevertheless apt. This kind of thing works when the ordinary use relates to, and influences, the new one.

Unlike «hot», «high», and «heavy», we don't use «reference» much metaphorically. Perhaps that's because it's a borderline technical term. It has a life outside the academy, but it's not a particularly rich one. The clearest candidates for metaphorical uses of «reference» are natural scenes. Patterns of rocks and trees have no particular intentionality about them, though they often seem apt patients for such expressions. These scenes are, metaphorically, intentional, they metaphorically refer, lead, guide, or suggest.

Flowers and shadows point at the sun, and thus indicate its location in the sky. The moss grows on the shady side of the tree, suggesting a northern exposure, to those wandering the northern woods. Trees turn to scrub as one ascends the mountain. These are cases of what Paul Grice (1957, 378) called «natural meaning» and Fred Dretske (1981) called «indication». Indication involves a relatively stable natural regularity, so, from the presence of scrub and lack of tall trees one can infer a high elevation. They are apt targets for metaphorical uses of what Goodman called «representation», which is a kind of reference. They are perhaps not literal examples of representation, but they are actual, metaphorical examples of it. And many, like Dretske (1981), Millikan (1984), Fodor (1987) and others, have suggested that indication might also be a tool for explaining genuine intentionality.

Exemplification is quite different than the cases just mentioned. Typically, natural meaning is something that relates different states of affairs of different things: the flowers' pointing indicates the sun's location, the trees' heights indicate altitude. With exemplification, something calls attention to some, but not all of its own features. There is no separate state reliably related to the one of interest. Nevertheless,

some natural scenes seem apt targets for metaphorical uses of «reference» in this exemplificatory sense.

Remember that our quarry is examples of metaphorical exemplification that *refer*, metaphorically, because Goodman only seemed to care about those that *possess* the relevant features metaphorically. As we will see, that might be because Goodman spent much more time in art museums than he did in the woods.

4. Expression in nature?

«That's a *white birch!*» The tree sits among other hardwoods, some maples, a beech or two, some birch, and the occasional softwood hemlock or pine. It's older than the other trees here, majestic. Over time, it has grown tall and broad, not bent by wind, burned by lightning, or bulbous with chaga. You are struck by its birchness. You're alone, not leading an arboreal identification class. You are not using the tree as an exemplar. It's as if the forest has just offered this to you. It hasn't. Not literally at least. Nevertheless, it's perfectly apt to call this tree an exemplar of a birch. The tree possesses that feature—it is a birch—and, metaphorically speaking, it refers to that aspect of itself. There is no literal sense in which this tree is an exemplar of being a birch, even though it is, literally, a birch, because the tree doesn't symbolize anything at all. This is a case of metaphorical exemplification, but not one that's due to possessing the feature metaphorically.

Further on, you spy a rock outcrop beside a dying coppiced oak. The scene is melancholic. Like the birch before, this scene is just part of nature. It's not aimed at telling you anything, and if it has feelings at all they are nothing like what you take melancholy to be. None of that interferes with the scene being melancholic, metaphorically speaking. Since it's just a natural scene, though, it's not aimed at highlighting that feature about itself, either. Yes, this natural scene might reliably occasion associations to sadness or sad things, but that is not the same thing as referring. In this case, the scene metaphorically possesses the relevant feature, and metaphorically refers to it.

To the extent that reference is something done by agents and their artifacts, these natural examples reflect metaphorical extensions of

«reference» to a different domain. These are cases of metaphorical exemplification that Goodman never discussed. Are they cases of expression? Something else? What does this mean for Goodman's account of expression as metaphorical exemplification?

A birch calling attention to its birchness doesn't seem like a case of the birch expressing anything, metaphorically or otherwise. It does seem like exemplification, though. Like the birch, a tailor's swatch doesn't seem to express anything about its identity, even though it exemplifies a number of its features. Goodman thought that many cases of exemplification were not expression, so in that sense this is no surprise. The problem is that this case involves metaphorical exemplification that isn't expression. It's possible this misses Goodman's point. Perhaps all cases of artistic expression are cases of metaphorical exemplification, though not all cases of the latter count as the former. We will see some worries about that weaker claim presently.

