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Education privatisation in sub-Saharan Africa: agendas, policies and trends

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Rui da Silva, Theresa Adrião, Thibaut Lauwerier and Rita Locatelli

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EDUCATION PRIVATISATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: AGENDAS, POLICIES AND TRENDS

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Introduction □

Rui da Silva¹, Theresa Adrião², Thibaut Lauwerier³ & Rita Locatelli⁴

Education, and particularly the provision of quality education, has been at the forefront of global development agendas for the last thirty years, becoming a priority for governments, bilateral, multilateral, and civil society organisations.

The growing demand for more diversified educational opportunities and the failure of governments to provide quality education for all citizens in the context of increasing educational demand have been considered two driving forces behind the expansion of education privatisation, a phenomenon which has gained increasing attention in development discourse and research. The private sector has always been involved in education, with families, religious institutions and philanthropic organizations playing an important role in its funding and provision. However, current forms of privatisation, which have emerged as a result of the acceleration of globalisation and of the expansion of the neo-liberal ideology, have led to a greater market involvement in the sector (Rizvi 2016). In this context, international and regional organisations have been playing an active role in building a global education architecture and in promoting the emergence of a global education policy space (e.g. Hill 2003; Ball, Junemann, and Santori 2017; Verger, Fontdevila, and Zancajo 2016). This global architecture, however, includes a myriad of organisations that interconnect agendas inspired by contrasting principles, such as freedom choice or education as a right, which may have a significant impact on the expansion of policies promoting privatisation (Adrião 2018; Antoni Verger, Fontdevila, and Zancajo 2016).

Privatisation *of* education has been defined as an increase in the ownership of education by ‘external actors’, increasing the proportion of private actors involved in an education system. There is also privatisation *in* education, which corresponds to introducing methods, principles, and approaches from the market sector into education (Ball and Youdell 2008). At the same time, reference can be made to the commodification of education, which involves the transformation of education into a

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market product that generates profits (Verger, Fontdevila, and Zancajo 2016; Verger, Novelli, and Altinyelken 2018; Lubienski, Yemini, and Maxwell 2022).

For this book, we share the perspective of Belfield & Levin (2004) regarding education privatisation, who analysed how this phenomenon has been occurring in the United States. For the authors, privatisation:

Is an umbrella term referring to many different educational programmes and policies. As an overall definition, ‘privatization is the transfer of activities, assets and responsibilities from government/public institutions and organizations to private individuals and agencies’. Also, privatization is often thought of as ‘liberalization’ – where agents are freed from government regulations, or as ‘marketization’ – where new markets are created as alternatives to government services or state allocation systems. (2004, p.19)

Globally, education privatisation arises in different forms, such as low-fee private schooling, public-private and multiple stakeholder partnerships, supplemental private tutoring (shadow education), school vouchers, and targeted subsidies which enable private or government-assisted private school choice.

This book examines the phenomenon of education privatisation with a particular focus on sub-Saharan Africa. Although much has been written about education privatisation in this region, this book aims to contribute to filling the gap concerning the several factors and rationales, as well as the different forms in which non-state actor (UNESCO 2021) or ‘external actors’ (Lubienski, Yemini, and Maxwell 2022) have been involved in education in sub-Saharan Africa. We also pay particular attention to education privatisation in this specific region by focusing on Francophone and Lusophone countries which have so far been underrepresented in Comparative and International Education literature, particularly in English. Although there has been a general increase in privatisation, in addition to the lack of literature in these regions, research has shown that the available data is not sufficiently reliable or exhaustive to provide an in-depth understanding of this phenomenon (ReFPE, 2022). Hence the need for new knowledge about this part of the world. This is what our book sets out to achieve.

The effort to bring authors who are non-native English speakers has been challenging. This process increases time and effort in reading and writing in English and often dissuades the authors from accepting to participate in these types of projects.

English is the first language of only one author who contributed to the book. In some cases, the mother tongue of the authors is different from the official language of the countries they are nationals of. Considering this challenge and English as lingua

franca, as editors, we have worked to make English accessible, but decided to leave some unusual but informative, conceptualisations unedited. Consequently, language constructions may seem peculiar to those for whom English is their first language. However, these are instructive conceptualisations and promotes diversity and a more equitable participation. It also promotes the author's and readers' appropriation of English as a lingua franca.

The collection is comprised of eight chapters, which examine different forms of approaching education privatisation phenomenon and the role of non-state actors in education in different parts of the African continent. It is organised in three main parts: the editors' introduction and concluding chapters and the guest authors' eight chapters. The Introduction sets out the aim and scope of the book and a summary of the chapters to follow. The Conclusion outlines the key themes emerging across the chapters and the gap it intends to fill.

In Chapter 1, Rui da Silva and Theresa Adrião sought to map the research terrain around education privatisation in sub-Saharan Africa. Based in a search in academic databases from 1990-2020 the chapter shows that there is clearly a split between pro and con education privatisation articles, with a more persuasive critical analysis of this phenomenon.

Mark Bray (Chapter 2) focuses on private supplementary tutoring in sub-Saharan Africa, widely called shadow education. The chapter examines this phenomenon, focusing in particular on fee-charging provision, emphasizing common points with other regions in the world but also the sub-Saharan Africa specific drivers.

Then, Chapter 3, by Anna Cristina D'Addio examine the role of non-state actors in early childhood education and care using indicators from the countries Profiles Enhancing Education Reviews (PEER profiles) on non-state actors in education and other indicators from the World Inequality Database on Education database and the Global Education Monitoring Report. The author prides a bird's-eye view concerning the issues on provision, governance, and regulation in early childhood education and care.

Chapters 4 to 8 take up a particular look of this phenomenon in different countries examine more closely the education privatisation phenomenon. The first of these chapters, authored by Hilaire Hounkpodoté and Thibaut Lauwerier analyses data from the PASEC2014 and PASEC2019 surveys, which provide data from primary schools in ten Francophone African countries. Through a comparative analysis of PASEC data the authors contribute to the understanding of the dynamics of education privatisation from the perspective of education quality in Francophone Africa.

Alberto Nguluve and Isaac Paxé (Chapter 5) examine Angolan private higher education expansion after the 27 year civil war in 2002 highlighting the blurred line between the private and public, where private actors are simultaneously public managers. Also concerning Angola, Chocolate Adão Brás and Camila Maria Bortot (Chapter 6) examine the teacher training programme in Angola and how this programme introduced in a mercantile rationality in Angola. The chapter shed light how a teacher training programme promoted endogenous privatisation, and a technical rationality in the education system in Angola.

Virginie Briand, Sabine Kube-Barth and Mathilde Nicolai (Chapter 7) examine the impact of the major non-state actors in education delivery and quality on Democratic Republic of Congo. The authors problematize the rise of low fees private schools in the country, especially in densely populated urban and peri-urban areas. Chapter 8, by Marie-France Lange provides us with an interesting account of education privatisation in Burkina Faso and the challenges pose by this phenomenon to the country inequalities in access to education and academic achievement.

In the final chapter of this book (Chapter 9), Abdel Rahamane Baba Moussa presents the conclusions of this book with an analytical overview and also a thoughtful reflection on the need to rethink the governance of education systems and, in particular, the relationship between public authorities and the private sector.

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Trends of education privatisation research in sub-Saharan Africa from 1990 to 2020 ☐

Rui da Silva⁵ & Theresa Adrião⁶

Introduction

Published studies make it possible to map the research terrain and can indicate the interests and priorities of scholars and funding agencies. They can also express the intensity with which a given phenomenon is observed in time and place. Surveying published articles has long tradition in comparative and international education. Several different methodologies or analytical approaches are used to survey published articles, although the strategy is common, i.e., to determine emphasis on scholarship and to review what scholars have published (Foster, Addy, and Samoff 2012; Davidson et al. 2020; Wiseman Alexander, Davidson Petrina, and Stevens-Taylor 2016). Our approach was to review peer-reviewed publications that were published between 1990 and 2020 concerning education privatisation in sub-Saharan Africa. To this end, we used three databases: ISI of Web Knowledge, Web of Science (WoS) and Scielo.

Education privatisation was selected for this study taking into consideration that education plays a key role in global agendas, is a human right and is increasingly becoming a field for doing business (Adrião 2018; Belfield and Levin 2004; Klees 2008; Verger, Fontdevila, and Zancajo 2016).

The paper draws on a corpus of documents characterised as existing data published between 1990 and 2020. It starts in the year the Jomtien World Declaration on Education for All (1990) was launched and follows through 2020. In this way, it encompasses the three main international education agendas from the last 30 years – the Jomtien World Declaration on Education for All, the Dakar Framework for Action: Education for All: Meeting Our Collective Commitments (2000), and the Education 2030: Incheon Declaration (2015).

The article is organised in three main parts. Following these introductory notes, it first provides an overview of the issues involved in education privatisation, followed by methodology and data. Following this overview, we explore the data according to

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thematic focus (keywords), research design and source of research funding. The third and final part presents the concluding reflections.

1. Education between the public and the private

Education, and in particular the quality of education, has cut across educational agendas in the last 30 years. In this way, education has been elected as a priority by bilateral, multilateral and civil society organizations (e.g., UNICEF, World Bank, Save the Children, Plan International, NORAD, Global Partnership for Education). These organizations have been actively engaged in building a global education architecture and promoting the emergence of global education policy space (Verger, Novelli, and Altinyelken 2018; Klees 2012). This global architecture includes a myriad of organisations that can interconnect several agendas, such as choice, freedom, and education as a right. In this way, several actors' for-profit schools can contribute to objectives such as access to education for the poor or quality education for all through internationally defined educational benchmarks (Verger, Steiner-Khamisi, and Lubienski 2017; Klees 2012).

In this context educational political space resembles a marketplace of ideas with the participation of various actors in three dimensions – education management, educational provision and curriculum (Mundy et al. 2016; Adrião 2018). This marketplace of ideas advances the rise of education privatisation in discourses and practices. This leads to global actors from outside the countries setting agendas and priorities, particularly for countries that are more peripheral or in the Global South (Verger, Novelli, and Altinyelken 2012; Robertson 2012; Verger, Novelli, and Altinyelken 2018). However, this influence should not be viewed from a simplistic approach. This stems from the fact that national actors, even from the most vulnerable and peripheral countries, are not passive, acting at the same time as creators and interpreters (George and Lewis 2011; Le Grange 2013; Kassaye 2013).

Taking this into consideration we can conclude that education privatisation is a multifaceted and contingent phenomenon. Education privatisation can also be characterised as a process of social transformation and not only of reform. (Robertson and Dale 2013, 432; Verger, Fontdevila, and Zancajo 2016; Ball 2007). Also relevant for our analysis are the two main types of education privatisation proposed by Ball and Youdell (2008): 1) privatisation of public education, or “exogenous” privatisation; 2) privatisation in public education, or “endogenous” privatisation.

In the Global South we are seeing a transition from a *de facto* privatisation strategy to a strategy by design⁷. This is happening because initiatives by individuals or communities, such as low-cost schools or community schools, are being incorporated into national strategies and in transnational networks (Srivastava 2010). These strategies are developed by individuals or communities to overcome the absence of public education or to address the provision of inadequate public education.

For the purpose of this paper, we share the perspective of Belfield & Levin (2004) regarding education privatisation when the authors examine the ways in which this phenomenon has been occurring in the United States. For these authors, education privatisation:

“is an umbrella term referring to many different educational programmes and policies. As an overall definition, ‘privatization is the transfer of activities, assets and responsibilities from government/public institutions and organizations to private individuals and agencies.’ Also, privatization is often thought of as ‘liberalization’ – where agents are freed from government regulations, or as ‘marketization’ – where new markets are created as alternatives to government services or state allocation systems.” (2004, p.19)

2. Methods and data

This study is a qualitative time-series analysis of articles concerning education privatisation in sub-Saharan Africa published between 1990 and 2020, found in three databases. In order to identify relevant studies, we conducted a systematic search of publications in three databases using key words in English, French, Portuguese and Spanish: ISI Web of Knowledge, Web of Science (WoS) Scielo and in the Réseau de Recherche Francophone sur la Privatisation de l'Éducation (ReFPE). We included the Scielo and ReFPE databases because 95.4% of the literature present in the WoS in 2019 are in English (Vera-Baceta, Thelwall, and Kousha 2019). We used the research protocol defined by Adrião (2018)⁸. We only reviewed publications that were published after peer-review, and we did not perform a meta-analysis of the articles. The search in the databases takes into consideration the publications' title,

⁷ *de facto* privatisation means that education privatisation is a process apparently unrelated to public policy and privatisation *by design* occurs when public authorities proactively promote education privatisation and implement explicit measures (Verger; Fontdevila; Zancajo, 2016).

⁸ The database search was conducted by the research assistant Andrey Mori following the research protocol supervised by the authors.

abstract and keywords. The keywords used in the databases were financing, public-private partnership, co-management; aid or subvention; cooperative; privatisation, charter, and choice interconnected with the words school, basic, secondary, primary, elementary or compulsory.

To examine the results of the search in the databases, the research team collected information through the following coding process: study title, author(s), publication date, author affiliation, publication type and name, abstract, funding agency, method(s), factors under study, countries under study and main results/conclusions.

The results of the database screening following the above criteria resulted in the inclusion of 54 studies in this review, as shown in table 1. The 54 studies from this review were submitted to an in-depth analysis to map the terrain.

The articles were written in English (44), French (9) and Portuguese (1). The research methods used were varied, with the predominance of a qualitative approach (27) followed by a quantitative approach (14), a mixed methods approach (12), and other (1) (table 2). The classification of the studies' methodology posed some challenges to the research team. The studies were coded as quantitative, qualitative, or mixed methods when they included an explicit acknowledgement or outline of their research strategies, or when it was possible to identify their research strategies from the methods section. The articles whose research strategies could not be identified were classified as other.

Overall, only 10 out of 54 studies reported having received support from the following organisations: National Academy of Education/Spencer Foundation; University of Massachusetts Boston; Privatisation in Education Research Initiative (PERI) of the Open Society Foundations (OSF) PERI; Canada's Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council; Centre of Sustainable Livelihoods, Vaal University of Technology; Tiger Brands Foundation; John Templeton Foundation; Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Japan; Japan Society for the Promotion of Science; and Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research (KAKENHI).

Table 1 – Studies distributed by keywords

Charter	(Verger, Steiner-Khamisi, and Lubieniski 2017; Feldman 2020)
Choice	(Härmä 2016a; Gastineau <i>et al.</i> 2015; Hunter 2015; Sakaue 2018; Baum, Abdul-Hamid, and Wesley 2018; Zuilkowski <i>et al.</i> 2018; Longfield and Tooley 2017; Ayling 2017; Ndimande 2006; Härmä 2016b; Uba and Nwoga 2016; Mayengo, Namusoke, and Dennis 2015; Baum and Riley 2019; Sabates <i>et al.</i> 2019; Gulson and Fataar 2011; Ndimande 2012; Hill 2016; Humble and Dixon 2017; Maistry and Africa 2020)
Financing	(Menashy and Dryden-Peterson 2015; Mestry and Bodalina 2015; Boateng 2014; Daly, Mbenga, and Camara 2016; Gbreyesus 2017; Ron Balsera, Klees, and Archer 2018; Turrent and Oketch 2009; Crabbe 1999; Mestry 2016; Motala 2014; Silva 2018; Languille 2019; Arestoff and Antoine 2001)
Public-private partnership	(Wokadala and Barungi 2015; Hochfeld <i>et al.</i> 2016; Edwards, Klees, and Wildish 2017; Kolade 2019; d'Aiglepierre and Bauer 2016)
Privatisation	(Zeitlyn <i>et al.</i> 2015; Klees 2018; Aubry and Dorsi 2016; Roos 2004; Edwards Jr, Okitsu, and Mwanza 2019; Tessitore 2019; Offutt-Chaney 2019; Baum, Cooper, and Lusk-Stover 2018; Zamblé and N'guessan 2019; Balonga and Ziavoula 2005; Lanoue 2004; Guth 2004; Lanoue 2003; Erny 2004; N'Guessan and Zamble 2020; Calvès, Kobiané, and N'Bouké 2013; Pilon 2004)

3. Analysis of the articles

The following sections briefly outline the findings of the studies, according to the studies' thematic focus taking into consideration their distribution by the keywords used in the database search.

3.1 Thematic focus

Figure 1 shows the distribution of the reviewed studies by year of publication taking into consideration the keywords. A closer examination indicates that most of

the studies were published after 2015 even though the search time frame was 1990 to 2019. In figure 1 it is also possible to see that in the years before 2015 the keyword financing prevails, followed by choice and privatisation. After 2015 the keywords privatisation, choice and financing stand out.

Figure 1 – Publications by year and keyword 1990 - 2020




Table 2 presents a snapshot of the studies reviewed over the period 1990-2020. Regarding the studies' distribution according to the keywords, the choice studies are the majority at 33% (n = 18) closely followed by privatisation (30%; n=16). There were also 24% (n = 13) focusing on financing, 11% (n = 6) focusing on public-private partnership, and 2% (n = 1) focusing on charter. This indicates that the issues related to choice and privatisation are the main interests and priorities of scholars and funding agencies in the period under analysis. It is also relevant to highlight that in 2004 most of the articles (n=4) are published in French as a special issue in a journal.

When considering the methods used in each study, qualitative methods were used in 27 studies (50%), 14 studies (26%) used quantitative methods, 12 studies (22%) used mixed methods, and 1 study (2%) was classified as other because it was not possible to identify the research strategies used.

Table 2 – Summary data of the studies reviewed (1990 – 2020)


	Count	Per cent
Total number of studies	54	
Focus of the articles (keyword)		
Charter	1	2%
Choice	18	33%
Financing	13	24%
Privatisation	17	31%
Public-private partnership	6	11%
Methods used in the studies		
Qualitative	27	50%
Quantitative	14	26%
Mixed methods	12	22%
Other	1	2%

Figure 2 shows the countries mentioned in the analysed studies. Regarding the studies that focused on a single country and multiple countries reveals that 21 out of 48 countries from sub-Saharan Africa are not mentioned. South Africa appears consistently at the top of the lists ($n = 13$), followed by Uganda and Liberia ($n = 8$). A closer examination, however, reveals that countries such as Burundi, Central African Republic, Comoros, , Eritrea, Guinea, Somalia, Togo, Zimbabwe, Benin, and Mali are only mentioned in articles that provide an overall perspective of sub-Saharan Africa or low-income countries.

3.1.1 Charter

The keyword *charter* produced only one result. The article included in the review is published in a journal and addresses issues related to “the rise and consequences of an emerging global education industry” (Verger, Steiner-Khamisi, and Lubienski 2017, 325). Although the article deals with more generic issues, it is included in this review taking into consideration that the authors use examples from sub-Saharan Africa (Uganda and Liberia). The article highlights that within the global education industry, the notion that for-profit schools can contribute to noble goals, such as providing education to the poorest and most marginalised populations, is problematic.

Figure 2 – Countries referred to in the studies and frequency



The authors argue that low-fee private schools have unusual media coverage at international level. The article also highlights that international development agencies that traditionally support public education now embrace these private solutions.

The article also mentions that charter schools from the United States of America are networking and supporting low-fee private schools in the Global South. These alliances and the consultancy firms work together to standardise educational processes.

This standardisation is a strategy to enable the production of one size fits all products (e.g., materials, curriculum) to promote economies of scale.

3.1.2 Choice

The keyword *choice* includes studies with reference to Burkina Faso, Benin, Comoros, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Mauritania, Kenya, Liberia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, South Africa, and Uganda.

The studies reviewed related to the keyword *choice* point out that the socio-economic conditions of the populations make it impossible for them to choose. This stems from the fact that the private sector is growing due to the lack or insufficiency of government education provision. Nevertheless, the article that mentions data from Nigeria; Côte d'Ivoire; Somalia; Mauritania; Chad; Comoros; Burkina Faso; Gambia and Senegal (d'Aiglepierre and Bauer 2016) analyses the parents' choice concerning Arab-Islamic education. This article gives a different view of choice concerning countries that have most of the populations that are Muslim. This study concludes that parents' main driver to choose Arab-Islamic education is cultural and religious concerns, followed by inadequate facilities and a lack of quality in relation to formal education. However, also highlights that we must consider that each country analysed has very different historical and present circumstances that must be considered.

Overall, the articles that do not mention the Arab-Islamic education point out that business interests will never align with universal access to education. This is particularly true for the most marginalized populations and those living in remote areas. Nevertheless, some of these studies also indicate that the private sector is contributing to universal access to education. This is due to the fact that the private sector is heterogeneous and context specific.

A more detailed analysis of each article allows us to observe nuances in the various countries. This relates to the countries' characteristics and whether the studies are conducted in rural areas, urban areas or in areas with high population density.