By contrast, the sad forest scene is expressive. Standing before the rocks and oak, you're struck by the way it seems sad. This is very much like what happens when encountering a sad painting. Whatever one's preferred account of expression, these cases clearly seem like examples of the phenomenon, with an interesting twist: if there is reference involved it can't be in the literal sense one has in mind when talking about intentionally produced artifacts. With paintings, poems and symphonies, we have literal reference, but scenes in nature aren't built with any communicative intention at all. Nevertheless, both fall under the banner of expression (though see Vermazen 1986, 204–205 for a contrary view).

Perhaps the sad forest vindicates Goodman's approach. The two cases that seem like expression are those in which possession is metaphorical, after all. In one—the poem is joyful—reference is literal, while in the other—the forest is sad—it is metaphorical. Reference's status might be less important than possession's. Another trip through the forest undermines this suggestion.

The oaks in this part of the woods are wilted, drooping. Leaves that should be green are turning brown, some with yellowish spots. Hen-of-the-woods dot the forest floor. This old stand of trees seems ill. It is. You can't see the illness, *per se*. The fungi are rotting the trees' heartwood, and viruses have infected their living tissue. You see spots, drooping

leaves, and mushrooms. Like facial expressions, these signs suggest inner turmoil, and in that sense they are expressive. Forest patches don't refer to anything, at least not in the sense sketched here. In this case, however, it seems like the forest is pointing out its own maladies, so it is reasonable, if not literally true, to say that it expresses something about its state of health. By contrast, the vibrantly green, upright stand of trees some way down the hill speaks volumes about its health.

Healthy and unhealthy stands of trees are examples of metaphorical exemplification. The exemplification is metaphorical not because the trees only metaphorically possess health, or illness. They are literally (un)healthy. It's just that they don't literally *refer* to their states of health. Metaphorically, they do. So, we cannot save Goodman's proposal by claiming that all convincing examples of expression are metaphorical exemplification where possession of the relevant features is metaphorical. Here we have literal possession, metaphorical reference, and expression.

Regrouping, the Goodmanciac might suggest that all cases of metaphorical possession plus literal or metaphorical reference count as cases of expression. But the forest defeats this proposal too. Hedgehogs are literally prickly, but they are not metaphorically prickly, being docile, approachable, and adorable. Prickliness in the metaphorical sense is incompatible with that. Eastern prickly pear cacti and porcupines, by contrast, are both literally and metaphorically prickly. The spikes on their surfaces make any approach ill-advised. In the porcupine's case, this is also reflected in its attitude should you get too close.

On your way out of the forest you encounter a dense bush of prickly pear beside a surly porcupine. The spikes are literally prickly, but they call attention to the figurative prickliness of the situation as well. This scene is metaphorically prickly—Stay away, asshole!—and it metaphorically refers to that fact about itself. Nevertheless, the cactus doesn't seem to be expressing this fact about itself. It is prickly, and it calls attention to that fact about itself, but this is not an expression of prickliness. The porcupine is a better candidate for expressing something because in that case the prickliness is partly an attitude accompanying the quills. A cactus's spikes are almost wholly constitutive of its metaphorical prickliness, while porcupine quills are only partly constitutive of it.

Perhaps the cacti look as they do for evolutionary reasons. Better to be prickly and seem that way, than to be prickly and hide it away! Perhaps, then, the cacti literally refer to their metaphorical prickliness. Even if that's true, the cacti don't seem terribly expressive. And if you want metaphorical reference paired with metaphorical possession, imagine yourself atop a glacier, surrounded by shards of forbidding ice and dangerous crevasses. The scene is literally prickly but also metaphorically so. Unlike the cacti, glaciers aren't in the business of referring to anything, so any reference is at best metaphorical. Neither cacti nor glaciers seem expressive, but they both plausibly metaphorically exemplify prickliness.