In the cases of South Africa (Ndimande 2006; Hunter 2015; Maistry and Africa 2020), Benin (Gastineau et al. 2015), Mozambique (Härmä 2016a) and Uganda (Sakaue 2018) the authors mention that there is no choice. This is because the private sector in education is growing due to the lack or insufficiency of government education provision and the population's socio-economic conditions. Yet, the Nigeria article (Härmä 2016b) states that issues related to population density also play a role in allowing the choice mechanism to work. Nevertheless, other articles from South

Africa (Hill 2016; Ndimande 2012; Gulson and Fataar 2011) indicate that there was choice operating, albeit in an informed and complicated fashion. This is because the choice patterns are aligned with historical patterns of racial inequality and the complex conditions and contradictory elements of education marketization. These factors also develop new patterns of stratification in access to education, preserving educational inequalities in post-apartheid South Africa. In this way school choice in South Africa depends on racism and creates racialization.

The Liberia (Longfield and Tooley 2017; Humble and Dixon 2017), Nigeria (Baum, Abdul-Hamid, and Wesley 2018) and Kenya (Zuilkowski et al. 2018; Baum and Riley 2019) cases indicate that the families are applying choice mechanisms and choosing private schools or faith-based mission schools as opposed to government schools. The authors particularly highlight the case of low-fee private schools in urban areas with high population density. These papers argue that the private sector is substantially contributing to universal access to education in these countries. In this way, the articles advocate that the different governments should support these initiatives.

Taking this into consideration, it is also relevant to highlight that the authors of the Nigeria study (Baum, Abdul-Hamid, and Wesley 2018) advocate the support of the state to private schools. This stems from the fact that the authors consider that when the private sector educates significant parts of the student population the government should ensure that all students have access to quality education. The authors state this based on the assumption that the public schools are inferior in quality or perceived as unsafe. It is also commonly suggested by these articles that parents are active choosers, even when living in difficult circumstances.

The Uganda case (Mayengo, Namusoke, and Dennis 2015) highlights a different perspective concerning choice and the role of the public and private sectors in a country dependent on international development funds. The authors argue that small non-registered private schools provide a strange twist, since this form of privatisation is less tied to capital entrepreneurship than schools that are part of the Ugandan government's Universal Primary Education programme. This is because the government of Uganda is implementing the Universal Primary Education programme with a World Bank loan, thus connecting the government schools to a market economy and a profit-driven business model instead of the private schools.

The Kenya article (Baum and Riley 2019) points in a different direction, indicating that parents favour private schools. The reasons underlying this option are connected to the fact that parents perceive the private sector as being better and Kenyan public

education is constrained in its ability to provide high quality education to all children, since classrooms are crowded, academic resources are dispersed, and teachers' motivation is low.

The Ruanda case (Sabates et al. 2019) explores a different perspective, the impacts of unconditional cash transfers on school-related choices. The study concludes that in this case the unconditional cash transfers did not impact the families' ability to send their children to school. Thus, the authors point out that the unconditional cash transfers supported the students that were already in school and did not impact the most marginalized children that were not in school.

3.1.3 Financing

In this theme we find articles that deal globally with sub-Saharan African countries and articles with a particular focus on Cape Verde, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda in issues related financing/ funding.

The articles that deal with sub-Saharan African countries more broadly (Turrent and Oketch 2009; Menashy and Dryden-Peterson 2015) address issues of funding education in fragile and conflict-affected states. These two articles state that without investment from donors in the education sector of fragile and conflict-affected states these countries will never achieve education for all. It is stated that the introduction of performance-based systems attached to loans and development aid do not seem to be appropriate to support the world's most vulnerable countries.

Overall, the studies in this keyword state that the funding available for public education is inadequate, leading to the existence of school fees and/or informal fees. This factor contributes to the exclusion of children or is an extra barrier for children who are out of school.

The articles with specific reference to South Africa also highlight issues concerning inefficient management of available funds (Boateng 2014; Motala 2014; Mestry and Bodalina 2015; Mestry 2016). Nevertheless, all mention inadequate funding of education. The management efficiency mentioned in the articles is related to the ability to manage available funds and planning. One article (Mestry 2016) argues that managers should find innovative and creative strategies to procure additional funding. It also highlights that managers should see entrepreneurship as part of their responsibility to complement government funds. These authors suggest that

fundraising and financial efficiency are the main function of South African school managers.

The article with specific reference to The Gambia (Daly, Mbenga, and Camara 2016) deals with issues related to out-of-school children and funding. The article addresses a voucher system implemented by the government with support from the World Bank. The School Improvement Grant voucher analysed in this article follows a different direction from what is commonly found in the literature (e.g. Verger, Fontdevila, and Zancajo 2016). This system was developed to help families cope with informal school fees when out-of-school students access public schools.

In relation to Ghana (Crabbe 1999) the study addresses the publications market. The author stresses that the state must privatise this area because the private sector has the potential to provide better publishing services. It also mentions that the publishing companies should lobby the government to achieve this.

The article that addresses the cases of Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar and Uganda uses these countries as an example of the consequences of inadequate funding to education (Ron Balsera, Klees, and Archer 2018; Arestoff and Antoine 2001). The authors state that market-based approaches undermine the use of private education providers as a strategy to expand access to inclusive education. The funding gap to public education leads to quality constraints and undermines the governments' duty to provide free and compulsory education. The authors state that if the governments do not improve the education budget for public schools it will be hard to achieve the goal of inclusive, quality education for all.

The case of Ethiopia (Gbre-eyesus 2017) deals with funding to secondary education and technical and vocational training. The author stresses the importance of secondary education meeting the needs of students who enter the labour market. It considers that secondary education that focuses on technical-vocational education programmes can play an important role in developing human capital to boost economic growth. According to the author, this process will support Ethiopia in its journey to become a middle-income economy.

The Tanzania case (Languille, 2019) also deals with secondary school funding. The author tries to show the issues surrounding power and conflict in relation to education policies and budgets in a historical perspective. The author highlights that mass secondary education is a priority for several governments but that has not led to any substantial change of education budgets. The author also concludes that education bureaucrats within the state who enjoy degrees of autonomy struggle with other factions in power to defend the sector's specific budget interests. She also points out that the

international emphasis on domestic revenue to fund education requires caution. This stems from the fact that domestic funding does not undermine the constant need for robust international aid to achieve Sustainable Development Goal 4.

The case of Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and São Tomé and Príncipe (Silva 2018) is related to the Global Partnership for Education financial support to these countries. The author analyses the Education Sector Plans submitted by these countries to obtain financial support from the Global Partnership for Education. He concludes that in these Plans education for all is a common goal to all countries. He also states that the language from business and economics is becoming the centre of educational discourse together with decentralisation issues. In relation to Cape Verde and Mozambique, the author states that in these countries' education is identified as a strategy to solve economic and social challenges. Education privatisation in a broader perspective occurs explicitly in the documents of Guinea Bissau and São Tomé and Príncipe, presenting an optimistic view regarding the importance and need to increase the role of education private providers.

3.1.4 Public-private partnership

The articles addressing *public-private partnership* issues focus on cases from Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, South Africa and Uganda. Overall, the studies included in this review take two different approaches. One set of articles highlights how public-private partnerships increased or maintained inequalities in access to quality education (Edwards, Klees, and Wildish 2017; Wokadala and Barungi 2015; Klees 2018; Feldman 2020). Another set of articles advocates the advantages of public-private partnerships in relation to public providers (Hochfeld et al. 2016; Kolade 2019).

The Uganda case (Wokadala and Barungi 2015) illustrates that the public-private partnership schools analysed seem to benefit richer households. The authors also indicate that, for example, a student with poor school results from a wealthy family is more likely to have a high-quality education than a bright student from a poor family. The authors conclude that public-private partnerships are more regressive than the total of universal secondary education funding.

The Kenya case (Edwards, Klees, and Wildish 2017) deals with issues related to government support to low-fee private schools. The authors conclude that government resources should be channelled to public schools considering that low-fee private schools have an uncertain effect on quality and a negative impact on equity. The authors also point out that if quality public education with no fees is available the low-fee private schools will go out of business.

The Liberia case (Klees 2018) deals with issues concerning the public-private partnerships named Partnership Schools of Liberia that cost over \$25 million over a three-year period. The author states that Partnership Schools of Liberia is a waste of resources. He also highlights that the gains in testing obtained by the schools included in this partnership have more likely been due to changes that could be made in regular public schools. The findings indicate that Partnership Schools of Liberia appears to have been started for ideological reasons rather than for its cost-effectiveness or potential effectiveness.

The Nigeria case (Kolade 2019) highlights that private education providers and religious organizations are making a significant contribution to access to basic education in the country, particularly religious schools. The author points out that the results of non-state schools in basic education indicate that the Nigerian government should support these actors. The author concludes that, as in other sectors, the government should launch new incentives to engage businesses as partners in order to expand resources and facilities in public schools.

The fifth study included in this keyword addresses issues related to the public-private partnership between the Tiger Brands Foundation and the government of South Africa to support school meals (Hochfeld et al. 2016). The authors indicate that the Tiger Brands Foundation has introduced a successful model of school nutrition in vulnerable schools. The study suggests that this school nutrition model has contributed to provide employment and business opportunities for community members, as well as increasing knowledge about healthy food. The other article from South Africa (Feldman 2020) addresses a PPP in the Western Cape Education Department. The author suggests that this model is advancing and most likely will become “an accepted mode of delivering education to schools in areas of poverty” (Feldman 2020, 15). Although the study shows that the PPPs are advancing in Western Cape also emphasizes that is unclear if this model fits in the South African context.

3.1.5 Privatisation

The keyword *privatisation* includes two articles that give an overall perspective about education privatisation in sub-Saharan Africa and six articles that make specific reference to Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, Republic of the Congo, Senegal, South Africa, Uganda and Zambia.

One of the articles that gives an overall perspective on education privatisation (Aubry and Dorsi 2016) provides access to a tool for assessing whether the education

sector is aligned with the human rights framework. The authors state that the next step is to define guiding principles on the role of private actors in education from a human rights perspective, where a set of standards will be developed on how states should approach private education provision.

The other article that gives an overall perspective on education privatisation presents the results from “research to assess the relationship between private sector regulation and private sector growth in education” across twenty countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Baum, Cooper, and Lusk-Stover 2018, 101). This study states that the existing private school regulation theory in sub-Saharan Africa has a negative effect on the growth of official private schooling markets. The results also suggest that these regulatory environments provide regulators with opportunities for rent seeking and corruption, with minimal social benefit.

In the Malawi case (Zeitlyn et al. 2015) the authors analyse secondary education private schools and how this subsystem is dependent on the private sector. The authors state that secondary education private schools in Malawi are extremely diverse in students’ performance and fees. The authors highlight that the students and also many teachers are in these schools because they have no choice. These results from the selectivity of government schools based on primary school leavers’ exam results. The authors state that the fees vary and seem to be associated to pass rates in national exams. In this way national exams serve as the main barometer for entering the best secondary schools rather than the student’s family’s wealth. This study also indicates that the main characteristics of secondary education private schools in Malawi include extreme annual variations in the number of pupils and teachers, and minimal investment in infrastructure and teaching and learning materials.

The South Africa case focused on issues related to the extent to which the legislative framework and education-funding models applicable to school education in South Africa post-1994 have, in attempting to address historical inequalities, resulted in a particular form of privatisation of public education (Roos 2004). The author also examines the impact on autonomy of the funding and human resourcing of Section 21 school. The author concludes that this broad autonomy developed several mechanisms to balance unequal access to education due to the role played by private education providers.

The cases of Nigeria, Kenya and Uganda (Tessitore 2019) deals with issues related to the Bridge International Academies. The author points out that private companies are influencing education in African countries, although their positive impact on the public sector remains inconclusive. The author also highlights that the goal of

public education in Africa is the same goal of Bridge International Academies, i.e., to successfully educate all students.

The Zambia case (Edwards Jr, Okitsu, and Mwanza 2019) addresses issues related to low-fee private schools in a slum of Lusaka. The authors conclude that low-fee schools at the level of early childhood care and education contribute to the access to education of poor children who would not otherwise have this opportunity. However, the authors inform that entry in these schools is only possible for many families if they make significant sacrifices, given that the enrolment of one child accounts for 30% of the household income. This case study indicates that early childhood care and education operate without any monitoring or support from the Ministry of Education. It also concludes that the government has not devoted sufficient resources to the sector, despite being the most resource consuming. The authors also point out that since Zambia is subject to the whims of economic globalisation, as debt payments increase there are fewer funds available for social services, including education.

The Liberia case included in this keyword is a comparative study with New Orleans in the United States of America (Offutt-Chaney 2019). The author highlights that educational failure in Liberia is perpetuated by educational philanthropists and international for-profit chains. The author also states that anti-Black coloniality created by external interest groups continues to operate through contemporary neoliberal reforms. She also notes that, like the educational and philanthropic elites at the turn of the century, today's educational reformers have the same missionary zeal, destabilizing predominantly Black-run public school systems.

With reference to this keyword, there are four articles that analyse Côte d'Ivoire which give a historical overview of education in the country highlighting the influence of the Catholic Church in the education privatisation landscape (Lanoue 2003, 2004; N'Guessan and Zamble 2020; Zamble and N'guessan 2019). These studies also mention that the expansion of education private providers is related to the population educational demand not met by public education.

The Burkina Faso articles (Calvès, Kobiané, and N'Bouké 2013; Pilon 2004) mention that the Ivorian education system has a strong presence of private schools that surpass the public schools, especially since the mid-1990s in the urban areas. The main reason for the proliferation of private schools is the deterioration and lack of public investment in education. The cuts in public spending on education are also mentioned by the study that examines Madagascar that contributed to the increase of education private providers.

The article of Pilon (2004) gives an historical perspective of Burkina Faso education system mentioning the influence of the catholic church that still operates the

more prestigious private schools in the country. However, both articles from Burkina Faso allow us to understand that the country education system is segregated and there is 'two-speed' private sector – one 'popular' and one 'elitist'. Similar conclusion are advanced by the articles from the Republic of the Congo and Rwanda (Balonga and Ziavoula 2005; Erny 2004), where the catholic church still has an important role as an education private provider within a segregated education system.

The article that examines Senegal (Guth 2004) gives us a particular look at the private education providers in this country, French schools, that refuse to see themselves as private and are a legacy of France colonial rule in the country. These French schools promote republican values going in the opposite direction of the Franco-Arabic, however only to the students that can pay high school fees.

4. Conclusions

Drawing on the 54 articles in our review published between 1990 and 2020 we sought to map the research terrain and produce new knowledge without collecting new empirical data about the privatisation of education in sub-Saharan Africa. Our review shows clearly that education privatisation is under-researched in per-reviewed publications regarding sub-Saharan Africa. This conclusion stems from the fact that comprehensive studies focused on a reduced number of countries and there is lack of research in fragile and conflict-affected states.

The articles also show that there is clearly a split between pro and con education privatisation articles. However, the critical analysis of this phenomenon is more persuasive.

Our review offers an overview of the published research and enables the following patterns to be identified: the issues related to choice and privatisation are the themes to which the researchers devoted most attention, followed by funding, public-private partnership and charter; the country with the largest number of publications is South Africa ($n = 13$), followed by Uganda and Liberia ($n = 8$); the majority of studies used a qualitative approach ($n = 27$).

Overall, it is possible to conclude that education privatisation is expanding in sub-Saharan Africa. The population's socio-economic conditions are also a factor pointed out by the reviewed articles as critical to undermine the choice principles advocated in the literature. This is because the private sector in education is growing due to the lack or insufficiency of government funding or provision. The articles concerning public-private partnerships also follow the same path. Nevertheless, the South Africa case

highlights that school choice depends on racism and creates racializations, developing new patterns of stratification in access to education in that country.

The choice regarding countries where most of the populations is Muslim highlight that choice is more related to parents cultural and religious concerns rather than schools' performance advanced by the human capital theory.

Our more detailed analysis of the reviewed articles suggests that business interests will never align with access to education for the poorer and more remote population. However, the reviewed studies indicate that we must not overlook the fact that the private sector is multifaceted and context-specific and contributes to access to education particularly in urban areas and in countries where the public sector is underfunded.

It is also important to note that there is evidence from the reviewed studies that underfunding of public education promotes the existence of school fees and/or informal tuition fees. This contributes to parents' preference for private solutions, increasing the obstacles to and costs of access to education.

Finally, we consider important to stress that in an age when international development agencies are promoting private education initiatives, future research could analyse how international agencies (e.g. UNICEF, World Bank) and funds (e.g. Global Partnership for Education and Education Cannot Wait) act and position themselves in relation to education privatisation in sub-Saharan Africa. Future research could also review Grey Literature from international organizations and think tanks and expand the data bases used to allow a more exhaustive list of publications and, possibly, include more countries.

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Shadow Education in Sub-Saharan Africa: Privatization Alongside and Within Public Schooling ☐

Mark Bray⁹

Introduction

In their influential publication about ‘hidden privatisation of education’, Ball and Youdell (2008, p.14) distinguished between privatisation *in* education and privatisation *of* education. By the former, which they also called endogenous privatisation, they meant deployment of private-sector ideas, techniques and practices in order to make the public sector more business-like. By the latter, which they also called exogenous privatisation, they meant the opening up of public education services to private sector participation on a for-profit basis. These processes are commonly driven by deliberate government-led initiatives. This chapter addresses a third category in which private activities develop alongside the public sector but also have hidden impact within the public sector. The development usually occurs despite rather than because of government policies, and thus is related to what Verger et al. (2016, p.7) called privatisation by default.

The chapter focuses on private supplementary tutoring. In the academic literature, such tutoring is widely called shadow education because much of it mimics schooling. Thus, as the curriculum changes in the schools, so it changes in the shadow; and as the school sector expands, so does the shadow (Aurini et al., 2013; Bray, 1999; Hajar & Karakus, 2022). Such tutoring may be delivered by entrepreneurs who operate tutorial centres, by full-time teachers who provide tutoring as a side activity, and by university students and other informal suppliers. The tutoring may be provided in person and/or online on a one-to-one basis, in small groups, and/or in large lecture theatres. While some tutoring may be free of charge, this chapter is concerned with fee-charging provision.

In some parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, shadow education is very visible and longstanding. Elsewhere it is less visible but expanding rapidly. Major issues associated with the theme include marketization of education, financial burdens on households, and exacerbation of social inequalities. These themes are well known in much of Asia

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and elsewhere (Zhang & Bray, 2020), though even there they need much greater attention than they have received to date.

Also needing greater attention is the backwash of shadow education on schooling. In some cases the shadow curricula clash with those of schooling, partly in content and approaches but also in timing if students learn material from tutors ahead of schooling and then are bored during school hours. Shadow education also impacts on disparities in classrooms. Tutoring reduces disparities when it helps slow learners to keep up with their peers, but it exacerbates disparities when it helps fast learners to stretch further. Further, teachers who are also tutors may be tempted to neglect their regular lessons, for which they are paid anyway, in favour of their private tutoring in which revenue depends on performance. Sometimes teachers go further to pressurise their school students to receive tutoring outside school hours, and even cut components of their teaching in order to preserve the content for their private lessons. This pattern could fit under the heading of privatisation *in* education, though is rather different from what Ball and Youdell (2008) had in mind.

To set the scene, this chapter begins with some indicators on the scale and nature of shadow education in Sub-Saharan Africa. It then turns to demand, supply, and the impact of shadow education. These remarks permit identification of implications for policy makers, particularly concerning regulations. The final section links back to the broader literature on privatisation and education.

The Scale and Nature of Shadow Education

Mapping of enrolment rates in shadow education is difficult because few statistics have been collected on common measures. Nevertheless, two cross-national datasets provide an instructive starting point.

The first dataset is from the Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality (SACMEQ). Table 1 shows data on enrolment rates in shadow education as recorded in a pair of SACMEQ surveys. The range in 2007 is noteworthy, from 75% in Mauritius to 1% in Eswatini. The 2013 repeat of the survey indicated striking expansion – for example from 6% to 34% in Botswana, and from 4% to 29% in South Africa. Shadow education was only a minor theme in the overall survey, and for methodological reasons the precise numbers should be treated with caution (Paviot, 2015). Nevertheless, the clear overall message is that shadow education even in those years was a significant phenomenon; and it is since likely to have expanded further.

Table 1: SACMEQ Data on Enrolment Rates in Shadow Education, Grade 6, 2007 and 2013 (%)

Country	2007	2013
Mauritius	75	81
Kenya	52	n.a.
Uganda	25	n.a.
Zimbabwe	15	n.a.
Seychelles	13	21
Tanzania	14	n.a.
Mozambique	10	21
Zambia	6	n.a.
Botswana	6	34
Malawi	4	14
South Africa	4	29
Namibia	3	6
Lesotho	3	n.a.
Eswatini	1	11

n.a. = not available. Reports for Kenya, Uganda and Lesotho either did not include any data on this topic, or did not clearly indicate the proportions of total populations receiving paid rather than fee-free tutoring. Reports for Zambia and Zimbabwe could not be located. Tanzania [Mainland] did not participate in 2013. Separate data are available for Zanzibar, but are not shown.

Sources: SACMEQ (2010, p. 1); SACMEQ national reports.

A similar message applies to the second dataset, from the Programme d'Analyse des Systèmes Éducatifs de la CONFEMEN (PASEC).¹⁰ Table 2 shows survey data from Grade 6 students in 2019. Whereas most countries in Table 1 are Anglophone, all countries in Table 2 are Francophone. Shadow education enrolment rates appear lower than in the Anglophone countries, perhaps reflecting different traditions on roles of the state and of non-state actors. Again for methodological reasons the precise numbers should be treated with circumspection, but the table shows that enrolment rates were substantial in several countries.

¹⁰ CONFEMEN is the Conférence des Ministres de l'Éducation des États et Gouvernements de la Francophonie [Conference of Ministers of Education of Francophone States and Governments].

Table 2: PASEC Data on Enrolment Rates in Shadow Education, Grade 6, 2019 (%)

Country		Country	
Benin	22	Chad	10
Senegal	22	Niger	10
Cameroon	20	Congo	8
Togo	16	Gabon	8
Côte d'Ivoire	14	Burundi	6
Guinea	12	Congo, Democratic Republic	6
Burkina Faso	10	Madagascar	1

Source: Bray & Baba-Moussa (2023), p.9.

Since Tables 1 and 2 refer only to Grade 6, data from other grades are also needed. In general, peak enrolments occur shortly before high-stakes examinations. In most cases this is at the transition from lower-secondary to upper-secondary schooling (commonly the end of Grade 9), and at the conclusion of upper-secondary schooling (commonly Grade 12). Table 3 summarises studies in four countries not represented in Tables 1 and 2. The high enrolment rate for Angolan students in Grades 11 and 12 is especially noteworthy.

Table 3: Further Cross-National Indicators of Shadow Education

Country	Patterns
Angola	Among the 8,513 students in Grades 11 and 12 in Luanda, Benguela and Huambo surveyed by Chionga (2018, p.90) in 2015, 93.8% were receiving or had received tutoring at some time.
Ethiopia	Melese & Abebe (2017) surveyed 866 upper primary students in four regions (two relatively developed and two emerging) plus the national capital. When asked if they had ever received private tutoring, 66.8% replied affirmatively.
Ghana	A 1999/2000 survey of 1,535 students in 39 schools sampled to represent four different types of community found private

tutoring participation rates of 32.8% in primary, 49.5% in junior secondary, and 72.3% in senior secondary (Montgomery et al., 2000, p.12). A 2018 report, though without details on the sample, stated that about 68% of school children received extra lessons after school, with 23% of them receiving home tutoring (Business Ghana, 2018).

Nigeria

A 2004 nationally representative survey of 4,268 households asked about household expenditures in the 2003/04 academic year. One third (33.5%) of households with primary school children spent money on private tutoring, and over half (53.2%) of households with secondary school children did so (National Population Commission & ORC Macro, 2004, pp.92, 102). Oyewusi and Orolade (2014, p.272) suggested that Nigeria had over two million tutorial centres, plus much individual tutoring in individual homes. Akinrinmade (2023) noted demand for tutoring among low-income as well as middle-income and high-income families.

The Angolan study cited in Table 3 recorded the locations of tutoring received by the sampled Grade 11 and 12 students (Chionga, 2018, p.103). Over half received the support in the homes of the tutors, while one third did so in tutorial centres, and 10% in their own homes. Only 3% received support through the internet and in other locations.

Elsewhere, schools are the default locations for tutoring, particularly when that tutoring is provided by teachers in those schools. In Mauritius, at one point this was even given official sanction. In 1988 the Minister of Education proposed a set of regulations to prohibit tutoring in Grades 1-3, partly to protect the health of young children (Parsuramen 2007, p.10). At the same time, the Minister decided to permit the use of classrooms for tutoring in Grades 4-6 in order to allow the activity to be conducted in appropriate environments rather than the “appalling physical conditions” of converted garages and other locations.

Much private tutoring in other countries also occurs on school premises, though it is usually done in the face of official disapproval. The literature documents these patterns for example in The Gambia (King, 2012), Kenya (Munyao, 2015) and Zimbabwe (Simbarashe & Edlight, 2011). The schools have apparent appropriateness

insofar as they are designated spaces for teaching and learning with facilities designed for educational use.

Other tutoring is provided in churches, mosques, cafés, libraries, and other public locations that may be less convenient in layout and facilities. The use of churches and mosques commonly reflects community participation in the phenomenon, providing support for families and recognising that shadow education is part of daily life. Munyao (2015, p.101) indicated that teachers in Kenya provided tutoring in out-of-school locations “to avoid being found out” in the face of official disapproval at their schools. Tutoring in cafés may be welcomed by the owners of those cafés seeking business and willing to provide space. In public libraries, administrators may be tolerant or even supportive on the grounds that libraries are venues for learning of different kinds.

Although the Angolan data did not indicate significant tutoring through the internet, in other countries it has become common as an alternative channel. Compared with counterparts in Europe, North America and East Asia, for example, African households are less likely to have domestic personal computers, and the reach and power of the internet broadband is more limited.¹¹ Coverage of mobile phones is considerably wider, however, and tutoring at a distance through technology will certainly grow.

Drivers of demand

The most obvious driver of demand for shadow education is social competition. Families see that educational qualifications are a major way either to improve their socio-economic status or to maintain their already high status. In previous eras, formal education was an adequate channel to achieve this goal, but contemporary families increasingly feel that schooling is not enough.

Perhaps ironically, a major background factor has been success in campaigns for universalization of primary and lower secondary education (UNESCO, 2015). In earlier eras, many families did not aspire for advanced education because it was an unchallenged tradition in their social class that instead their children left school to find employment or to manage family duties. With rising enrolment rates in primary and lower secondary education, families now find that upper secondary and even higher education are within reach, and develop aspirations that would not have been

¹¹ List of sovereign states by number of broadband Internet subscriptions – Wikipedia, accessed 16 December 2023.

considered by their parents (Bray, 2017). Nevertheless, avenues for education remain stratified, or become even more so. Thus, alongside questions about what level of education has been achieved are questions about the institutions and programmes in which the education has been achieved. Shadow education becomes necessary to reach the more prestigious institutions.

Within this process, high-stakes examinations raise demand for shadow education at key junctures. At higher levels, these examinations determine who can remain in the education system and who are pushed out. At lower levels, the examinations are part of streaming: individuals remain in the education systems, but enter less or more prestigious tracks according to their scores. Thus, especially crucial are the examinations at the end of senior secondary education, but also important are preceding examinations, which sort students into different strata.

The demands of examinations in turn shape the content of tutoring sought by students and their families. In all contexts, the most popular subjects are mathematics and languages (particularly English, French or Portuguese, according to the country concerned). This is partly because they are core subjects in the examinations, and partly because they facilitate achievement in other subjects.

Also important are perceptions of inadequate quality in schools. With reference to secondary education in Tanzania, for example, Martínez (2017, p.7) observed that many schools lacked enough teachers to cover all subjects, with particularly worrying gaps in mathematics and science. “Students sometimes go without teachers specialized in the subjects for months, and must often find alternative ways to learn these subjects or pay for private tuition, or fail exams as a result”.

In some settings, the pressure becomes greater because teachers themselves demand the right to provide tutoring. They usually justify these actions by pointing to inadequate salaries. Again with reference to Tanzania, Martínez (2017, p.47) remarked on “the often compulsory costs of remedial training or private tuition offered by teachers”; and in Nigeria, Oyewusi and Orolade (2014, p.273) observed that:

It has always been the belief of the Nigerians that the ‘reward of a teacher is in heaven’. Today, because of their involvement in private tutoring where they are receiving untaxed income they have always replied that their reward is now on earth.

This is not true of all teachers, of course, but has become widely evident across Sub-Saharan Africa.

Turning again to parents, the demand for tutoring, as one might expect, is fuelled not only by aspirations but also by feelings that they cannot themselves tutor their

children (see e.g. Akinrinmade, 2023, p.137). Sometimes such feelings are deliberately fuelled by tutorial companies so that they can then offer remedies. With reference to Japan, but having wider relevance, Dierkes (2013) described private tutoring as an “insecurity industry”.

Further factors in parental demand may include keeping their children productively occupied and under supervision while the parents are working. Kenyan parents interviewed by Paviot (2015, p.137) were anxious to avoid idleness and bad company. Their remarks included: “When left alone, children do not manage their time well so they need to be guided by teachers during their free time”; and “It avoids idleness and peer pressure from bad company”.

Diversity of supply

Elaborating on earlier remarks, it is useful to consider in turn commercial suppliers of tutoring, teachers in regular schools who provide tutoring as an additional occupation, and informal suppliers such as students and other self-employed personnel.

The commercial sector

Most urban areas host multiple commercial tutorial enterprises, as can be made immediately evident by a computer Google search with appropriate key words according to language. The majority of these enterprises are small and serve only their localities, but some have national and even international reach.

In 2017, an analysis of existing provision and market potential entitled *The Business of Education in Africa* was presented by a company called Caerus Capital. The report aimed “to shine a light on opportunities in education for investors” (Caerus Capital, 2017, p.12), and viewed much potential for the supplementary sector. It suggested that worthwhile investments over a five-year period might be made for US\$0.4 to 0.6 billion, generating revenues of 15 to 20% (Caerus Capital, 2017, p.101). Four major shaping factors were considered pertinent (p.26). First was an anticipated demographic shift. Sub-Saharan Africa was the world’s youngest region, with 50-60% of the population aged below 25. This, the report remarked, could generate a ‘demographic dividend’ while expanding public pressure to improve educational access, quality and relevance. Second was expansion of the middle class, with six million households expected to move from earning US\$5,000 a year to earning between US\$5,000 and US\$20,000 by 2025. Third was rapid urbanisation, with currently 40% of the population living in

cities and expected to reach 64% by 2050, which would create various economies in modes of educational provision. And fourth was the use of technology, with the region having 445 million unique mobile phone subscribers compared with 200 million in 2010, and the trajectory for use of both mobile phones and internet bandwidth expected to continue.

However, the report added, these factors impacted differently around the continent. Observations on supplementary education were included in the six countries taken as case studies and ranked in order of business potential. Top of the list was South Africa, recognising its existing economic strength and continued potential coupled with perceptions of qualitative shortcomings in public education that private tutoring could ameliorate. Already many tutorial enterprises operated in South Africa, but the report noted room for more. Next on the list was Nigeria, which had a much larger population but infrastructural challenges combined with issues of political and economic stability. Third was Kenya, with rising spending power and better digital coverage than Nigeria; and fourth was Ethiopia with a large population but lower per capita incomes. Senegal, ranked fifth, was the only Francophone country on the list. Given that its per capita GDP was higher than that of Kenya, it was perhaps surprising that after-school tutoring was described as unaffordable for most, but that may have reflected a widespread feeling that non-religious education was a government responsibility and thus that private tutoring was not a natural focus for household spending. Finally, at the bottom of the list was Liberia, which was still suffering from the legacies of civil war with weak infrastructures, low incomes and perceived negligible potential in the domain of supplementary education.

Among the commercial providers highlighted by Caerus Capital was great diversity. At one end was Kumon, established in Japan in 1954 and by 2023 operating in 51 countries around the world including Botswana, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa and Zambia.¹² Within this cluster of countries, the greatest activity was in South Africa with over 200 centres. The company employs a franchise model, and specialises in mathematics and English. At the other end of the scale are innumerable small companies serving their local neighbourhoods; and in between are medium-sized companies with branch operations.

Alongside direct providers are companies that match parents with tutors. A modest example, established in 2014, is Mak-Addis in Ethiopia. In 2020, Mak-Addis indicated that it had over 200 qualified tutors in its database “willing to provide tutoring

¹² <https://www.kumon.org/our-programmes/>, accessed 16 December 2023.

service for a very affordable price”.¹³ Much larger is PrepClass in Nigeria, also established in 2014 and by 2023 claiming over 50,000 tutors on its books.¹⁴ Initially, PrepClass operated only as a matching service that earned revenue from commissions on sessions taught by the tutors. Subsequently the company added online courses, earning revenue from registrations and from sale of materials and lesson notes. PrepClass online courses continued operation even when schools were closed in 2020 by the Covid-19 pandemic.

A related but lower-tech model employs SMS (Short Message System) texts on mobile phones, which generally have wider access than broadband. A leader in this domain has been Eneza, established in Kenya in 2011. The tutorial company has partnered with telephone companies so that fees are deducted from mobile airtime rather than requiring separate procedures. Each SMS message is necessarily short, but the company has tailored content to the national curricula of the three countries and includes basic content, quizzes, and examination preparation. The ‘Ask a Teacher’ function promised that learners could chat with live teachers who would respond to questions within an average time of five minutes (Joffe, 2021). Through its pricing and mode of operation, the company is able to target the lower parts of the income pyramid. From its base in Kenya it subsequently expanded to Côte D’Ivoire, Ghana, Tanzania, Togo and Rwanda.¹⁵

Nevertheless, in general face-to-face operations remain much more prominent than technology-based ones. Companies commonly stress individual and/or small group tutoring on the grounds that schools have much larger classes in which teachers cannot give personal attention to each learner. However, tutorial classes are not always small. In Benin, for example, Napporn and Baba-Moussa (2013, p.83) noted the operation of tutors able to attract senior-secondary (*baccalauréat*) candidates from a radius of 30 kilometres for classes accommodating several hundred students at a time.

Teachers as tutors

Teachers willing to offer tutoring may be especially important in rural areas which are not served by companies or other providers. With reference to The Gambia, for example, King (2012, p.3) observed that while urban centres “have a plethora

¹³ <https://makaddistutors.wordpress.com/>, accessed 19 June 2020.

¹⁴ <https://prepclass.com.ng/home>, accessed 16 December 2023.

¹⁵ [https://www.pioneerspost.com/news-views/20210104/the-largest-classroom-africa-how-text-messages-mean-millions-of-children-can#:~:text=In%20the%20Ask%20a%20Teacher,platform%20three%20times%20a%20week](https://www.pioneerspost.com/news-views/20210104/the-largest-classroom-africa-how-text-messages-mean-millions-of-children-can#:~:text=In%20the%20Ask%20a%20Teacher,platform%20three%20times%20a%20week;); <https://mastercardfdn.org/eneza-education-launches-shupavu-sms-learning-in-rwanda-in-partnership-with-the-mastercard-foundation/>, accessed 16 December 2023.

of ‘legitimate’ tutoring options and opportunities for both broader and higher educational attainment, teachers in rural areas are frequently among the few prepared to offer any supplemental services”.

Concerning school-based tutoring, variations may be found at the institutional level. In Kenya, Mogaka (2014) investigated 12 secondary schools in one district. Students from all 12 schools reported that supplementary tutoring was being offered in their schools, but in one school it was free of charge (p.44). Further, tutoring in that school was considered optional in contrast to its “compulsory” nature in the other 11 schools. In such circumstances, much depends on the views of the school principal, and also of course the teachers and parents. Mogaka added (p.46) that students in boarding schools, or in boarding sections of mixed boarding/day schools, received more tutoring than students in schools that only served day students.

As noted above, in many settings inadequate salaries are a major factor underlying tutoring provided by teachers. The pressures to expand education systems within the context of budget constraints led governments to devise lower-cost categories of teachers; and alongside, communities commonly recruited their own low-cost teachers (Teacher Task Force, 2020). Nevertheless, a study of teachers’ pay in 15 Sub-Saharan African countries found much diversity (Evans et al., 2021). In relation to comparable professions, teachers in Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire and Zambia were paid much more, but in Liberia, Niger and Sierra Leone they were paid less. At the same time, teachers had fewer working hours – one implication of which was that they were more readily available for private tutoring.

On a qualitative plane, a merit of tutoring provided by teachers is that they can be assumed to have basic pedagogic competence, even though many countries suffer from shortages of qualified teachers and of course some are better than others at their craft. However, some teachers may stretch considerably beyond their basic training in the forms and content of tutoring that they offer.

Other informal providers of tutoring

Alongside these categories of providers are many informal arrangements. Urban areas are not only more likely to have commercial enterprises, but also more likely to host universities which then supply students who secure extra pocket money through tutoring.

Urban areas may also have large numbers of educated personnel who are unemployed or ‘between jobs’, and providing tutoring as a temporary measure. In Burkina Faso,

for example, 49% of the tutors of primary school children in Ouagadougou surveyed by Ouattara (2016, p.205) were “[university] students or unemployed graduates”. Similarly in Benin, Napporn and Baba-Moussa (2013, p.85) cited a study of identities of tutors in which 40.0% were teachers but 49.9% were university students, 6.7% were secondary school students, and 4.4% were unemployed or other informal workers. Echoing concerns about university students in Benin who provided tutoring, Houessou (2014, p.194) noted that most lacked pedagogic skills and many provided tutoring in subjects outside their own specialisations.

The Impact of Shadow Education

An obvious question is whether shadow education ‘works’ in the sense of improving the academic achievements of its recipients. This question is difficult to answer conclusively because scientific analysis would have to compare the performance of precisely similar groups of students having and not having precisely similar types and amounts of tutoring. For ethical and practical reasons, it is not possible to conduct social experiments of this sort. Nevertheless, researchers can still seek statistical correlations between variables, and can ask whether students and their families at least perceive that they secure academic benefit.

In Kenya, Kilonzo (2014) looked not only at the proportions of Grade 8 students receiving various types of tutoring in 29 schools but also at their performance in the district-wide test taken by all students. He showed clear correlations between receipt of tutoring and test scores, adding that students who had received home-based tutoring scored even higher than those who had only received school-based tutoring, and that students receiving one-to-one tutoring scored the best of all. Correlations must always be treated with caution, since they may to some extent reflect self-selection by students who would achieve at higher levels anyway. Nevertheless, the differences were sufficiently large to be persuasive that tutoring did indeed make a difference for the students who received it. In Ghana, Ansong et al. (2023) reported similar findings based on national survey data, particularly for rural areas and boys.

Then, turning to perceptions, it might seem obvious that students and their families would only pay for tutoring if they perceived it to be beneficial. However, other factors come into play, including power relationships with teachers who demand tutoring, peer pressures when everybody else seems to be receiving tutoring, and decisions to secure tutoring as an ‘insurance policy’ in case it really does prove useful and is better to have than to risk doing without. Some researchers have specifically asked students about perceptions of benefits. For example:

- ❑ In *Angola*, 97.1% of students in the three regions studied by Chionga (2018, p.109) indicated that private tutoring had improved their study habits, and 97.2% felt that it had contributed to overcoming academic difficulties.
- ❑ In *Benin*, tutors commonly assemble students across different levels and work with them in groups. Houessou (2014) surveyed 200 students receiving private tutoring in four primary and lower secondary schools. For 40.0% of these students, the tutoring was in groups from a range of grades which, the students felt, did not permit adequate attention from the tutors. Nevertheless, 60.0% of the total sample felt that their grades had improved.
- ❑ In *Ghana*, a 2018 survey found that most students considered private tutoring (known as extra classes) to be an important element in the preparation towards their final examination. Some 67% felt it a good use of time, and 63% strongly agreed to recommend it to others wanting to boost their grades (Business Ghana, 2018).
- ❑ *Kenyan* data from the 2007 SACMEQ survey with a national sample indicated that 81.5% of respondents stated that they learned new things, in addition to practising examination questions and repeating or revising school work (Paviot, 2015, p.112).

However, much depends of course on both the skills and motivations of the tutors and the readiness and motivations of the students. In The Gambia, King (2012, p.40) remarked that tutoring was not well structured: “Tutors are not properly monitored and can teach irrelevant stuff. Many are motivated by the extra bucks and not a strong desire to help.” Similar remarks have been made in Benin by Houessou (2014, p.194). Further, private tutoring can be subtractory as well as supplementary. First, students who are receiving tutoring may be tired from excessive academic work; and second, they may respect their tutors more than their teachers because they have chosen these particular tutors and are paying for their services.

These remarks have implications for the (in)efficiency with which education systems operate. From one angle, shadow education might be viewed as beneficial because it potentially increases learning and can help slow learners to keep up with their peers. However, slow learners may be unmotivated and/or from low-income families unable to afford tutoring, and since in practice shadow education is more commonly accessed by students who are already higher achievers, it is much more likely to in-

crease gaps than reduce them. These disparities raise challenges at the classroom and school levels as well as at the system level.

The matter may also be linked to stresses on children. In Mauritius the point was made sharply during a National Assembly debate (Obeegadoo, 2011, p.97):

Private supplementary tuition places an unhealthy burden on children, to the extent of being described by some as a new form of child labour. In Mauritius, it is not uncommon for young children aged nine, ten or eleven, to be subjected to supplementary tuition every day of the week and for several hours. To which must be added the double homework effect: homework from school, homework from tuition. The psychological toil, if not the physical toil, is all too obvious.

To this point was added the observation (p.99) that at the level of senior secondary schooling, “large numbers of students, particularly in the final years of secondary, are absent from school during the term time, ostensibly to revise from home, but in reality to attend private supplementary tuition – with the blessing of parents and teachers alike”. Further, the teachers in the regular classes at that season “do very little effective teaching”, instead concentrating their time and energy on students that they were themselves tutoring.