Goodman's proposal is that exemplification happens when something possesses a feature, but also calls attention to it. Artistic expression is metaphorical exemplification, in which something fails to literally possess a feature, but metaphorically possesses it, while also literally referring to it. But metaphorical exemplification has three manifestations, corresponding to whether possession and reference are literal or metaphorical. In all three cases, we have examples that seem to count as expressive, and those that do not. This strongly suggests that Goodman was missing something.

Past criticisms of Goodman have suggested his account does more to change the subject than to offer an account of expression, but they also suggest he goes wrong because of how he untethers expression from its human counterpart, based on the expression of mental states. The worries sketched here have little to do with those criticisms, and that's perhaps a good thing. In my opinion (Kulvicki 2008), it's a bad idea to tie artistic expression too closely to the expression of emotions in humans, except to the extent that the two share a structure. The next section considers whether there is a way to work with Goodman's preferred tools that yields a convincing account of artistic expression.

5. Rethinking expression

The previous section's lesson is that metaphorical exemplification might be too blunt an instrument to account for expression. Possession and reference, metaphorical and literal, do not sort the space of options

in a manner that corresponds neatly to the phenomenon of interest. It can help to present the examples in a grid.

| | Literal Possession | Metaphorical Possession |
|-------------------------------|---|--|
| Literal Reference | Mournful face. (E) Tailor's swatch. (~E) | Joyful symphony. (E) Prickly pear. (~E) |
| Metaphorical Reference | Healthy forest. (E) That's a birch! (~E) | Sad forest. (E) Prickly glacier. (~E) |

Each cell contains an example that is expressive (E), and one that is not (~E). Perhaps the distinctions between kinds of reference and possession are just not up to the task of explaining expression, and we need to start our quest anew. Another, less radical response suggests that this table is accurate, but incomplete. Perhaps there is another distinction, another dimension, that this graph collapses. Adding it might leave us with a plausible account of expression.

Expressive and non-expressive examples in the chart all track a distinction between surface and depth. The tailor's swatch exemplifies, but it doesn't express. It also exemplifies features readily available to appropriately positioned observers. We see the weave and color, feel the texture and weight. We see the mournful face too, but mournfulness sits at one remove from the facial features we notice. They aren't simply identifiable with mournfulness, so much as indicative of it, and this stands even if, as William James (1884/1983) suggested, these expressions partly constitute the state. We find a similar situation with the sad forest and prickly glacier. The oak and stones seem sad, but because of their colors, shapes, organization, lighting, and so on. Sadness is not so much manifest as one step away from what's noticed most directly. Not so for the prickly glacier or prickly pear, in either its metaphorical or literal senses. Yes, it's a forbidding place, but the shards and crevasses constitute its prickly nature, literally and figuratively.

We can say, of the glacier and tailor's swatch, that they indicate their features, just as the sad forest and mournful face do, but that comparison is strained. Features of the forest and face seem to indicate that they are sad or mournful, while not seeming (wholly) constitutive of sadness or mournfulness. They are signs of something else. The swatch

and glacier, by contrast, don't seem to indicate anything about themselves because the features we notice just are what they call attention to, they are not signs in any interesting sense.

So far, the proposal invokes, vaguely, some epistemological distinction between immediate and mediated perception as well as metaphysically heavy talk of constitution. The point is not to establish any claims about how we should understand these distinctions. For example, it might turn out that certain ways of organizing a face are constitutive of being in a mournful state. It's doubtful that they are completely constitutive of such states, but perhaps partly. The point is that we understand turns of face to be indicative of mental states, and not simply identical to them. Likewise, it might turn out that there is no stable distinction between immediately perceiving the shapes and colors of tree and stone, and mediately perceiving, or noticing, something like sadness. What matters for present purposes is that there is an identifiable set of features, like shapes, colors, and the like, that we understand ourselves to perceive in a manner distinct from how we perceive sadness. We might later decide that there is no stable ground from which to defend that distinction. But we would still have a distinction in apparent immediacy to lean on in describing how we understand the world. It's important to try and understand constitution, immediate perception, mediated seeing, and the like. How we understand these will affect how we ultimately describe this or that case. But for present purposes the point is that these apparent distinctions seem important to understanding the difference between cases of exemplification that count as expressive, and those that do not.

We have, so far, focused on cases that are completely literal – mournful face, tailor's swatch – and those that are completely metaphorical – sad forest, prickly glacier. Now let's consider the graph's mixed diagonal. It's plausible that I cannot just see that something is a birch, since being a birch is partly being included in an evolutionary lineage. The bark and leaves are merely, one might say, signs of ancestry. But when it comes to identifying trees out in the wild, things don't work that way. We take the bark and leaves to be much more closely aligned with kind than a philosopher might suggest. That's why we are reluctant to say that the birch exemplar is expressive. Yes, it calls attention to the fact that it is a birch. It's an exemplar! But we don't

treat those features as indicative of kind membership, so much as constitutive of it. This differs a lot from how we understand a tree's health in light of features it presents to us. The mushrooms, the spots of blight, are understood more as symptoms, signs, of an unhealthy state. As a matter of fact, leaf shape and bark type might be as much signs of species membership as mushrooms and spots are of unhealthiness. But we don't treat them that way, and this is important for whether we take the cases in the lower left quarter to be expressive or not.

The same is true for the upper right. A joyful symphony seems to indicate that about itself. Its joy is obvious, but not quite manifest. The pattern of notes and orchestration indicates joy, just as a facial expression might. Hence, the symphony is understood as being expressive. But the prickly pear works differently. Yes, it is forbidding, and in that sense metaphorically prickly. But the spikes are what constitute its forbidding nature. There is nothing else to know about them. They aren't signs of some further state of affairs. And hence they don't so much seem expressive, as constitutive of the relevant state. The cactus metaphorically exemplifies prickliness, without expressing it. Porcupines are another thing altogether, since the spikes pair with an attitude that distinguishes them from docile hedgehogs. Animal spikes are only partly constitutive of the prickliness that they might express.

All of this shows why Goodman had the right idea focusing on metaphorical possession, even while showing how his account missed the mark. When something only possesses a feature metaphorically, it is very difficult to imagine perceiving that feature, as it were, on its surface. Cases of metaphorical exemplification where the possession is only metaphorical lend themselves to seeming expressive, because they manifest the surface/depth distinction sketched here. And it is plausible, as we will see, that expression involves a kind of exemplification.

This section started by asking whether some third dimension might distinguish the expressive from the non-expressive cases in the graph. The tentative answer is yes. The difference amounts to one in which what is exemplified, metaphorically or not, is exemplified via something akin to signs for something else. It's not far off to say that expression is exemplification, metaphorical or otherwise, by proxy.

6. Exemplification by proxy

Exemplification, we are told, amounts to the right combination of possession and reference:

x is P and x refers to P.

Metaphorical exemplification happens when either possession, or reference, is metaphorical:

x is, metaphorically, P and x refers to P,
 x is, metaphorically, P, and x refers, metaphorically, to P, or
 x is P and x refers, metaphorically, to P.

A proxy is one of many mechanisms by which something might refer to one or more of its features.

Someone is sad, and their face tells that story. The individual exemplifies sadness, their features call attention to that aspect of themselves. But there are intermediaries. The mouth, eyes, cheeks, and so on, are what speak to someone's disposition, but they are not simply identifiable with sadness. The individual expresses sadness because they exemplify sadness by proxy. The poem is joyful in that everything from the turns of phrase to the organization of lines seems that way. But, again, this is exemplification by proxy. The turns of phrase are not so much constitutive of joy as signs of it, even if they are only metaphorically so. When that which is exemplified comes closer to the surface, when there is no proxy apparent, we tend to see less expression, *per se*, and more simple exemplification, whether it be literal or metaphorical.