Regulating Shadow Education

Given the concerns about impact on education systems and the broader society, governments are increasingly concerned with regulation of shadow education. Schooling has long been regulated, albeit with shortcomings in enactment of regulations, and shadow education is beginning to catch up.

The questions then are (i) who and what should be regulated, and (ii) how. Commonly, regulations are devised separately for commercial enterprises and for practising teachers. As noted above, much tutoring is also provided informally by university students, retirees and others; and increasing amounts of tutoring are provided via the Internet, in some cases across national boundaries. However, informal provision and internet tutoring are especially difficult to regulate, and authorities may instead decide to focus on educating the consumers to enable them to make their own decisions.

Regulating tutorial companies

All countries have general regulations for companies, requiring safe buildings, proper contracts, accurate tax returns, honest advertising, etc.. Around the world some governments have specific provision for tutoring companies (see e.g. Bray &

Kwo 2014; Zhang 2023), but in Sub-Saharan Africa such specific provision is less common.

Nevertheless, one example is from the Addis Ababa Education Bureau in Ethiopia. Its regulations, devised in 2004, have five main components (Melese, 2020):

- ❑ *Facilities*: Tutorial centres must have appropriate classrooms, electricity, water, toilets, telephone access, road access, and premises with minimum areas of 600 square metres.
- ❑ *Location*: The institutions should be located away from noise.
- ❑ *Tutors' qualifications and pedagogical experience*: As in public schools, tutors should have a minimum of teaching diploma qualification for tutoring primary students and first degree for tutoring secondary students, and should hold pedagogical training certificates.
- ❑ *Curriculum*: The curriculum should be similar to that of regular school classes.
- ❑ *Times and durations*: Tutoring should be provided for a maximum of five days per week per pupil, and for not more than 45 minutes per day.
- ❑ *Class size*: Classes should have no more than 10 students.

These regulations seem to require tutorial centres indeed to shadow regular schooling in teachers' qualifications, facilities and curriculum, and are even more demanding than requirements for schooling in terms of class size and restricted duration. However, the regulations are vague in some respects. For example, they state that any person or body not implementing will be punished, but do not state the nature of the punishment. In any case, the regulations have not always been strictly applied (Lemma, 2015).

Even more difficult to regulate are companies operating through the internet either as matching services or through provision of courses. Thus Mak-Addis, for example, was described by the Caerus Capital report (2017, p.201) as "operating as an online aggregator outside of any government regulations". The company website did include a code of conduct for tutors, stressing responsibility, integrity, and care in interpersonal relationships including awareness of power dynamics.¹⁶ However, a wide gap might exist between enforcement of such a code and merely placing it on a website. Similar remarks may apply to the management of online courses, some of which may be provided across national boundaries and thus beyond the regulatory reach of authorities in the recipient countries.

¹⁶ <https://makaddistutors.wordpress.com/tutors-register/>, accessed 16 December 2023.

Regulating provision of tutoring by teachers

Turning to regulations on private tutoring provided by practising teachers, the main questions are (i) whether teachers should be permitted to provide private supplementary tutoring, (ii) if so, for whom, and perhaps when and where, and (iii) if not, how this regulation can be enforced. The majority of African countries have no regulations on this matter, and leave it to a *laissez faire* environment. In Angola, for example, Chionga (2018, p.86) remarked that although private tutoring had proliferated, “the education authorities remain silent” on the phenomenon. Nevertheless, some countries do have regulations, particularly to restrict the tutoring activities of teachers in public schools (Table 4).

Table 4: Regulations on Private Tutoring by Serving Teachers

Eritrea	In 2012 the Ministry of Education banned the operation of tutorial centres, instead permitting teachers to operate fee-charging classes in schools on Saturdays (Eritrea, 2012). Then in 2019 these Saturday classes were also prohibited (Sium Mengesha, 2020).
The Gambia	All private tutoring by serving teachers was banned in 2010 (King, 2012, p.3).
Kenya	A 1988 Ministry of Education circular directed teachers to offer support to students as part of their regular duties without cost to parents (Kenya, 1988). The Ministry followed up in 1995 with a general ban on fee-charging private tutoring, reiterated in 1999 (Mogaka, 2014). Another circular in 2008 repeated the prohibition of all types of fee-charging private tutoring by serving teachers, and in 2013 the prohibition of holiday coaching was reinforced by an amendment to the Education Act (Kenya, 2013, section 37).
Mauritius	Teachers are prohibited from privately tutoring students in Grades 1-4 (Mauritius, 2011), but are permitted to tutor students in higher grades.
Mozambique	A 2014 Ministry of Education circular addressed tutoring in homes (Mozambique, 2014, Article 41). It indicated a requirement for tutors to secure approval from the district

education authorities, providing evidence of qualifications and intended types and levels of tutoring. Teachers in both public and private schools were forbidden to offer paid private tutoring to their existing students.

Tanzania [Mainland] A 1991 Ministry of Education circular (Tanzania, 1991) permitted forms of vacation tutoring, provided that school managements were aware of the process. However, a subsequent circular (Tanzania, 1998) banned all private tutoring in school settings.

Zambia The Minister of Education announced in 2013 that all private tutoring was prohibited in schools at weekends and during holidays (Mukanga, 2013). Government officials affirmed the policy on various subsequent occasions. In 2019, the Ministry clarified that it applied only to public schools and not to private ones (*Lusaka Times*, 2019).

Zimbabwe In 2014, the government prohibited holiday coaching and what in Zimbabwe are called extra [private] lessons (Zimbabwe, 2014). In 2020, teachers were required to sign a document recognising that they were forbidden to provide extra lessons (Mangwiro, 2020).

The fact that several governments listed in Table 4 prohibited serving teachers from providing tutoring is noteworthy. However, the practice continued in all these countries. In Kenya, for example, after promulgation of the regulations some schools used alternative labels for holiday tutoring such as ‘mentorship’ (*Daily Nation*, 2013). Some Kenyan parents described the holiday tutoring as mandatory and even bringing a financial penalty if their children failed to attend (*Daily Nation*, 2018); and tutoring also continued during the ordinary weeks of term time (Nyongesa, 2019).

Among the governments with *laissez faire* approaches, the remarks by an officer of the Rwanda Education Board (REB) provide some insight. He was quoted by Nayebare (2013) as stating “private tuition does not need any regulations from REB”. He preferred to leave matters to the school level, and added:

We are also parents; we understand the need for extra studies for children. We understand that each child has a special way of studying.

Yet again in contrast to governments that ban private tutoring is the policy in Zanzibar where the authorities in 1998 approved private tutoring on the premises of both primary and secondary schools. A government document (Zanzibar, 1998, p.18) explained that schools were permitted “to charge a small fee for extra tuition provided by teachers after the official working hours in situations where parents are willing to do so”.

Also in contrast to prohibition of tutoring by teachers in many countries is a Ghanaian initiative that seemed actively to encourage it. In 2017, Ghana’s President announced a Free Senior High School (SHS) scheme (Akufa-Addo, 2017), which led to a surge of enrolments and design of a Double-Track system. In this system, schools moved from a three-term to a two-semester arrangement with alternating attendance by Green and Gold Tracks that utilised school buildings all the year round. Anxious that the Free SHS scheme should indeed be free, in 2018 the Minister of Education announced that the government would provide 50 cedis to every student “as an academic intervention where the teachers, if they have to organize extra lessons in Maths and English, will not charge the students but the government will give them money” (Ofosua, 2018). Confirming arrangements in 2019, the Deputy Minister explained that the overall objective was “to ensure that learning outcomes improved overall through the development of an effective academic remedial programme for all students” (Kale-Dery, 2019); and in 2020, the government disbursed funds to schools not only for teachers providing supplementary lessons but also to management/support staff (Ghana Education Service, 2020). From a wider perspective, however, the scheme seemed to legitimise the provision of supplementary tutoring; and if in due course funding constraints might lead to withdrawal of the scheme, the culture of such tutoring would already have been reinforced.

Conclusions

This chapter commenced with the distinction presented by Ball and Youdell (2008, p.14) of privatisation *in* education and privatisation *of* education. Those authors were mainly concerned with government-led actions to form partnerships with, or hand over functions to, the private sector. The focus of this chapter, however, has been on private education activities that occur by default and may even be opposed by governments. Shadow education has become a major activity around the world, and while its extent and impact may not (yet) be as great as in Asia, for example (Bray, 2023a), it is clearly ‘catching up’.

From the perspective of families, the basic forces underlying demand for shadow education resemble those in many other parts of the world. The fundamental force is social competition, in which families seek to improve the lifetime prospects for their children or, in the case of middle- and upper class families, at least to maintain their social ranking. Other drivers include perceptions of declining quality in public education and therefore that supplementation is needed to compensate. Much of the perceived qualitative decline arises from expansion of schooling, but ironically this expansion also fuels demand for shadow education because families have more opportunities for educational advance than their earlier counterparts had. Also among factors driving demand is supply. Tutorial companies engage in explicit advertising, and teachers who provide tutoring engage in hidden advertising. University students and other informal providers may be in an intermediate category with a combination of formal and word-of-mouth advertising.

The issues then arising include ones related to private schooling and other services. Questions include the quality of provision, which, as with high-cost and low-cost private schooling, may range widely yet cannot be simply correlated with the scale of fees (because high-cost providers are not necessarily qualitatively superior, and low-cost ones are not necessarily qualitatively inferior). Shadow education also exacerbates educational inequalities, since it is much more likely to be accessed by higher achievers seeking greater heights than by lower achievers seeking to catch up; and in turn it exacerbates social inequalities because higher-income families have stronger ambitions and greater resources to access both greater quantities and better qualities of shadow education (Bray, 2023b; Zhang, 2023).

The chapter has also highlighted issues arising when teachers in regular schools also provide tutoring outside school hours. This can become a form of privatisation *in* education, but of a different type from that considered by Ball and Youdell (2008). Ethical issues arise when such teachers neglect their main duties in order to devote more time to their private work; and even more problematic are instances in which teachers deliberately cut parts of their regular lessons in order to promote demand for their supplementary tutoring. With such matters in mind, some governments have devised regulations to address the issues. However, other authorities are *laissez faire*; and even where regulations do exist, they are rarely enacted with effectiveness.

Further issues concern implications of marketization of education, and of contradictions when governments espouse fee-free education as a human right but peer pressures and entrepreneurialism push parents to pay for these supplements. In this connection the Mauritian patterns deserve recall. With Grade 6 enrolment rates

in shadow education reaching 81% (Table 1), clearly private tutoring was not just a preserve of rich families. Elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa enrolment rates were more modest; but the phenomenon is expanding throughout the region, and in practice is probably under-reported.

This last point emphasises the need to focus more attention on the matter. The SACMEQ and PASEC data are shaky insofar as private tutoring was just a side component in surveys that were more concerned with schooling, and suffered from both methodological and implementation constraints. Many of the other studies cited in this chapter also had limitations in sampling and methodological rigour. With such matters in mind, the chapter encourages more researchers to take the theme out of the shadows with stronger data and more rigorous analysis, considering shadow education alongside and in conjunction with not only regular schooling but also other forms of private provision.

Note: Much of this chapter draws on Bray (2021), and is reproduced with permission.

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Regulation and governance of non-state Early Childhood Care and Education in African countries ☐

Anna Cristina D’Addio¹⁷

Introduction

The right to education begins at birth. The recent concept of early childhood which spans between birth and 8 years of age (UNICEF, 2001) recognizes the importance of the entire period between infancy, toddlerhood and pre-primary and primary education. ECCE is thus defined by the set of holistic programmes and policy frameworks which govern the early childhood period (ages 0 to 8 years) (UNESCO, 2021b). The first 1,000 days of age are crucial for child development. During the first years of life children experience rapid growth in cognitive development as by age 3, 90% of the brain is developed (Brown and Jernigan, 2012). During that period children are also very vulnerable and fragile.

Early childhood care and education is recognized as an essential support to parents in their daily lives. Its affordability and the quality of service, in particular, provide important opportunities for breaking the cycle of disadvantage (UNESCO, 2021b; United Nations, 2021; Ünver et al., 2021). Acknowledging that, the fourth Sustainable Development Goal (SDG 4) and its target 4.2 specifically call on countries to ‘ensure that all girls and boys have access to quality early childhood development, care and pre-primary education so that they are ready for primary education’. The UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) and the Global Education Monitoring (GEM) Report are supporting countries in setting benchmarks “(...) for addressing the accountability deficit associated with longer-term targets” (GEM Report UNESCO and UNESCO-UIS, 2022). Among the seven indicators chosen for this benchmarking work, one is indicator 4.2.2 which measures the participation rate in organized learning (one year before the official primary entry age) highlighting again the importance of early childhood education (UNESCO, 2023b).

Other frameworks have showcased the role of early childhood education. The Nurturing Care Framework for Early Childhood Development highlighted equity as a guiding principle (WHO et al., 2018). According to Guiding principle 17 of the

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Abidjan principles (2019) ‘States have the obligation to realise the right to education including by prioritizing (a.) the provision of free, quality, public pre-primary education’. The Global Partnership Strategy for Early Childhood, coordinated by UNESCO (2022a) involved scaling up ‘access, inclusion, equity and quality’ with four strategic priorities. Building on it, the Tashkent Declaration (UNESCO, 2022b), which also refers to the Abidjan Principles, was issued at the end of the World Conference on ECCE held in Uzbekistan in 2022. It set equitable and inclusive ECCE for all as one of the guiding principles to transform ECCE– the others being ECCE personnel, governance, regulation and finance, innovation (Bianchi et al., 2022).

Despite increasing commitments, implementation issues and poor investment continue to affect the deployment of ECCE in low-income countries (Kenya Ministry of Education, 2017; Neuman and Powers, 2021) it remains under-resourced and comparatively neglected as a policy issue. This paper seeks to better understand which factors facilitate or impede efforts to make ECE a political priority in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs which have historically devoted more attention to other education levels, often neglecting ECCE (Shawar and Shiffman, 2017). In sub-Saharan Africa, and Northern Africa and Western Asia, which have made a lot of progress between 2010 and 2020, nearly half of children of pre-primary school age were not in education in 2022 (UNESCO-UIS, 2023a). Among Sub-Saharan African countries only 7 provided some years of free pre-primary education guaranteed in legal frameworks in 2022 (UNESCO-UIS, 2023a). Moreover the Benin, Chad, Central African Republic; Equatorial Guinea, Lesotho, Mali; Niger; South Sudan; Togo, and Zimbabwe have no benchmark on early childhood education; the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Sudan, Uganda have no data to assess progress in this area; while Eswatini, Gabon, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nigeria, Somalia and Zambia collect no data on the benchmark (UNESCO, 2023b).

By 2030, the number of children up to primary school entry age who need childcare but lack access is expected to increase by 25 million in low- and lower-middle-income countries (Devercelli and Beaton-Day, 2020). Gaps in provision accompanied by increasing demand have driven the entry in the sector of a range of non-state actors including private providers, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), faith-based organizations and community groups (see Box 1). Their presence is much higher at this level of education relative to others (UNESCO, 2021a). Globally, non-state providers are educating 41% of all pre-primary students, compared to 14% and 19% at the primary and secondary levels, respectively (Baum, 2021). And these data refer just to recognized or registered private schools suggesting that they are likely to be a lower

bound of the effective ones (Baum, 2021). For example, an early study based on the Young Lives survey suggested that 58% of the children participated in ECCE in Addis Ababa and other urban centres but only 5% of these were in government programs (Woodhead and Streuli, 2013). In Mozambique, most of the pre-primary education is provided by non-state actors primarily religious or community organizations (Bonilla et al., 2019; Härmä, 2016).

As the need for ECCE services continue to grow, understanding the opportunities and challenges that non-state actors present at this education level is critical (RTEI, 2022). This is even more important now in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic during which many young children, especially the most vulnerable, have missed out on ECCE services with potential implications for their development. This chapter discusses the theme of non-state actors in ECCE in African countries looking in particular at issues related to governance and regulation and their implications on quality and equity.

Box 1: Non-state actors cannot be clearly distinguished

There are multiple types of non-state actors in education. Yet related discussions typically involve a simple classification between public and private ones. In practice, the landscape is more complex, and distinctions are far less clear-cut. In this respect, the Global Education Monitoring Report 2021/2 (UNESCO, 2021a) has defined a non-state actor ‘any actor that does not represent the state’ an actor then ‘with a voice and stake in education, from impoverished parents spending money on education to corporations whose market dominance can shape education systems’. This chapter will use this definition to discuss non-state actors.

Based on the analysis of policies and legislation described in the PEER profiles (PEER GEM Report, 2021), it has been possible to depict a very heterogeneous landscape demonstrating the extent to which non-state actors engage in multiple activities in education, and can take multiple forms (UNESCO, 2021a). That analysis also suggested that distinction can be blurred as non-state actors enter the education sector for diverse reasons related to ideas, values, beliefs and interests. Using criteria based on ownership, financing and management different configurations emerge. There can be public schools managed by non-state actors. For example in Botswana, financing of public education is provided by the State and by families, other legal entities and individuals in the forms and limits defined in Law No. 96/AN/00/4e

which specifies that these actors do that in partnership with the State and public authorities”. In Angola, the Lei de Bases do Sistema de Educação establishes in its article 57 related to financing that the State may co-finance private institutions, as long as this is relevant from a public or strategic interest. In this respect, analysis of the PEER profiles has suggested that government-aided non-state schools exist in 171 out of 204 countries.

Individual and social benefits of ECCE extend over the long-term

Early childhood education, as part of a comprehensive package of interventions, creates the foundations for expanded opportunity and offers a chance to escape poverty (UNESCO, 2021b; United Nations, 2021). Its absence can lock children into deprivation and marginalization and negatively affect their opportunities in education and beyond.

Often the research on the impact of early childhood care and education has focused on the short-term individual returns from investing in early childhood education programmes, especially for children from disadvantaged backgrounds (UNESCO, 2021b, 2021a). Studies on medium and long-term effects are still limited due, for example, to the dearth of documentation for programmes implemented in the past, the difficulty in assessing whether standards had been met and how each child had benefited, and the challenge of unpacking the complex relations from interventions to outcomes, especially as successive interventions can build on but also undo the effects of each other (D’Addio, 2022a, 2022b).

Research from the United States, which shows positive long-term effects, even spanning generations, has generated a lot of attention (D’Addio, 2022a). A meta-analysis of 22 experimental and quasi-experimental studies carried out over the course of 50 years found that participation in early childhood education reduced placement in special education and grade retention, and increased secondary school completion by as much as 11 percentage points (McCoy et al., 2017). The same study suggests that even when effects fade out in the short term, medium and long-term gains can be substantial (McCoy et al., 2017), but the mechanisms underlying such effects are complex (Barnett, 2011). Long-term gains can also be related to noncognitive skills development over the early years (Heckman et al., 2013; Kautz et al., 2014). Evaluation of a 1960s project in Michigan targeting disadvantaged African-American children concluded that they subsequently experienced fewer suspensions in school, had better employment outcomes, and were less likely to receive criminal convictions

or to suffer from ill health (Heckman and Karapakula, 2019). Early childhood education programmes' positive impact therefore extends beyond individual outcomes to broader outcomes that support social inclusion.

Evidence on early childhood interventions is also growing for other countries (The Lancet, 2016). In Chile, analysis of grade 4 students showed that those who had attended a public early childhood education programme before entering kindergarten scored higher in reading, mathematics and social sciences than children who had not, with bigger effects for poorer children (Cortázar, 2015). In Karnataka, India, 40% of the gain in cognitive development thanks to a preschool scholarship persisted to the end of grade 1 (Dean and Jayachandran, 2020). In Indonesia, an early childhood education intervention in about 3,000 or 4% of villages in the country reduced gaps in language, cognitive development, communication, general knowledge and pro-social behaviour between poorer and richer children (Jung and Hasan, 2015). An early childhood education programme in Kenya, which involved teacher training, classroom instructional support, teaching and learning materials and a health component in four districts, significantly improved school readiness (Ngware et al., 2018).

In recent years the research has also examined the influence of different types of programmes on the effects of ECCE (D'Addio, 2022a). A meta-regression study, based on a sample of 250 estimates extracted from 30 studies about natural experiments of universal early childhood and education programmes conducted between 2005 and 2017, found about 1/3 of estimates suggesting significant positive effects, half of the estimates were not statistically significant and one in 6 was significantly negative (van Huizen and Plantenga, 2018). Responding to the question, 'when do children benefit from these programmes?', the authors suggest that quality matters, the effects do not fade out over time and public provision is likely to produce more benefits than private provision (van Huizen and Plantenga, 2018).

Access and Participation to ECCE varies considerably

Legal frameworks have positive effect on enrolment

Looking at the situation through the SDG 4 benchmark lenses, increasing early childhood education participation is a target in 117 countries, primarily in Africa and Asia. Yet this comes often without a legal framework to make pre-primary education compulsory (UNESCO, 2023a).