Significantly, cases of exemplification *by proxy* tend not to exemplify the proxies. Yes, the face has a certain set of features, and in theory those features could be exemplified by a face. But in this case the features indicate a sad state of mind, and it is the state of mind that is exemplified by the face, even though the features offer our only access to it. Oftentimes, and perhaps in the easiest cases, the relationship between the proxy and the thing expressed is indication, or something closely related to it. In other cases, one of which is described below,

the connection can be largely conventional. Exemplification by proxy happens when some perceptible aspects of an object play the role of calling attention to some of its other features. They are not, in and of themselves, important except in this proxy role.

Contrast an expression of sadness with a set of sad faces being used to teach people about human expression of emotion. Five actors are brought in to show the class varieties of grief. In this case, the actors exemplify facial features, rather than what those looks typically stand proxy for.

Let's reconsider the ur-example of exemplification in light of this. The tailor's swatch exemplifies features like pattern, texture, color and weave. It's not expressive because no proxies are involved. Now, in addition to being of a certain texture, weave, pattern, and color, the swatch is Harris tweed. This signals an origin, a source, and a set of artisans. The swatch possesses all of those features: the wool comes from sheep and is shaped by hands in the Outer Hebrides. Does the swatch exemplify being Harris tweed? It complicated!

On the one hand, this might work like the birch. If, like white birch, Harris tweed has a simple and readily available set of features that set it off from others—it sort of does, and in the past it certainly did—then one might take being such a fabric to be readily perceptually available, and thus no proxy is needed. I can tell true Harris tweed when I see it! If, by contrast, Harris Tweed is more or less indistinguishable from other types of fabric, from different parts of the world, or those who might use the swatch are generally ignorant of Harris tweed's distinctive features, then it would have trouble calling attention to that fact about itself at all, without some help.

A label, affixed to the sample, can play an expressive role. In this context the label is a way for the sample to indicate something about itself, something not obvious upon inspection, and in that sense having the depth required for expression. That's a case in which it seems like the tailor's swatch is expressive as well as exemplificatory. The words «Harris tweed» are the proxy for being Harris tweed. In a similar fashion, the word «Fragile» can be expressive of fragility when written on the side of a box (see Kulvicki 2008, 92). Not only is this an example of expression, it's a very conventional one. Labelling is not the same as crafting sentences. It is recruiting a piece

of language to play an expressive role, by putting it in the right relation to a sample. This use is distinct from one in which one points at the sample and utters «Harris tweed!». It's as though the sample is telling us something about itself. Like all cases of exemplification by proxy, the labelled swatch doesn't exemplify the curves in the letters that write out «Harris tweed». The proxy isn't exemplified, though the kind of fabric it indicates is.

When exemplifying by proxy, features of a thing call attention to, highlight, refer to some of its other features. Typically, those features referred to in this way are not perceptually available except through something like a proxy. The red square might exemplify redness, but it doesn't exemplify it by proxy, and so it is not expressive of redness. Affix a tag, «red!», to the square, and it still fails to express redness. The redness to which attention is called is too much on the surface, whereas what expression seeks is at some depth.

Conclusion

Goodman's identification of expression with metaphorical exemplification is problematic but also insightful. Past critics focused on raising worries sufficient to let them put Goodman's account to one side and try something completely different. Here, the hope was to take Goodman more seriously, and try to see what one might harvest from such a rich account.

Expression seems non-trivially related to exemplification, and it is plausible that exemplification is a kind of symbolization. The formula for exemplification – possession plus reference – yields a palette of options once we realize that both «possession» and «reference» can be used metaphorically. For Goodman, artistic expression involved metaphorical exemplification, but he only focused on one kind, that in which something metaphorically possesses but literally refers to some feature. That was unfortunate, even if it was understandable.

Broadening our scope to consider other varieties of metaphorical exemplification shows that (1) all variations in the graph allow for cases of expression, but (2) also allow for cases that are not expressive. So, a simple identification of expression with metaphorical exemplification

is off the table. In all such cases one can find examples of expression, but all such cases admit examples that are not expressive. What Goodman seems to have missed is that expression involves not just exemplification, metaphorical or otherwise, but also proxies. Once the distinction between exemplification by proxy and more direct kinds of exemplification is on the table, we get a nice way to sort cases of exemplification that are expressive from those that are not.

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