Globally about half of countries do not offer free provision of pre-primary education, and three quarters of countries do not make it compulsory (UNESCO, 2023a).

A recent review of legal frameworks in 193 countries found that 63 countries adopted legal provisions for free pre-primary education, and 51 countries adopted compulsory pre-primary education (UNESCO, 2021c). And in 2022, 88 out of 186 countries with available data still did not have any legislation committing to either free or compulsory pre-primary education (UNESCO, 2023a).

Ghana, the first sub-Saharan African country with compulsory pre-primary education, passed legislation in 2007 to include two years of kindergarten in compulsory basic education starting from age 4. The Early Childhood Care and Development Policy issued by the Ministry of Women and Children's Affairs in 2004 provides a framework for the guidance of all stakeholders who are supporting the survival, protection and development of the children in Ghana in their early years. In April 2022 the Department of Basic Education in South Africa announced plans to introduce two years of compulsory early childhood development for all children before entering the formal school system in grade 1 in order to improve literacy and gauge school readiness (Lehana, 2022). In Ethiopia, the introduction of the National Policy Framework for Early Childhood Care and Education in 2010 promoted O-Class or pre-primary classes attached to government primary schools (Kim et al., 2022) resulting in an increase of the gross enrolment ratio from 4% in 2010 to 29% in 2015 and a decline in the share of private enrolment from 95% to 18%. Similarly, the United Republic of Tanzania, recorded large increases in pre-primary gross enrolment ratio rose from 33% in 2014 to 42% in 2019 and reduction in private enrolment (from 7% to 5%) after the introduction of free preschool in 2014.

Several factors affect participation


Participation increases with age, reaching its highest level the year before primary school entry, the focus of SDG global indicator 4.2.2: in this group, the indicator averaged 76% globally in 2021-2022. In Sub-Saharan Africa shares ranged from 15% in Djibouti to over 95% in the Seychelles in. While some countries have registered fast progress, others such as Benin and Cameroon have stagnated.

Many studies have acknowledged that children from more advantaged households are more likely to get better quality services than their disadvantaged peers unless public policies foster access to improve developmental outcomes. In an ideal world, ECCE would help to level the playfield and provide equal opportunities for all. In reality, the extent to which early childhood care and education fulfills its aims depend largely on features such as geographical distribution of services, quality of caregivers,

the cost of services, and who is benefitting (Lauwerier et al., 2013; Ünver and Nicaise, 2016). As the Global Education Monitoring Report 2020 on Inclusion and Education (UNESCO, 2020) shows, even when inclusion is enshrined in legislation and policies, implementation may lag behind and discrimination may undermine a large part of the benefits expected. It is often the case that the most disadvantaged families and children are left behind (Ünver and Nicaise 2016; UNESCO 2020).

For example, among Sub-Saharan countries with data over the period 2016-2022, poorest children are at large risk of exclusion. The average net attendance rate is 40% among the poorest quintile while it is 84% among the largest quintiles (Figure 1). But also other factors such as geographical location, health and disability conditions affect participation (UNESCO, 2021b).

Figure 1: The poorest children are at large risk of exclusion



Note: y-axis net attendance rate one year before the official primary entry age, by wealth, selected countries, 2016–2022

Source: UIS database as in (UNESCO-UIS, 2023a)

Non-state actor provision is prominent in ECCE

Standardized, comparable data on care and education services for the youngest children do not exist for many countries, especially in comparison with other education levels. This is due to the variety and, often, the informality of some types of provision.

In high-income countries, non-state actors (especially faith-based organizations and charities) have dominated care and education services for the youngest children. For instance, private institutions in 33 high-income countries accounted for 57% of total enrolment for children under 3 in 2018. In Germany about one third of providers for children under 3 were Catholic or Protestant church programmes (Blome, 2018; Strehmel, 2019). Another third were NGOs. Only 3% of providers were in the for-profit sector (European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2019). Often, NGOs and religious organizations are also usual ECCE providers in rural areas.

In 33 middle-income countries, 19% of children under 3 are enrolled in early childhood educational development programmes; non-state actors account for 46% of enrolment, with national shares ranging from less than 2% in Azerbaijan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine to 100% in Dominica and Turkey, albeit at low enrolment levels.

Overall, low- and middle-income countries' governments seldom sponsor childcare, which is considered unaffordable in light of other budget pressures (Penn, 2022). In Gambia, early childhood care and education primarily for ages 3 – 6, is mainly provided by non-state actors (69% of centres, 74% of total enrolments), and is categorized into state centres, grant-aided centres (community-run and funded by the state), *Madrassas* run by religious organizations and 'private' centres (which are in this context run by private individuals, organizations or NGOs). The latter are the largest ECCE provider accounting for 56% of total enrolments. *Madrassas* come second with 19% of total schools and enrolments. However, according to the Education Sector Policy 2016-30, the state plans to introduce universal access to ECCE through strong links with NGOs and communities.

In many countries communities help to deliver ECCE often serving those most in need. In Uganda, 7% of ECCE centres are community-based ((Uganda Ministry of Education and Sports, 2018). Yet, community-based programmes differ in structural characteristics. A comparison in a sample of non-state ECCE provision in major cities in Kenya, Nigeria and United Republic of Tanzania found that the student-teacher ratio in community-based ECCE provision was the lowest in Nigeria (11.7) but not in the United Republic of Tanzania. In general, the costs of community-based programmes were found to be low in Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania, while in Nigeria there was little variation between provider fees (Baum, 2021).


Some governments also partner with NGOs, unions, faith-based organizations, communities and other types of non-state actors to run childcare centres. The government of Ghana makes loans available to private schools for the purposes of upgrading

infrastructure; such opportunities provide incentive for private entrepreneurs to invest in education (Pesando et al., 2020).

Informal arrangements with relatives such as grandparents and siblings or with friends, neighbours, babysitters or nannies may also be the only option available. In Chad and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, half of children under 5 had been left alone or with a sibling in the week prior to the survey. The use of siblings as care-givers can hamper the older sibling's schooling and right to play, and siblings' inexperience can have negative implications for the young child's learning and well-being (Gromada et al., 2020).

Between 2000 and 2022, the share of private institutions in total pre-primary education enrolment increased from 28.5% to 36%. Shares range from less than 1% in Eastern European countries, including Belarus, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, to more than 95% in many countries, notably including Small Island Developing States in the Caribbean (e.g. the British Virgin Islands) and the Pacific (e.g. Samoa) (Figure 2).

Figure 2: The share of private institutions in early childhood enrolment is high



Note: y-axis: Proportion of children enrolled in private institutions, pre-primary education, 2021

Source: (UNESCO-UIS, 2023b)

Yet the trend in private pre-primary enrolment varies across regions. In 2022, Oceania had the highest share of private institutions in total enrolment at 53%, followed by Eastern and South-Eastern Asia at 50%. By contrast, less than 1 in 5 children in Latin America and the Caribbean were enrolled in private pre-primary institutions. In Sub-Saharan Africa and in Northern Africa and Western Asia about 1 in 3 children are enrolled in private pre-primary institutions with differences across countries. In Kenya, for example, 22.5 % of the learners enrolled in the pre-primary private schools (Kenya Ministry of Education, 2020).

Official administrative data seldom capture unofficial non-state providers

Analysis of household surveys suggest that in six of seven sub-Saharan African countries the share of non-state enrolment is underestimated by administrative data (Baum, 2021; Baum et al., 2018; King et al., 2020) with differences between sources averaging 20 percentage points. In Malawi, the share of private institutions in the pre-primary education enrolment ratio was 7% according to administrative data but 63% according to household survey data in 2016-17. Unregistered providers pose concern about quality, governance, regulation, and equity (UNESCO, 2021a).

Non-state provision has mainly addressed demand in urban areas, where such services tend to be more commonly available, and from richer households which can afford them. For instance the probability of attending private preschool was significantly higher for urban than for rural children in five countries including Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa and Uganda (Baum, 2021; UNESCO, 2021a). A study exploring the public and private options available at the ECCE level, along with the preferred and actual choice of preschools in an urban informal settlement in Zambia found strong demand for ECCE among the urban poor. Such a large demand overwhelms low-fee private (LFP) preschool options due both to an insufficient number of public preschools as well as parents' relative preference for the LFP options (Okitsu et al., 2023). In Burkina Faso, the non-State sector contributes mainly to the development of preschool in large localities through the construction of pre-school infrastructure. Yet, preschool education primarily present in urban areas, remains at the early stage (in 2016, the gross pre-school enrolment rate, all types of school combined, was 3.5%).

Depending on contexts, private arrangements within urban areas may be the only option. For instance, in the three urban regions of Ethiopia in 2019/20: Addis Ababa (104%), Dire Dawa (31%) and Harari (45%), the gross enrolment ratio in private

kindergartens is much higher than the national average (10%) (Ethiopia Federal Ministry of Education, 2020).

But where ECCE services exist, different factors drive family's choice. One of the most important is cost. Affordability of ECCE services is a concern. Analysis based on the GEM report PEER profiles on non-state actors¹⁸ (PEER GEM Report, 2021) suggests that globally subsidies for tuition fees and non-tuition fees for families with children enrolled in non-state schools exist in 47 and 54 countries, respectively.

Families spend 9.4% of their annual budget on private pre-primary education in Ghana (compared with 5.1% for those whose children attend public pre-school) and 4.9% in Ethiopia, on average. These costs are unaffordable for the poor households (UNESCO, 2021a; Baum, 2021). As a share of annual consumption, the cost averages 6% for the richest and 17% for the poorest in Ghana; the equivalents in Ethiopia are 4% and 21% (UNESCO, 2021a). Non-state pre-primary fees may vary by type of provider. In Morogoro, United Republic of Tanzania, the annual fee, in purchasing power parity terms, is US\$444 in for-profit, US\$302 in faith-based, US\$253 in community and US\$246 in NGO schools. Tuition varied by school registration and approval status, class size, pupil/teacher ratio and percentage of certified teachers. Children from the richest 20% of households were 2.5 times more likely to attend private provision than their peers in the poorest 20% (Baum, 2021).

Another feature driving selection of ECCE services by families is proximity. In Maputo, Mozambique, the large share of pre-primary schools separate from primary schools is due to parents' preference for the proximity of pre-primary school (Härmä, 2016). Public childcare is absent also in informal settlements (Caddy, 2017). For instance, in Mukuru slum of Nairobi the vast majority of providers (94%) were private offering services within walking distance, on average (Bidwell and Watine, 2014). A study of suburban locations in metropolitan areas of sub-Saharan Africa found that families, on average, could choose between three (in Lagos, Accra, and Johannesburg) and five (in Nairobi) pre-schools within walking distance. For parents in these neighbourhoods, proximity (in Accra, Nairobi, and Johannesburg) and quality of the centre (e.g. teacher qualifications, motivation and in Lagos) were important reasons (Bidwell and Watine, 2014). Indeed, quality, or at least how families perceive it (e.g. teacher qualifications, motivation, curriculum quality), also plays an important role in selection.

¹⁸ The PEER profiles are developed by the GEM Report team at UNESCO and cover policies and legislation related to the theme of the Global Education Monitoring Report or other themes central to SDG 4. On non-state actors there are 211 profiles. They can be found here: education-profiles.org.

The quality of non-state providers is highly variable

Quality refers to structural and process factors linked to positive child outcomes (UNESCO, 2021a). Structural factors are inputs, such as educator/child ratios, class or group sizes, teacher qualifications, materials, physical environments and infrastructure, safety, and attention to water, sanitation and hygiene. Process factors are related to learning and include activities children engage in, stimulation and staff-child interactions, all of which are difficult to measure (UNESCO, 2016). The challenge for policy-makers is to set standards and ensure they are met and to minimize variation in quality between types of providers and within each provider type.

Whether non-state providers deliver services of good quality remains an open question with sometimes contradictory results. A survey of 37 pre-schools in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, found that private pre-schools, which were in the majority, performed better overall but neither private nor public pre-schools met standards (Admas, 2019). In Ghana, private pre-schools had better facilities (Pesando et al., 2020). In Kenya, despite differences between public and private centres were not significant, water, sanitation and play facilities were better in public centres while private providers did not meet government service standard guidelines (Sitati et al., 2016). In Nigeria, for-profit private schools had higher pupil/teacher ratios (Baum, 2021)

Concerning teacher certification for non-state ECCE, 87% of countries have this in place at the global level. Out of 163 countries, the majority are upper-middle (42) and high-income (57) countries (UNESCO, 2021a). The latter tend to have regulations on educator qualifications, certification and working conditions.

Teacher certification in community schools varies. In the United Republic of Tanzania community-based schools were found to have 100% certified teachers, while they were lower in Kenya (76%) and Nigeria (25%). Compared to other types of non-state provision, community-based provision tends to have limited qualification requirements and to include volunteers from the community who have good networking capacities to support programme quality. Teachers in community-based programmes also face issues of low pay and late payments (Baum, 2021).

In many low- and middle-income countries, private ECCE educators tend to be less prepared and have fewer professional development opportunities than their public-sector peers. Only 8% of private but 75% of public kindergarten teachers undertake the Ghana Education Service's training programme (Ghana Ministry of Finance, 2019), as there are no minimum requirements for private ECCE teachers (Wolf et al., 2018). In Zambia, private pre-school teachers increasingly are certified

by unaccredited private colleges, while teachers in public pre-schools must be certified through the Zambia Pre-schools Association (Edwards et al., 2019).

Research on teaching practices is scarce relative to high-income countries. In Ghana, public pre-schools scored higher for ‘praising children for positive behaviours, stimulating classroom interactions, promoting cooperative learning, and using specific tools to facilitate learning’ (Pesando et al., 2020). There may be differences within the private sector. In Kenya, approved private pre-schools scored significantly higher than unapproved schools on teacher–student interaction indicators, such as wait time between activities, teachers’ responses to children’s questions, teachers’ use of open-ended questions and helping students work through problems (Baum, 2021).

The use of English as medium of instruction in non-state pre-schools is also a source of tensions. In Ghana, most public and private pre-schools reported English and a local language in their instruction, while 22% of private schools but no public schools reported teaching exclusively in English (Wolf et al., 2018). In Zambia, the pre-primary curriculum with English as a medium of instruction, diverge from the government’s play-based and mother-tongue based curriculum. Yet urban poor parents view investing in low-fee private preschools as strategy ‘to ‘transform’ their children into ‘modern’ citizens, eventually exiting from their stigmatized lifestyle and marginalized social status’ (Okitsu et al., 2023).

Non-state provision of ECCE challenges governance and regulation

ECCE involves a complex set of services that most countries struggle to govern well, especially for children under 3. Governance of ECCE may in fact be led by the education ministry, another ministry (e.g. social policy or women’s affairs) or an agency, sometimes linked to the president’s office. Analysis of governance and regulations in 211 education systems based on the GEM report PEER profiles (PEER GEM Report, 2021)_ suggests that the ECCE portfolio rests with the education ministry in less than 1 in 3 countries (29%). For example, in Morocco, the Ministry of Social Development, Family and Solidarity works alongside the Ministry of National Education, Vocational Training, Higher Education and Scientific Research for the development of preschool and for the integration of students with disabilities into other levels. In addition, the Ministry of Youth and Sports is working to improve and develop the level of educational and social services provided to children between three months and six years. In Malawi, early Childhood Development is under the Ministry of Gender Child Disability and Social Welfare (MoGCDSW). District, city, and town

councils implement early childhood development policy through local district social welfare offices in coordination with the local community. ECD implementation and orientations are coordinated and managed by the IECD Coordinators in the MoGCDSW and in the local district social welfare. In Seychelles, the Ministry of Education does not regulate child minding services; however, a number of guidelines for childcare operations have been developed by the Public Health Division of the Ministry of Health, the Small Enterprise Promotion Agency (SEnPA) and the Ministry of Community Development and Youth (PEER GEM Report, 2021).

This split governance framework can create differences in care and learning objectives for children within each system with many services focused on ‘care’ for children up to three years of age and ‘education’ from three years of age and older (Deloitte, 2021). For instance, in Botswana responsibilities are shared among the Preschool Development Committee (ages 0 – 4) and the Ministry of Education and Skills Development (ages 4 – 6).

Further to this fragmentation, the range and number of actors active in ECCE and the volume of non-state provision complicate both governance and regulation. Yet good governance and regulation arrangements can improve access, equity and quality and prevent the emergence of parallel systems linked to type of provider and parental ability to pay. For example, engaging community-level stakeholders, including parents, which happen in many lower-income countries can support governance at the local level (Vargas-Barón et al., 2019). (Box 2)

Box 2. Including parents in the management of ecce structures can support governance at the local level

Parents are also another type of non-state actors. Several countries, including Côte d’Ivoire, Lesotho, Morocco, Niger, Togo and Tunisia, expected ECCE centres to include parents in their decision-making through management committees or elected representatives (PEER GEM Report, 2021).

In Ivory Coast school Article 28 of Law No. 95-696 stipulates that cooperatives are set up to promote relations between the school and the environment and to enable pupils to be open to their socio-economic environment. The new article 17 of Law No. 2015-635, amending Law No. 95-696, stipulates that parents are associated through their representatives with the consultation and management bodies established at the level of educational institutions and the national consultation bodies. Finally, the

Autonomous service for the promotion of private education (SAPEP) is responsible for the administrative and pedagogical management of private kindergarten education structures in addition to promoting the quality of teaching and prevention.

In Niger, Order No. 00140/MEBA/DGEB/DPS of 18 November 2005 states that the Association of Educating Mothers is a democratic organization bringing together all mothers or guardians of the same public, private, primary, secondary or pre-school educational institution. It works in collaboration with the Parents' Association. It is responsible for informing parents on what is related to the life and organization of education activities. Article 57 of Law No. 98-12 stipulates that the parents of pupils, through their representatives, participate in the management and animation of schools and in the various "deliberative bodies of schools" (PEER GEM Report, 2021).

In Togo Decree No. 2012-007/PR stipulates that a management committee is set up in each school. The latter aims in particular to develop, implement, support and evaluate development projects; mobilize the actors around the objectives of the project to develop their structure; contribute to the elaboration of local education development plans; develop assistance plans for girls and children from poor families or families with disabilities; and to promote training activities (PEER GEM Report, 2021). The Children's Charter guarantees the establishment of parents' committees in public and private educational establishments. In Rwanda, a private nursery must have a Teachers' council, a Sector education council and a District education council. Communities and parents shall be involved in the management of preschools according to the IECCD Policy (2013). In Morocco, institutions must have a management board. Parents' associations have a duty to ensure transparency and democracy; they are credible interlocutors and partners in the management, maintenance and evaluation of educational establishments. In addition, each local education network is supervised by a management office, composed of the directors of schools and schools connected within the same network, representatives of teachers, parents of pupils and local professional groups. In Tunisia, Article 47 of Framework Law No. 2002-80 stipulates that parents, pupils and associations, through their representatives on school boards, are part of the educational community. The latter assume their tasks in cooperation and complementarity with the institution.

How non-state actors are governed varies by country. Differences emerge in the coordination and integration of ECCE services in African countries. In Congo, Decree No. 80/402 of 10 October 1980 stipulates that the Teaching and Supervision

Division must promote teaching at the pre-school level in both private and State establishments. In Madagascar, private education at the pre-school level is implemented by the Directorate of Pre-school Education and Literacy (DEPA) of the Ministry of National Education (MEN). A body of the Ministry of Education, the National Office for Private Education (ONEP) was created to manage and facilitate interventions between the State and private institutions, particularly at the pre-school level. In the United Republic of Tanzania, non-state provision for children under 4 is regulated by the Ministry of Health, Community Development, Gender, Elderly and Children and the 2019 Law of the Child Act, while pre-primary education is regulated by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology and the 1978 National Education Act (PEER GEM Report, 2021).

Faith-based provision can lead to even more fragmented governance. In Mali, the Ministry of National Education is responsible for pre-schools while the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Local Government supervises Koranic schools. ECCE in Somalia is delivered through traditional Koranic schools, integrated Koranic schools, and privately owned kindergartens and nursery schools run by local NGOs and private foundations in large urban centres. The federal Ministry of Education, Culture and Higher Education is responsible for ECCE policy, service standard guidelines, monitoring and evaluation, while the Ministry of Religious Affairs develops integrated Islamic religion-based ECCE curriculum and appoints and supports training of ECCE trainers (PEER GEM Report, 2021)). ECCE in Somalia is delivered through traditional Qur'anic Schools, Integrated Qur'anic schools and privately-owned kindergartens and nursery schools. They are run by local NGOs and private foundations in larger urban centres. The Ministry of Education, Culture and Higher Education of the Federal Government of Somalia develops ECCE policy and service standard guidelines, monitoring and evaluating; in parallel, the Ministry of Religious Affairs develops integrated ECCE Islamic religion-based curriculum and appoints and supports training of ECCE trainers.

Decentralization adds another layer of complexity. In Ethiopia, ECCE governance is sectorial with weak links between education and health ministry plans despite programmes targeting families with young children (Woodhead et al., 2017).


Regulatory frameworks for non-state actors do not focus enough on equity and quality

Regulation should, as a general principle aim to mobilize all available resources to promote educational development that serves the academic, socioemotional and well-being needs of every learner and educator while also achieving desirable system outcomes related to equity, inclusion, quality, innovation and efficiency (UNESCO, 2021a). As ECCE providers are diverse, regulatory frameworks should aim to define minimum standards and set quality assurance mechanisms to monitor quality and equity of provision (Ponguta et al., 2019; UNICEF, 2019). In this respect the Tashkent declaration highlights that to “ECCE policies, settings, services, programmes and practices should be monitored and evaluated and guided by national standards and regulations that incorporate rights, scientific evidence and the viewpoints of all stakeholders and children » (UNESCO, 2022b).

Findings from PEER information mapping suggests that some areas are comprehensively covered by regulation (PEER GEM Report, 2021) both globally and in Sub-Saharan Africa. Nearly all systems stipulate requirements for entry and operation including registration and licensing. By contrast, few countries regulate aspects such as fee setting that could promote more equitable access (**Figure 3**). Among African countries, for example, in Ethiopia, while non-state ECCE services are free to determine their fees for operation, the federal government plans to introduce cash transfers to non-state providers that will control the fees levied by these services, with the aim to reach more disadvantaged populations. The Education Sector Development Program 2015 – 2020, stipulates also that existing government assistance to non-state providers will be enhanced through additional tax incentives, cash transfers, and provision of learning material, to ensure disadvantaged populations are well represented at this level (which tends to be dominated by relatively wealthier families who can afford fee-paying services).

Analysis also suggests that in a few countries, specific rules concern profit making of the ECCE non state providers. In South Africa the National Integrated Early Childhood Development Policy 2015, allows both for-profit and non-profit organizations to deliver ECCE services. However, for-profit organizations may only qualify for government aid if they have been specifically contracted by the state to provide services to vulnerable groups.

Figure 3: Regulations for non-state provision of ECCE tend to focus more on administrative requirements than on aspects that could promote equity



Note: squares show value in Sub-Saharan Africa; the lozenge marker shows instead global values.

Source: Based on PEER profiles on non-state actors in education www.education-profiles.org

In some instances, countries demonstrate more advanced approaches for regulating, monitoring, and facilitating improvements of private ECCE provision or expanding access (Baum, 2021).

In 2007 Ghana became one of the first countries in Africa to systematically incorporate early childhood education into its efforts towards guaranteeing universal basic education including two-years of pre-primary schooling as a required component of the basic education system (Pesando et al., 2020). Recognizing that the private sector was already delivering a sizable share of early childhood services, Ghana also set some standards such as keeping these services affordable by setting tuition limits for private schools not receiving state subsidies (Pesando et al., 2020).

Many countries lack comprehensive regulatory frameworks or fail to implement them. In Eswatini, the Multi-Sectorial Early Childhood Development and Education Framework 2018–22 contains registration guidelines and minimum standards applicable to all ECCE services, irrespective of ownership, but is yet to be formally adopted (Eswatini Government, 2018; World Bank, 2021)

Regulations tend often to focus on administrative requirements

The majority of regulations for non-state ECCE providers cover registration, approval and licensing. Standards and requirements cover health and safety standards, teacher qualifications and training requirements, group size or pupil/teacher ratios, financing, and zoning and infrastructure standards.

In Mauritania, the Pre-school Education Service of the Ministry of Social Affairs, Children and the Family is responsible for registering and approving public and private kindergartens and pre-schools. Applications for private kindergartens must include a request addressed to the ministry, a morality investigation by police, a criminal record review, a medical certificate and a study of the project describing the building, security, equipment and location, ensuring that it is situated far from traffic crossings and petrol stations, and at least 500 metres from the closest similar facility (PEER GEM Report, 2021).

In Eswatini, individuals, communities, and faith-based providers that wish to establish an ECCE centre must register with the Ministry of Education and Training (MoET) through their Regional Education Office. Both state and non-state providers are required to comply with minimum infrastructure and ratio standards, which include pupil-teacher ratio, classroom size, and toilets (separated by sex). To be considered for registration, applicants must additionally establish a centre committee and have the parents participating in its composition. The MoET initially issues applicants a one-year provisional registration. If the centre is deemed to have met all the required standards and guidelines within one year of operation (following an inspection), the provider is issued a certificate of official registration.

In Ghana, families, the private sector, NGOs, philanthropists, and religious organisations are encouraged to complement and supplement the Government's effort to provide access to ECCE education. The government and private operators can obtain licenses to establish crèches, day care centres, nurseries and kindergartens (PEER GEM Report, 2021)

In Niger, any natural or legal person, fulfilling the conditions specified by Decree No. 96-210/PCSN/MEN may set up a school. The granting of approval is conditional on establishing two separate files addressed to the responsible minister including among others, the criminal record, a certificate of Nigerien nationality and residence, a plan of premises, an estimate of the works and the list of teaching equipment and materials, a commitment to comply with the general rules of public education as well as information on staff and a report by a local commission responsible for verifying school infrastructure standards. The State then conducts a "morality inquiry" of the

applicant and requires the opinion of an accreditation commission. Moreover, only a legal person may apply for the opening of several establishments. Derogations may be granted to natural persons who demonstrate their ability to carry out the planned training measures. Any person over 25 years of age wishing to run a pre-school establishment must also submit an application for authorization which must include a copy of the diplomas obtained; the Brevet d'étude du premier cycle (BEPC) is required, or a recognized equivalent diploma and professional experience of at least five years. The opening of a Koranic or catechism school or a childcare centre must be the subject of a declaration sent by the head of the school to the Prefect of the Department, under cover of the Regional Directorate of National Education (DRE) or the foreign service of the Ministry of the Civil Service and Labour (PEER GEM Report, 2021).

In Tunisia, the Framework Law No. 2002-80 set that the Ministry of Education's authorization is required for the establishment of a private primary school or kindergarten. It is not possible for the same person to set up more than one private educational institution. In Togo, the establishment of private secular and denominational schools is also subject to state approval. A regulatory framework is in place to control the creation and operationalization of schools through Ministerial Order No. 042/MEPS of 20 August 2004 and Order No. 261/MEPS/CAB/SG of 3 September 2014 which set the conditions for being authorized and set up the establishment.


Entry and operation requirements may differ by age (UNESCO, 2021a) and provider type. Certain requirements can be counterproductive. In South Africa, entry requirements act as a disincentive for potential non-state providers to enter and operate officially, but unregistered operation can lead to issues with quality, safety and equity (BRIDGE et al., 2020). The National Integrated policy of 2015 noting that the 'norms and standards do not clearly differentiate between different types of early childhood development programmes' provided for increased power of the local municipalities to strengthen the registration and monitoring system (South Africa Government, 2015).

Non-state providers register as business or commercial entities in some countries. In Lusaka, Zambia, low-fee private centres must register through the City Council and its health and commercial sectors. They can operate as 'commercial enterprises' whose education orientation is not considered (Edwards et al., 2019).

Not all countries have regulations on teacher accreditation in non-state ECCE

Many countries (87%) have regulations on teacher certification or training for ECCE teachers. Yet only about 40% of countries have regulations on teacher accreditation, with regional shares ranging from 13% in Northern Africa and Western Asia to 69% in Eastern and South-eastern Asia (**Figure 4**). In Sub-Saharan Africa regulations on teachers' accreditation mechanisms exist only in half countries

Figure 4: Only 1 in 2 countries have regulations on teacher accreditation in non-state ECCE



Source: Based on PEER profiles on non-state actors in education www.education-profiles.org

In Gambia, all teachers and caregivers in ECCE centres are required to be qualified or trainable in ECCE. The Revised Guidelines for the Opening of Private and Other Schools in the Gambia 1998 additionally state that any centre wishing to enrol one-year-old children is required to employ a qualified nursing assistant. Caregivers in community centres however are often volunteers and may receive ad-hoc payments from community members or philanthropists. In Ethiopia, all teachers in ECCE

services (state and non-state) are required to fulfil the minimum qualification and certification standards (including training in special needs education), while the government funds and provides ECCE teacher training to both state and non-state providers. ECCE centres in Eswatini are required to recruit teachers and caregivers from their surrounding community, all of which must undergo in-service training (if they haven't been previously trained) and fulfil the minimum qualifications listed in the National Curriculum Framework and the National ECCE Guidelines.

Quality assurance mechanisms are still not common in ECCE

Quality assurance mechanisms, such as internal and external inspections, can support state and non-state actors in monitoring and strengthening the quality of non-state provision (Neuman and Devercelli, 2013). Globally the education ministry is responsible for assuring the quality of non-state ECCE provision in 63% countries but in 28% of countries multiple authorities have that responsibility. In Sub-Saharan Africa primary responsibilities in this area rest with the Ministry of education in 71% of countries, while in 1 in 5 multiples authorities intervene. In Sierra Leone, according to the Child Right Act (2007) the council shall inspect the premises, books, accounts and other records of a day-care centre at least once every six months. In South Africa, a data-driven approach was developed to ensure the quality of private ECCE centres. With the use of an application, parents, teachers, principals and administrators can contribute to monitoring and feedback process using real-time data (Consortium for Pre-primary Data and Measurement in Africa, 2020). In Niger, Order No. 0136/MEN/DEPRI/DETFP of 3 July 2000 provides for the establishment of a commission to verify standards and infrastructures in private educational establishments, particularly in pre-school education.

Child assessment is rarely used. In South Africa, assessment is based on the National Integrated Early Learning and Development Standards and the South African National Curriculum Framework for Children from Birth to Four, which provide key developmental results in six areas: communication, exploration, well-being, identity and belonging, creativity, and knowledge and understanding (PEER GEM Report, 2021). In Sierra Leone, the 2021 Integrated Early Childhood Development (IECD) policy includes the development of a play-based early learning assessment tool based on the Early Learning Standards for assessing progress across the domains of child development (PEER).

Regulations in low- and middle-income countries generally specify minimum standards, including for learning materials. For example, all ECCE services in Eswatini

(state and non-state) are encouraged to follow the Eswatini National Curriculum Framework for General Education 2018 (with specific standards for ECCE) and the Early Learning and Development Standards. The purpose of both these guidelines is to encourage the standardization of curriculum and learning standards across different providers of ECCE in the country. In Ethiopia, the federal government has developed a national kindergarten curriculum (3-year program) and minimum education standards, which is adapted by REBs to guide kindergarten curriculum development at the regional level. According to the National Preschool Inspection Framework 2007, all providers (no matter whether state or non-state) are required to adopt a relevant and participatory curriculum, which is reflective of the child's development, while the Education and Training Policy 1994 requires all kindergartens to use nationality languages as their language of instruction.

In Lagos, Nigeria, where non-state provision is included within the quality assurance system, 56% of private pre-primary schools were inspected by the Quality Assurance Department of the State Ministry of Education. It was also found that pre-primary schools charging high tuition fees were inspected more frequently (68%) than those charging less (48%). In Nairobi, Kenya, community schools are inspected more often than religious, charity, or for profit schools. By contrast, in Morogoro, United Republic of Tanzania, there is higher level of government oversight and no difference in inspections by school recognition status. Diverse provision means that coordinated data collection systems are needed (Baum, 2021).

In Togo, the Education Sector Plan 2020-2030 expects to initiate meetings between the founders of private kindergartens and inspections “for a better understanding and application of the texts in force” (p. 53). It also aims to strengthen the mechanisms for supervising private pre-school classes. Strategy S1.3 of the Education Sector Plan 2020-2030 states that to ensure the quality of private pre-school institutions, they will be “better supervised with a strengthening of supervision mechanisms and the organization of exchange meetings between the public administration and the founders of private preschool institutions”.

Sanctions are applied for violation of standards

The majority of countries, 92% in Sub-Saharan Africa, have regulations to sanction providers that do not comply with government standards. Some include a process allowing providers to redress issues within a certain period; if there is no improvement, their licence can be revoked, or the centre closed.

For example, in Sierra Leone the Child Right Act (2007) states that if the day-care centre is not being managed efficiently in the children's best interest or complying with the requirements for its authorization, the council can suspend the registration/License.

Strong governance is needed when non-state actors dominate provision

Good governance demands strong coordination, collaboration and cooperation that is horizontal (between sectors) and vertical i.e. responsibilities decentralized to regional and local actors (Britto et al., 2017; Yoshikawa et al., 2018).

To ensure that ECCE policies and services align with other relevant childcare, health and education policies across different government portfolios, ECCE governance frameworks can be supported by a holistic, cross-portfolio office for children (Vargas-Barón et al., 2022) yet until now the number of countries adopting them has not been systematically documented. Numerous global declarations, including Education for All and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Cross-portfolio offices can support inclusion in ECCE by ensuring that a jurisdiction's ECCE service delivery and policy response around a child is coordinated and consistent. In Mauritius, the Early Childhood Care and Education Authority (ECCEA), which is under the Ministry of Education since its creation in 2008, works with other ministries to provide equal pre-school access to all children, with a focus on those at risk for developmental delays. Poor children from poor households are provided with food, clothing, transportation, pedagogical materials, medical care and psychological support (Denauw and Loizillon, 2021). The government also facilitates access to ECCE through the abolition of fees in public pre-schools, and the extension of the per capita grant for children ages 3 to 5 years attending private pre-school to guarantee access to one or two years of pre-primary education across the country. In Sierra Leone, where Early Childhood Care and Education governance is a multi-ministry intervention including the Ministry of Basic and Senior Secondary Education (MBSSE), Teaching Service Commission, Ministry of Health and Sanitation, Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs, and Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, the MBSSE launched the Integrated Early Childhood Development (IECD) policy in 2021 for children aged from zero to eight to have access to early childhood development (ECD) services.

The extent to which responsibility for ECCE is integrated into a single comprehensive governance framework across all age levels and actors in early childhood may also support greater consistencies in ECCE policies, curricula, and workforce for children of different age levels (Neuman, 2005 in Deloitte 2021) while also helping to position

ECCE as a public good. Coordination with primary schooling, is an increasing concern as it can facilitate a smooth transition between the two stages. Integration can also promote inclusion ‘by minimising the fragmentation of services, reducing the logistical burden for children and families in navigating the ECCE system, which may in turn minimise barriers for children from disadvantaged backgrounds in accessing services (UNESCO, 2021b).

Conclusion

Early childhood education is crucial for child development and can help to escape poverty and marginalization. Access to all is a pre-requisite to inclusion (UNESCO, 2020). But despite progress made in the provision of ECCE, many children still lack access especially in low-income countries. Even in high-income countries, however, the most vulnerable are more likely to be left behind (UNESCO, 2020, 2021a) as participation is affected by multiple factors such as household’s income and wealth, rurality, health status and disability.

Over time and especially where the public sector has lacked resources to provide ECCE services for families and children from birth to school age, non-state actors have responded to demand making their presence prominent in many countries. Ensuring they are meeting standards and not entrenching unequal access at the expense of disadvantaged groups becomes therefore crucial. The pandemic has highlighted the importance of understanding these issues and the need to ensure that all children have access to high-quality ECCE services.

Effective and feasible regulations and governance are critical tools to ensure quality and equity for all young children (Bianchi et al., 2022; D’Addio, 2022b; UNESCO, 2021a). But despite progress in this area more remains to be done especially in low-income countries.

While government efforts to expand public provision in pre-primary education have helped enrolment grow in some contexts, monitoring efforts need to be accelerated for the full range of non-state providers and target populations (UNESCO, 2022b). The national SDG 4 benchmark-setting processes led by the GEM Report and UNESCO-UIS (GEM Report UNESCO and UNESCO-UIS, 2022) aims to make countries accountable for their commitments; this is a crucial step to ensure ensuring access to quality early childhood education for all learners.

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Comparison of Private and Public School Performance in Francophone Africa: Lessons from the PASEC survey ☐

Hilaire Hounkpodoté¹⁹ & Thibaut Lauwerier²⁰

1. Challenges for basic education in Francophone Africa

There has been much progress regarding access to schooling in Francophone Africa over the past two decades, mainly due to the international movements related to Education for All.

Nevertheless, this sector still has significant challenges, mainly due to socio-economic poverty and inequality. For example, let's look at the Human Development Index (HDI). Three categories of countries participating in the 2019 PASEC survey emerge from the data: 1) one country with a high HDI (Gabon, 115th), 2) two countries with a moderate HDI (Congo, 138th and Cameroon, 150th), 3) countries with a low HDI (all other countries). In addition, three categories also emerge in the updated classification of countries based on their income established by the World Bank: 1) one upper-middle-income country (Gabon), 2) five lower-middle-income countries (Benin, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, and Senegal), 3) seven low-income countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, DRC, Guinea, Madagascar, Niger, and Togo) (PASEC, 2020). Thus, the WIDE-UNESCO database allows us to observe that in this context, especially in the countries in the third category, hundreds of thousands of children are still out of school, particularly students from disadvantaged backgrounds (Figure 1).

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Figure 1. Percentage of children of primary school age who are not in school




Source: WIDE-UNESCO, 2022

This unschooling issue is alarming because Sub-Saharan Africa is characterized by strong demographic growth, so there will always be more children to enrol in the coming decades (CONFEMEN, 2017). Since governments cannot meet this high demand by opening enough classes and recruiting teachers, public schools face overcrowded classrooms. As a result, the private sector has become an alternative for many parents faced with the lack of public provision (ReFPE, 2022).

Beyond access, which has been emphasized, the region faces serious quality challenges because many young people, after primary schooling, lack basic skills, particularly in reading and mathematics (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Percentage of students by proficiency level in reading and mathematics – Late primary



Source: PASEC, 2020

Concerning literacy, which is one of the HDI components, despite continuous improvement in its indicators worldwide, the adult literacy rate is still relatively low in sub-Saharan Africa: 59.6% for women and 72.8% for men in 2020. The number of literate young people aged 15 to 24 remained constant in this region in 2020 (74.2% for women and 79.5% in 2020) (UNESCO, 2021).

Many factors can explain this situation. First, we can address the challenges related to teachers. Even though it is the focus of attention at the international and national levels, the teaching profession has undergone a long and increasing period of casualization in Francophone Africa. This casualization corresponded to a double parallel political movement: first, the Structural Adjustment Programs of the 1980s-1990s, one of the effects of which was the departure of qualified civil servant teachers and the closure of many pre-service training centres; second, the Education for All initiatives, which focused primarily on access to schooling through the mass enrolment of students to the detriment of the quality of education and, consequently, the qualification of teachers. An extensive literature review on this issue (Lauwerier & Akkari, 2015) shows that teachers' working conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa can hinder the quality of education: they can foster a lack of motivation and professional commitment. Again, in this context, the quality of initial and in-service training has deteriorated for teachers with an already low level of schooling (for the majority, upper secondary level). In addition, the duration of these training courses has decreased significantly, and the content is often inappropriate. Finally, gaps in teachers' knowledge of pedagogical content and classroom practices undermine student learning and achievement (Akyeampong, Pryor, Westbrook & Lussier, 2011). Many authors, including Bashir, Lockheed, Ninan, and Tan (2018), insist on the importance of content mastery. While formal teacher certification is not always correlated with pupil learning, good teacher mastery of topics is associated with better learning in both high-income and low- and middle-income countries (Bold, *et al.*, 2017; Hill, Rowan & Ball, 2005).

The languages of instruction constitute another major challenge insofar as, since their independence, African countries have opted for different policies regarding the language of instruction. If some decided to use national languages (for instance, Wolof or Pulaar in Senegal), others chose to use the colonial language as the instruction language, while others adopted mixed language policies. It is crucial to consider the language of instruction in contexts where most children do not speak the language used in the classroom, which is the case in most French-speaking African countries. Recent works by Laitin and Ramachandran (2017) show, using the Demographic

and Health Survey (DHS), that a year of schooling in a local language system has a higher impact than a year of schooling in a colonially inherited language in terms of the probability of being able to read. Currently, in most French-speaking African countries, students must learn in a language neither they nor their teachers have fully mastered. Varly, Mazunya, and Thacker (2017) show that the excellent results of Burundi in comparison with other sub-Saharan countries are probably due to its choice to use Kirundi as the language of instruction. Ramachandran (2017) noted that research has been converging for at least a decade, emphasizing the importance of mother tongue education in early learning. It should be pointed out that the curricular approaches in force in most countries, particularly the Competency-Based Approach, would like students to be in an active position at the heart of knowledge construction. Moreover, this is to be put in parallel with the pedagogical means that are inadequate with the ambitions of these approaches (Lauwerier, 2016).

This general situation in the Francophone African context, along with the growing development of the private sector (see also the other chapters of this book), leads us to the following question: To what extent has research shown better performance in the private or public education sector? We will now see that the literature on this question is not consensual.

2. Private-public sector comparison

Research comparing performance between private and public students has been conducted primarily in the context of Anglophone Africa. Baum & Riley (2019), offering a synthesis of previous research and a new study, focuses on the productivity of public and private schools in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly Kenya. The authors find a robust causal advantage of private school performance in reading and math. Private school students outperform their public school peers by one-quarter to one-half standard deviation. These estimates are smaller than those found previously by Bold et al. (2013) in the Kenyan context.

Nevertheless, the effect sizes found in this study represent a substantial difference in performance. These results support the findings in the literature on school choice in Africa: parents favour private schools because of the higher quality of education they offer. In his study on the Global South, Aslam (2017) shows that “there is evidence of certain types of non-state actors being able to achieve better learning outcomes than state school counterparts (moderate evidence for low-fee private (LFP) schools and philanthropic schools) and of certain types of arrangements with governments

(subsidies to non-state actors) showing weakly positive indications of improved educational quality” (p. 2).

In the same vein, research conducted by the Francophone Research Network on the Privatization of Education (ReFPE) in 2021 and 2022 in five countries (Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Morocco, Niger, and Togo) shows that families, including those from disadvantaged socioeconomic backgrounds, are pushed to choose either not to go to school or to go to a private school when the quality of their education is poor. According to families, school performance is better in private than public schools. Among the arguments often mentioned, we find recurrent teacher strikes that do not allow the school program to be completed, the poor quality and inadequacy of materials in the public sector, and the overcrowded school environment.

However, we must be cautious since this same research has shown that teachers are better qualified in the public sector – while noting the porous nature of the borders since these same teachers can teach in the private sector to supplement their salary (ReFPE, 2022). Also, the recent GEMR-UNESCO report (2021) urges caution about the rationality of parental choice:

A foundational assumption among those who support non-state schools and school choice is that parents, as consumers, have access to information about the best schools and use that information efficiently. In practice, [...], this is a fallacy [...] In any case, parents often ignore such information. They choose schools that appeal to them for other reasons: religious beliefs, convenience, and students’ demographic characteristics. In fact, parents often look for schools whose students have the social status to which they aspire and take advice from their social networks. Finally, in practice, school choice is not available for many households, notably those in rural areas (p.14)

Beyond the choice of families, research suggests possible explanations for the better performance of private schools, specifically in Francophone Africa.

Indeed, in analysing the characteristics of private provision, the ReFPE research (2022) points out that, in all levels of education – from preschool to higher education – the quality of private institutions, except community-based schools, is better than that of the public. We will see later that the PASEC data complement this finding.

Moreover, private students perform better because they generally do not come from the same residential and socioeconomic backgrounds as public students. For example, some regions of Burkina Faso have almost no private schools. Likewise, children of farmers hardly attend private schools (ReFPE, 2022). Nevertheless, even controlling for parental socioeconomic status, some research, particularly in Latin

America, shows that private school students perform better (Reyes Cayul & Akkari, 2017). Note, however, that residential background is rarely considered.

We maintain that, beyond the private supply itself, privatization creates disparities between populations of different socioeconomic levels. Indeed, tutoring can be an angle of private support given to students in addition to the teaching they receive in schools. This is what some authors like Mark call “shadow education” (Bray, 2021). Moreover, currently, this support benefits far more advantaged families (Harvey, 2005; Ward, 2014).

Thus, in this chapter, we will highlight what the PASEC survey data tell us about the performance of private versus public school students. We will also highlight in the conclusion what these data do not tell us to see what research needs to be done to understand the phenomenon better. Note that this is the first research to mobilize PASEC data to compare private and public performance.

3. Methodology

We used data from the CONFEMEN Education Systems Analysis Program (PASEC) evaluations, particularly the PASEC2019 survey.

Created in 1991, PASEC conducts learning assessments in basic education. Between 2014 and 2021, PASEC produced data and analyses on the comparative performance of education systems (PASEC2014 and PASEC2019). In general, the results of these assessments show that education systems in Francophone Africa still have problems with the quality of learning.

PASEC’s methodology is based on a sample survey of schools, classes, and students in each grade (end and beginning). For each country, a representative sample school is selected in grade 6 and half of sample is selected randomly in grade 2. Tests are administered to students after they are drawn from a class at the beginning (2nd grade) or the end of school (6th grade).

At the beginning of the school year, the tests are administered in two phases: about 30 minutes per student to answer the questions related to the language tests and about 20 minutes per student to answer the questions related to the mathematics tests, and a very light questionnaire about their characteristics, family environment, and educational resources.

At the end of the school year, the tests are presented as multiple-choice questions (MCQs) in a “paper and pencil” format, administered collectively and independently. The test is organized in several stages: the reading comprehension items, the

mathematics items, and the response to a questionnaire on their characteristics, their family environment, educational resources, and their well-being at school.

In the PASEC2019 evaluation and for the first time, the PASEC survey integrated data collection from teachers through four equivalent types of booklets comprising five parts, including reading comprehension, didactics of reading comprehension, mathematics, didactics of mathematics, and a context questionnaire on their individual characteristics, their professional experience and status, the characteristics of their class, information on their teaching, their pedagogical collaboration and their working conditions.

A questionnaire is also sent to school principals. It covers the principal's characteristics, their school's characteristics, inspection elements, relations with parents and the community, pedagogical aspects, management, and school life.

The PASEC data may also have several limitations, which make us cautious in our analyses. For example, schools linked to diplomatic missions, which enrol thousands of students, are not included in the private schools either. More generally, they are not included in official country school databases. However, even in Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire, since these schools are located only in cities and only in two or three large cities, in terms of population, they do not represent much.

In particular, they may not contain information on all types of existing private schools, even though the selection of schools in PASEC is made by stratification. This stratification first divides the schools by region or department of the country. Then, based on this categorization, the schools are selected according to the weight of public, private, or community schools (Table 1).

However, the category "private school" may not reflect the wide variety of private schools outside of state control and, therefore, not reflected in official data, particularly unregistered private schools that are often considered poor quality (ReFPE, 2022).

Table 1. Distribution of school type in PASEC surveys

	PUBLIC		PRIVATE		COMMUNITY	
	Percentage	Standard error	Percentage	Standard error	Percentage	Standard error
Benin	62.8	2.7	37.2	2.7	0.0	0.0
Burkina Faso	68.1	2.3	29.2	2.0	2.7	1.0
Burundi	93.6	2.0	6.4	2.0	0.0	0.0
Cameroon	67.5	2.4	29.6	2.1	2.8	1.6
Congo	53.1	2.6	44.8	2.6	2.1	0.9
Côte d'Ivoire	83.4	2.9	15.7	2.8	0.9	0.6
Gabon	63.9	3.3	36.1	3.3	0.0	0.0
Guinea	60.0	2.8	39.5	2.9	0.5	0.5
Madagascar	66.6	3.5	30.6	3.3	2.8	1.0
Niger	95.7	0.8	4.3	0.8	0.0	0.0
DRC	74.7	3.8	20.0	3.4	5.2	1.6
Senegal	81.8	3.5	18.2	3.5	0.0	0.0
Chad	67.2	3.1	12.6	2.5	20.2	2.8
Togo	66.1	1.4	33.0	1.4	0.9	0.6
Average	71.4	0.7	25.9	0.7	2.7	0.3

Source: PASEC2019 data

Nevertheless, the PASEC data, despite the limitations mentioned above, constitute a wealth of information that is very important for steering education systems. The database contains information on 62,934 students in 3,540 schools in 14 countries participating in the evaluation. These data are also among the most reliable in French-speaking Africa. Thus, beyond the fact that this survey allows for a comparison between many countries and periods (regular surveys), it supports our choice to mobilize these data for this research.

It should be noted that the availability of quality data for comparing private and public education is a significant challenge in Francophone Africa. In this context, having complete databases with school statistics is difficult. However, these statistical data do not include personal information that could justify the withholding of information by the ministries in charge of education. Therefore, how can critical data analysis be made possible without free and easy access to these data? Beyond the availability of data, there is the question of their quality. For example, when we have statistical yearbooks, they present aggregated data. However, they do not always allow for a detailed analysis

between the private and public sectors and even less for a detailed analysis of the different categories of private education. Also, in some countries, the quality of the forms filled in by the directors of private schools is lower than that of public schools, which explains why specific data concerning private schools seem “abnormal.”

Results

We will first present the characteristics of private and public schools in a comparative perspective based on PASEC data and then highlight the differences in performance on PASEC tests in the public and private sectors. This will then allow us to draw conclusions about the quality of the private and public sectors while noting the limitations of this type of analysis.

1. Characteristics of private and public offers

In this section, we highlight the characteristics of private and public offers based on PASEC data, which, it should be recalled, concerns a large sample of schools in Francophone Africa.

a. Teachers

This paragraph highlights specific characteristics of teachers in the private and public sectors. These are the academic level of teachers and their experience.

Academic level

In most countries covered by PASEC, the proportion of teachers with a university degree is higher in the public sector than in the private sector, except in Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Guinea, and Madagascar.


More specifically, in both the public and private sectors, there is a higher proportion of teachers with secondary education than university education. For example, the proportion of teachers with a secondary level is 66.4% in the private sector and 75.6% in the public sector in Benin. These proportions are, for example, 85.6% and 80.8%, respectively, in Burkina, 90.7% and 92.8% in the DRC, 73.4% and 68.6% in Togo, and 78.5% and 91.9% in Niger.

Experience

In all countries, most private-sector teachers have a maximum of 10 years of experience. The same situation is observed in the public sector, except in Benin, Senegal,

and Togo, where nearly 50% of teachers have between 11 and 20 years of experience (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Percentage of teachers by years in service



Source: PASEC2019 data

b. Equipment and educational resources


As noted in the literature in this context, the level of equipment in private schools is generally of higher quality. This kind of information is collected from teachers through a series of questions about classroom equipment availability.

The data show that, on average, the level of equipment is a little higher in private school classrooms than in public school classrooms. This means private school classes are better equipped on average than public schools, although the situation may be the opposite in some private schools.

More concretely, PASEC data provides information on the existence of a teacher's desk in the classroom. In general, teachers sometimes do not have a desk in both the public and private sectors. In more than half the countries, the proportion of teachers with a desk in their classroom is higher in private school classrooms than in public school classrooms. In Benin, the proportion of teachers with a desk is 90% in private schools and 90.3% in public schools. In Senegal, these proportions are 84% and 86.5%, respectively. In Niger, they are 96.4% and 57%, respectively.

The availability of electricity in classrooms is also analysed in this study. Although the availability of electricity is evident in some localities, it is found that even in urban areas, some classrooms do not have access to electricity. According to the data, a higher proportion of private school classrooms have electricity in all countries than public schools. For example, in Senegal, 77.3 per cent of private schools and 67.1 per cent of public schools have electricity. In Madagascar, these proportions are 36.6% and 6.1%, respectively (Figure 4).

Figure 4. Existence of electricity in classes between public and private



Source: PASEC2019 data

c. School management and life

Teachers' assessment of their school's management

In the questionnaire sent to teachers, PASEC asked a series of questions about their assessment of their working conditions. Among these questions, one concerns the quality of school management.

In most countries, public school teachers seem to appreciate the quality of their school's management better than private ones, except in Niger, for example, where 80.8% of private school teachers consider the quality of their school's management to be "good," compared to 71.9% of public-school teachers.

Management by school principals

The experience of principals is tracked in the PASEC data not only by the number of years spent as a principal but also by the number of years spent as a teacher before becoming a principal. In slightly more than half of the countries, the average years spent as a principal is almost identical in both the private and public sectors. In Benin and Madagascar, the average years spent as a principal is higher in the private sector (12.3 years for Benin and 10.1 years for Madagascar) than in the public sector (6 years for Benin and 6.2 years for Madagascar). In the DRC and Cameroon, public sector directors (16.4 years for the DRC and 8.6 years for Cameroon) have more years of experience than their private sector counterparts (6.2 years for the DRC and 6.3 years for Cameroon). As for past teaching experience before being assigned to the position of principal, we can see that in half the countries (Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Senegal, and Togo), private and public principals have almost the same number of years of teaching experience. In Congo and Niger, private principals (13.6 years for Niger and 12.2 years for Congo) have more teaching experience than their public counterparts (7.3 years for Niger and 9.1 years for Congo). In contrast, in Burkina Faso, Burundi, Guinea, Madagascar, and the DRC, public school principals have more years of teaching experience than their private school counterparts.

Additional pedagogical training, pedagogical leadership training, and on-going or additional training in school management

In characterizing public and private schools, the training received by school managers is an element of this study. While the proportion of school principals who have received additional pedagogical training varies from one country to another, a difference between public and private schools, although not very remarkable in several countries, seems to be significant in Cameroon (81.3% in the private sector compared with 63.8% in the public sector) and Senegal (74.5% in the private sector compared with 53.3% in the public sector). Concerning principals receiving additional training in leading a teaching team, the differences in proportions are remarkable in Côte d'Ivoire (65% for the private sector versus 35.3% for the public sector) and Senegal (73.6% for the private sector versus 31.7% for the public sector), Gabon (73% for the private sector versus 56.8% for the public sector) and the DRC (54.9% for the private sector versus 73.8% for the public sector). As for the benefit of continuous or complementary training on school management, the differences in favour of the private sector are remarkable in Benin (26.1% for the private sector versus 14.7% for

the public sector), Burundi (42.7% for the private sector versus 32% for the public sector) Cameroon (60.4% private versus 37.2% public), Congo (48.3% private versus 34% public), Senegal (60.3% private versus 27.6% public), and Togo (63.8% private versus 50.3% public). In Madagascar and the DRC, the proportion difference favours public sector managers (Table 2).

Table 2. Percentage of principals by additional pedagogical training, pedagogical leadership training, and continuing or additional training in school management

	Have you received any additional pedagogical training as a director in the last two years (seminar, refresher course, etc.)?		Have you received additional training in leading a teaching team in the last two years?		Have you received any in-service or additional training in school management in the past two years?	
	Private	Public	Private	Public	Private	Public
Benin	29.0	24.4	38.7	36.2	26.1	14.7
Burkina Faso	29.0	34.7	24.6	19.3	18.7	13.4
Burundi	38.1	33.5	21.1	16.3	42.7	32.0
Cameroon	81.3	63.8	75.6	69.9	60.4	37.2
Congo	72.1	42.1	62.8	54.5	48.3	34.0
Cote d'Ivoire	64.8	48.3	65.0	35.3	44.2	38.0
Gabon	66.3	62.7	73.0	56.8	55.4	48.7
Guinea	65.4	47.7	42.0	46.2	38.9	31.7
Madagascar	49.7	56.1	36.7	50.0	20.4	40.6
Niger	55.2	49.4	58.4	51.4	56.4	48.9
DRC	79.1	81.3	54.9	73.8	54.9	75.6
Senegal	74.5	53.3	73.6	31.7	60.3	27.6
Chad	47.1	51.8	39.8	50.9	53.0	53.6
Togo	87.2	78.8	59.8	40.7	63.8	50.3

Source: PASEC2019 data

It should be added to this analysis of the additional training received by principals. Most principals in the public and private sectors state that they are involved in administrative and pedagogical matters to manage classes properly.

Daily management of school life


In daily school life management, a teacher may be absent from a class for some reason. In order to be able to respect the time quantum and for the students to benefit from the lessons planned following the school calendar, the PASEC questionnaire asked how the directors, who are responsible for the school's management, arrange the lessons to make up for the teacher's absence. No private school principal asks students to go home in most countries (9 out of 14). Moreover, a significant majority (ranging from 55% to 96%) of both public and private school principals report that "students are occupied by a teacher from another class" or "they replace the teacher themselves," with proportions varying from country to country and between public and private. In the private sector, particularly in three countries (Benin, Guinea, Madagascar), principals (in a tiny proportion, between 1.6% and 3.2%) report using a retiree to replace a teacher. Although we found that both public and private schools offer to tutor the weakest students at the beginning and end of primary school, the proportions are overwhelmingly high in private schools.

d. Socioeconomic characteristics of parents and student support

The socioeconomic status of students is measured by an index constructed based on questions about the availability of material goods in the household and the characteristics of the dwelling (television, computer, radio, DVD player, cell phone, freezer or refrigerator, air conditioner, fan, stove, means of transportation, materials used for the construction of the dwelling house, latrines with or without running water, electricity, etc.). It should be noted that the PASEC survey attempted to collect data on school fees. However, the information was not sufficiently reliable because some gave overall school fees instead of providing fees per student. As a result, we have information on fees exceeding 25,000,000 FCFA, which is unrealistic.

According to the data, the socioeconomic level of parents of private school students is, on average higher than that of parents of public school students (see figure below). The highest gap in the index between public and private schools is found in Niger (18 points), followed by Burundi (15.5 points), Togo, Benin, and Guinea (9 points). To complete this picture, the socioeconomic situation of students in community schools, who are not included in the private/public comparison, is sometimes mixed. In some countries, the socioeconomic level is lower in community schools than in public schools (Figure 5).

Figure 5. Evidence between parental socioeconomic level in public, private, and community schools



Source: PASEC2019 data

It should also be considered that not all students have access to tutoring, depending on their parents' socioeconomic level. Again, this is a source of inequality that impacts school performance.

In the literature review, we discussed the issue of shadow education as a factor that promotes disparities between populations of different socioeconomic backgrounds. Therefore, we can present the PASEC data concerning the issue of shadow education. This support occurs either to help students with difficulty to fill their gaps or to help students who are already successful in improving their results.

The PASEC data allow us to know whether students are supported by a teacher-repeater, which is an additional financial burden for households. On average, practicing teachers or tutors provide slightly less than one-third (26.6%) of tutoring. This percentage is highest in Benin (41.7%) and lowest in Madagascar (5.7%). In public schools, tutoring is provided by teachers/repeaters on average at less than 25%, with a higher proportion in Senegal (33.9%) and a low proportion in Madagascar (7%). In private schools, the proportion of teachers/repeaters providing tutoring exceeds 30%, with the same country leading the way (Senegal, 56.5%) and Madagascar (4.5%) having the lowest proportion.


Thus, these characteristics of the private and public offers, according to the PASEC data, provide us with part of the explanation for the student's academic performance, a point we will address in the next section, highlighting, in particular, the performance gaps between private and public students.

2. Performance gaps

According to the data, a difference in performance is to the advantage of private school students in all countries in language and mathematics. These results confirming the better performance of private school students are consistent with what has been found in research comparing the performance of private and public school students in Africa.

In general, the language performance of private school students is better than that of public school students, except in Burkina Faso (Figure 6). The differences are also relatively significant. For example, in Senegal, the gap in 2014 was nearly 200 points, which has narrowed over time. On the other hand, in some countries, the gap between private and public is widening over time, as in Benin. There is not a big difference in reading scores in Burundi, perhaps because of the national language of instruction (Kirundi). One possible way to regulate the private sector is to control the languages of instruction.


Figure 6. Public-Private Language Performance Gap – Early Elementary (2014 and 2019)



Source: PASEC2014 and PASEC2019 data

The performance gaps are still huge at the end of primary school (Figure 7). In half of the countries, the gap between private and public schools is widening over time. In Niger, a gap of over 180 points in 2014. And more than 130 points in 2019 between private and public. In Senegal, the gaps are smaller at the end of primary school than at the beginning. Once again, in Burkina Faso, there is no real distinction in terms of performance between private and public schools.


Figure 7. Public-private reading performance gap – End of elementary school (2014 and 2019)



Source: PASEC2014 and PASEC2019 data

In mathematics, the performance of private school students is generally better than that of public school students. Again, the differences are relatively significant, except in Burkina Faso and Burundi (Figure 8).


Figure 8. Public-private math performance gap - Early elementary grades (2014 and 2019)



Source: PASEC2014 and PASEC2019 data

At the end of primary school, the gaps are still significant but are narrowing over time in 6 out of 10 countries. Niger had a high gap of nearly 140 points in 2014, which was substantially reduced in 2019 (Figure 9). The narrowing of the gap between 2014 and 2019 can be attributed to the numerous reforms undertaken by Niger to not only improve student performance in both public and private schools, but also to reduce existing disparities between the country’s regions, school categories and urban and rural areas. Indeed, following the results of the PASEC2014 evaluation, Niger has undertaken a number of reforms to its education system.


**Figure 9. Public-Private Mathematics Performance Gap
End of Elementary School (2014 and 2019)**



Source: PASEC2014 and PASEC2019 data

Concerning differences in the proficiency scales, it should first be noted that the best students are located in the bottom level (corresponding in Level 4 in reading and Level 3 in math). These students are likely fluent in the tasks at this level and better at the lower levels. There is a clear difference in most countries between private and public schools. This difference is even more significant at the end of primary school. Indeed, more private school students are in level 4 (Figure 10). For example, more than 70% of private pupils in Senegal are at this level. In Gabon, we note that in both the private and public sectors, there is a significant proportion of students at the end of primary school in level 4 reading.


Figure 10. Percentage of students in Level 4 of the reading proficiency scale – Late and early elementary – 2019



Source: PASEC2019 data

The same findings are also made in math at level 3 (corresponding at best level in competency scales). On average, while private students are much better in early elementary school, the gaps are less clear at the end of school (Figure 11). Gabon and Burundi are the two countries where the public sector performs well. In Niger, there is a large gap between the private and public sectors. One might ask, why do public school students do better in math than reading?

Figure 11. Percentage of students in Level 3 of the math proficiency scale – Early and Late Elementary – 2019




Source: PASEC2019 data

By gender, there are no significant differences between boys and girls in either public or private schools. However, girls generally are a little better at reading than boys, while boys are a little better at math.


Although we noted that the socioeconomic level of parents of private students is, on average higher than that of parents of public students, even considering land-use and socioeconomic index in our analysis, the gap between public and private remains persistent, except in Burkina Faso (Figure 12 and 13).

Figure 12. Performance gap between private and public students at the end of elementary school controlled for the land-use index and the average socioeconomic index of students in the school (PASEC2014)



Source: PASEC2014 data

Figure 13. Performance gap between private and public students at the end of elementary school controlled for the land-use index of students in the school (PASEC2019)




Source: PASEC2019 data

For private tutoring, there is a difference in reading performance to the advantage:

- Of students participating in tutoring significantly in Benin (+44.4 points), Cote d'Ivoire (+46.7 points), Niger (+16.7 points), and Togo (+19.7 points).
- Of students without educational support significantly in Congo (-33) to Madagascar (31.7 points), DRC (26.2 points), and Chad (22.8 points) (Figure 14).

**Figure 14. Difference in Reading Performance
Support from a Teacher or Tutor**




Source: PASEC2019 data

In mathematics, there is a difference in performance to the advantage:

- of students participating in tutoring significantly in Benin (35.7 points), Cote d'Ivoire (19.7 points), Gabon (15.6 points), and Togo (20.7 points),
- of students without school support in Congo (27.8 points), Madagascar (32.9 points), and DRC (20 points) (Figure 15).

Figure 15. Difference in Math Performance – Support from a Teacher or Tutor



Source: PASEC2019 data

Conclusion

To conclude, PASEC data show that, on average, a significant gap exists in student performance in favour of the private sector at the beginning and end of primary school. This gap is marked both in languages and mathematics.

Like the literature on the subject, we have several explanations for these better results. First, data on school supply shows that private schools are better equipped than public schools, particularly in terms of electricity and equipment in classrooms and schools in French-speaking sub-Saharan Africa. This is generally due to a higher financial contribution from parents since the analysis of the socioeconomic level of parents also shows better social positioning of parents who enrol their children in private schools. This is also linked to the possibility of taking support courses outside of school time. These comparisons clearly show the risk of reproducing inequalities generated by the privatization phenomenon in Francophone African countries, even if the socioeconomic factor is not the only one to explain the differences in performance between the two sectors.

Indeed, the PASEC data provide additional explanations since contextual data on school management were collected. Among other things, it shows that school

principals can make a difference. For example, we have seen that in the private sector, they attend in-service training on a more regular basis, find solutions when teachers are absent so as not to lose teaching hours for students, and take care to provide academic support for students in difficulty.

On the other hand, the PASEC data do not tell us that all private schools systematically perform better than public schools and offer students better learning conditions than public schools. Moreover, performance gaps between private and public schools (in 2014 and 2019 and in Years two and six) are widening in some countries and narrowing in others, so there are no unanimous trends.

In addition, questions remain following the analysis of the PASEC data. Is it the teachers who make the difference in student learning outcomes? We found that private school teachers were less qualified or motivated than public school teachers. Even here, the answer is not straightforward because we know, as we showed in the literature review, that it is common to find teachers who work in private and public schools. Is the difference in the number of hours of teaching effectively done?

Another issue is the language of instruction. We also know from numerous research studies that language proficiency significantly impacts the quality of learning. However, the PASEC data do not inform us about strategies for using the languages of instruction while assuming that urban and socio-economically advantaged students, who are more likely to attend private schools, are more aware of using French in their daily environment. To go further in this comparative analysis, additional investigations are necessary. In particular, conducting qualitative research, including interviews and observations, might be relevant to understand better what distinguishes private and public schools to achieve the performance described in the article while expanding the type of schools analysed, including non-state schools.

Finally, the central policy question is: how can the public sector be strengthened? The purpose of our research is not to advocate for the private sector. In particular, the commercial private sector cannot be generalized. Thus, how can we ensure that the public sector has the same requirements as the private sector, knowing that it must consider the most marginalized populations (low socioeconomic families, rural areas)? In any case, this study points to the inability of states to offer quality public services.

Beyond this political will, to ensure a better understanding of the PASEC data, these data should be complemented with the national statistics of each country. To do this, states must commit to developing a comprehensive system for collecting data on education at all levels and making it freely available on the websites of ministries of education. This is essential both to build targeted education policies based on

solid scientific foundations and to facilitate access to these data for the various actors of civil society and students and researchers in the countries concerned. This would complement the data from the PASEC surveys, which to date are the most rigorous for conducting comparative analyses of education systems in Francophone Africa, particularly on the critical issue of learning outcomes.

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Higher Education Capitalism and the Corrosion of the right to education in Angola ☐

Alberto Nguluve²¹ & Isaac Paxé²²

Introduction

The political-economic changes that have occurred in Angola since the decade of 2000 allow us to question to what extent the economic policy tailored to the market needs has enabled, not only the increase of private Institutions of Higher Education (IES, acronym in Portuguese), but essentially, the understanding of the motivations behind their construction and operation – to satisfy the labour market needs (companies) through qualified higher training and to make the profit they envisioned in the sector. Despite the absence of political and strategic guidelines from the State in the sector, the context attracted both the domestic and foreign capital. The private higher education appears, thus, to respond to the needs of qualified personnel in the country, to a “market” still unexplored and to an elevated number of “customers” who until then had not been able to enter the higher education due to the insufficiency of IES.

The advent, in the formal adoption of the capitalism in Angola, is based on the understanding that its political elite had about the advantages it could obtain in the economy (the power consolidation within the business sector and in favouring the policy of «primitive accumulation of capital») and in the politics (maintenance of its dominant class condition). Therefore, one can comprehend that the rise of private institutions in higher education derives from the process of emergence of the new bourgeoisie up the “wild capitalism” (Nkrumah, K, 1967) which benefits from the absence of «State» as a unifying entity of all the interests of a nation to prioritise the interests of the elite class which is simultaneously military-political and economic. The research question that underpins this study is to explore to what extent the «agents» that promote the privatisation of higher education do so under a strategic State project aimed at building a developmental culture for Angola.

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Angola – the emergence of capitalism and the constructed scenario

On the democracy's sake, it has been recurrent to debate about the freedom of speech, the right to a dignified life, the right to education and health, the respect for cultural differences and to question the dimensions specificity that constitute democracy: the public domain and the private one. The questioning makes sense, currently, because along with the political democracy is the "capitalist democracy", which is expressed, in its best way, as the free market competition. The free competition speech is unfocused on the great Angolan problem: inequality and social exclusion, corruption, greed for power, but on the positivist image of success of the accumulation of capital provides to a modicum number of those well positioned in the Angolan "political regime". Since the market policy has begun dictating the rules for the social policies elaboration, it became easier for the Angolan regime to adopt a competitive speech among the people. Currently, it is through the processes of reorganisation of new work relations and social integration that the condition and process of capital accumulation is explained and justified. The integration of individuals has begun being reoriented through consumption, while simultaneously the exclusion through non-consumption was accentuated (Santos, 1999a: 9)²³.

The relationship between the public and the private sectors can be found in the Constitution (2010) of the country the protection and guarantee of the rights of the parties' inviolability. Just as the public cannot, through legislation, annul all important aspects of the private life and its relationship with society, similarly the private cannot constitute a developmental domain of endless powers, that is, excessive powers that endanger the public domain (Fioravanti, 2013: 7). The challenge, for Angola, lies in the depth and rigor that the Constitution provides to the treatment of public and private issues with the guarantee of the limits and constituted rights.

What happened during the last fifteen years has shown that, from the disputes among private economic interests, interferences in the public domain have arisen.

²³ What differs social inequality prior to 2000 from the current one are the increasingly sinuous mechanisms used to legitimise the regime at the same time that inequality and exclusion are produced and reproduced. Santos (1999) asserts that «inequality and exclusion are two hierarchical systems»: In "inequality, belonging comes about through subordinate integration, while in the system of exclusion belonging comes about through exclusion. Inequality implies a hierarchical system of social integration. Those who are below are inside and their presence is indispensable. On the other hand, exclusion is based on an equally hierarchical system, but dominated by the principle of exclusion: one belongs by the way one is excluded. Whoever is down is out" (Santos, 1999a:2). Stated in this way, the two systems represent an ideal type, although, actually, both cohabit all the time.

This came to be thought of considering the private, not the opposite. The example is the opening of the Angolan economy to foreign market: the economic policy strategies have been constantly redefined in order to meet the national, international²⁴, and the private interests. Although the Constitution exists, it has always been insufficient to stop political behaviours that trigger processes of institutional deviations.

Different from the socialist system, in the capitalism, one of the main roles of the State would be to organise the “dominant classes as «blocs-in- power», conferring coherence and bringing together the different interests between specific fractions” (Estanque, 2013:232). This goal occurs with coherence and specification of the roles between the interests of the State and those of the particular groups that seek profits through their companies. This implies the existence of freedom and relative autonomy for the State to be able to “ensure the cohesion of the socio-economic order [...] and establish itself «above» each fraction and whenever necessary act for the benefit [...] of the working classes, for example, legislating against the (immediate) interests of the privileged groups” (Estanque, 2013:232). In Angola, the existing power relations, since the period of the One Party only, are intertwined in such way that the State interests are confused with the private ones. This happens because the officers who represent the government they also represent private interests (as owners of private companies/institutions), or even because those who are responsible for legislating on the sector are, simultaneously, entrepreneurs. There is a risk, therefore, of legislating for one’s own benefit.

The need for domains cohabitation, public and private, based on the idea that human life takes place from a biological viewpoint, in a private domain and, from a social point of view, in a public and political domain. Hannah Arendt (2010) talks about two lives – living life (private) and living in the world (public). The defence according to which the public should predominate over the private frames its arguments in the need for the *Rés-Pública*²⁵ (public thing). This way, the political action would be the expression of the common interest, that is, the common good. Since political action is in position to guarantee security and balance between private parties, it de-

²⁴ Globalisation influences countries to redefine their economic policies in medium and long term. It is an economy characterised by the rapid change in the portfolios of different systems of international capital with political interventions that meet various interests of the capital. The “risk profile of the countries participating in the world system changes, as “rich” or “poor”, “advanced” or “backward” countries lose or gain, depending on whether their economies are strengthened or weakened by the short-term international financial decisions” (Menezes, 2000:381).

²⁵ cf. Cícero, 2011.

depends on it, through the norms, to ensure cohabitation through the Constitution. The fundamental issue is related to political ethics, that is, to what extent it would be able to ensure common interests without overriding the private ones.

The predominance of private interests over the public ones easily originates institutional deviations²⁶. When government officers assume simultaneously prominent positions in private business, the State's interests are effortlessly adjusted to the private ones (the State is placed at the service of the private sector). The most common ways through which institutional deviations manifest themselves have been: «nepotism», in which political and economic favouritism falls to relatives; «clientelism», a way for individuals to seek economic benefits by joining networks of influential politicians or groups close to the existing power system to see their interests accomplished; institutional deviation can also contribute to the existence of «corruption», which results, largely, from non-compliance with the formally constituted duty in exchange for economic, political, social advantages, etc.; another way of institutional deviation, hidden from the public, is «patronage». This results from exchanges of favours among politicians who are in the government. It is a type of deviation that, when done in secrecy, is rarely noticeable in the public.

The specification of public and private domains, in terms of economic interests, certainly requires complying with the principles that guide the values and obligations in human activities. It is on the basis of ethical precepts and judgements that one can guide and discipline the individuals' actions and behaviour expecting that, in the long term, harmony and excellence (individual and social) can be achieved. The concern with ethics is justified by the need to have “civilising processes and not the pretension of certain groups, classes or social segments whose interests and political and economic goals do not possess a universalising feature” (Salmon & Cattani, 2011:180). Although it is asserted that “liberal” thinking tends to predominate in Angola, when a dispute for economic goods is placed in a “save-who-can” approach, it is fundamental to observe ethics (civilising features) for the interests balance.

The capital accumulation policy had an impact on the Angolan society: it allowed the redirection of political and economic options with the predominance of private

²⁶ For further details, one can search for the results of the study entitled «Fraud in upper positions: the corrupt debt contract from Angola to Russia», conducted by Associação Mãos Livres & Corruption Watch UK, 2013. The evidences presented indicate that those involved in major scale of corruption act this way facilitated by their positions in the government. They are simultaneously public and private managers.

interests over the public ones based on the “fiction of Homo economicus” (Salmon & Cattani, 2011:180). An attempt was made to copy what in other contexts is understood as free market competition and self-regulated market.

Since the mechanisms used in the competition were favourable to a restricted number of citizens, the political measure adopted today allows us to understand the consequences of the economy that was established in the “particular conception of human action, hedonistic, self-sufficient and selfish, being nothing more than beliefs and speeches that reflect interests” (Salmon & Cattani, 2011:180); to realise that for a long time it was legitimised, not the reasons for a rule of law, but the reasons for economic power that denies the violence that results from its way of operating (as a productive and capital accumulative system); it is a policy of domination that hides the consequences of its action, that is, it covers up social inequalities and contradictions through the media propaganda that shows the success of a few as if it were all; finally, it allows us to comprehend that it is a regime that “continuously creates and recreates inequalities, penalising and marginalising the most vulnerable” (Salmon & Cattani, 2011:181) to the extent that the free competition principle is accentuated in the society.

The end of the war in Angola (2002) meant both the birth of new political and social operations and the consolidation of the ways power is exerted from where the new ruling class of the MPLA government would emerge later – an Angolan Style oligarchy²⁷. It is understandable why the change of personnel, under the regime, was more operated in inner circle rather than outside, and this cannot be confused with exceptional cases, in which certain individuals, from different social spheres, were integrated because they were identified as potential people to strengthen the regime as these are individuals at the service of the government and certainly not the regime (hard core).

The opening obeyed two distinct approaches: through family lineage and through “merit”, which in fact these translated more as adulation (defenders of the regime) rather than professional personal merit. Because the party bureaucracy constituted a major obstacle to rapid social ascension, the art of flattery²⁸ overcame the basic rules

²⁷ In an oligarchy, it is difficult for the competencies control to be in an individual's hands. Even if one has a titular figure of power, they always exercise it in the relationship with their group in order to establish a certain balance, reciprocal control of the ways of power and, therefore, creating barriers (self-protection of the group) to a possible tyranny.

²⁸ The problem with flattery lies in the fact that the most outstanding ones may not be those with the best conditions (knowledge, techniques and experience).

of the party militancy and became the main way of growing and maintaining a certain social status.

Since the late 2017, the regime has sought to implement a different strategy than usual. It seems to be more open in making people believe that the “chairs switching” is not based on heredity, as well as the access to positions of prominence does not happen through flattery. We seem to be facing new practices (sacrifices) that aim not only to end the possibilities of the regime to lock itself into caste, but also to adhere to political practices²⁹ favourable to economic progress and, thus, to regain the trust of the masses and the international community.

It is in this context of regaining the masses’ trust that the current policy of expanding private higher education (technical and polytechnic institutes) is inscribed as a key sector in the preparation of a workforce corresponding to the challenges of the labour market, while it consolidates the position of those who invest in this sector.

Education as a right in the Angolan context

In a formal approach, education as a right has been declared since the foundation of the Republic of Angola³⁰, alongside with the universal declaration of the human rights. Within the frameworks of this declaration, it should be ensured that children and young people’s benefits of the right to education process are safeguarded. It is recognisable that education is a right that enables people’s cognitive development, their integration as useful members of their communities, as well as the one that mediates the enjoyment of other rights and freedoms.

In its implementation challenges, the governments in the Republic of Angola sought to build an education system that should respect the principles of the right to education, namely, the access, availability, and the adaptability. As an underpinning question of this paper, we highlight the mandatory and free education issue, as well

²⁹ One of the criteria that can prevent hereditary consolidation in the State affairs is impartial selection, objectivity, professional qualification, and performance evaluation (results). Public job applications “become tough competition” (Zippelius, 1997:224). They are ways that can prevent the consolidation of elites by heredity, favouritism or political opportunism. However, it is known that the differentiated criteria can also be applied as a way of preserving certain positions in the government to avoid the regime collapsing itself.

³⁰ Between 1975 – 1991, Angola was governed by a one-party only system, with the MPLA being the ruling party during this period. After 1991 up to the present date, Angola has adopted a multi-party system, with the MPLA winning the elections and forming a government led by President José Eduardo dos Santos (1992, 2008, 2012) and by President João Lourenço (2017 and 2022).

as the guarantee of a “meaningful and lifelong” quality education (UNESCO). In the light of the current Angolan Education Act (Act n.º 32/20), specifically in the general principles of the education and teaching system, the obligation translates into the “duty of the State, society, families and the companies to ensure and promote the access and attendance to the education and teaching system for all school aged individuals, including Early Childhood Education, Primary Education, and Junior High Education.

The gratuity (Article 11) is understood in the principles of the system as the exemption from any payment for registration, class attendance, school supplies and social support for all children who attend Primary Education in public educational institutions. Regarding secondary education and higher education, the enrolment fees, class attendance, school supplies and other charges are of the responsibility of the parents, guardians, or the students themselves, when they are over age.

The issue related to non-extension of the gratuity principle into secondary and higher educations has always been approached cautiously due to social pressure and the social conditions of the different groups that attend the school. For years, despite not being stated in the Education Act, secondary education students were exempt from paying enrolment fees and other fees for the provided services, leaving them only with the burden of guaranteeing the school materials and other costs to support the students’ condition in these subsystems. In higher education, daytime students were exempt from paying tuition fees for attending classes. However, they assumed charges such as enrolment fees and other services provided by universities, including the guarantee of all material and other conditions for attending the college programmes. Night shift students, called post-labour, were charged a monthly fee for classes attendance, and payment for other services provided by the university, as well as a fee payment equivalent to one academic year to fund the process of capstone defence papers, after the effective conclusion of a bachelor’s programme. Graduate programmes are entirely funded by the students.

The rationality for these charging approaches, subtly called “co-payments” to oppose the law, at that time, which did not contemplate the payment of tuition fees, was due to the fact that these programmes were created to meet the demand for more vacancies in the public colleges, at a time of scarcity even of private higher education institutions. With the resources shortage from public funds to meet the running costs of these programmes, particularly with the demand from the lectures staff that demanded the overtime pay, the solution was to charge these contributions from the students to cover the operating costs of these programmes. Over time, these

contributions have become secondary sources of revenue for the higher education public institutions.

However, in 2020, overcoming the bureaucrats' free will on this issue, the Government of Angola approved the "Regulation on tuition fees and fees in the higher education public institutions". The rationality of this document by its principles (Article 5) is based on the following purposes:

1. The principle of the student's financial responsibility translates into the assumption, by the student, of the costs related to the higher education access and training, through fees payment.
2. The principle of the costs sharing of the public education service, understood as the participation of the students from higher education public institutions, in the costs related to their bachelor and graduate training, which must correspond to a percentage of their training costs, defined by the State.
3. The principle of the services quality, in the fees collection, is reflected in the students' involvement in the accountability by the higher education public institutions in the application of pecuniary charges raised from the access and attendance to a higher education institution training to observe the quality standards of the services it provides (Article 5).

Comforted by this legal paper, the constant reasoning of the principles, the fees were set at 1,900 KZs (3.7 USD³¹) for the regular daytime shift, and at 15,000 KZs (29.79 USD) for the night shift. In addition to these charges, there are others related to enrolment in entrance exams, annual and midterm enrolments, provided services, and papers issuance. We envision here the position that suits the on-going processes of higher education privatisation.

Aiming at dealing and mitigating the students' burden with the costs derived from classes attendance and other higher education related costs, the Angolan government has instituted a scholarship programme in its public policy measures.

³¹ These figures are, in their own, a matter of debate about their own contribution to the financial capacity of the IES. As they are established in KZ and without being updated due to currency devaluation and inflation, they become insignificant for the IES financing purposes.

National scholarship grantees

IES Nature	Gender		Total
	M	F	
Publics	11 366	6 498	17 864
Privates	3 998	4 989	8 987
Total	15 364	11 487	26 851

Source: Higher Education statistical yearbook 2019

These figures of students benefiting from the respective institutions are distributed among 31 public IES and 53 private ones. If we analyse these figures by the nature of the IES, we comprehend that the students in private IES that have a higher cost structure, starting with the tuition fee whose values range between 30 –140 thousand KZ, represent 2.9% of the beneficiaries. In the ideal of the scholarships as state programmes to safeguard the citizens' right to education, we believe that the numbers are still negligible.

Enrolled students by IES, Nature and Gender

IES Nature	Gender		Total	%
	M	F		
Publics	78 087	46 669	124 756	40
Privates	89 262	94 291	183 553	60
Total	167 349	140 960	308 309	100

Source: Higher Education statistical yearbook 2019

The free access to education issue, regardless of the levels of discussion, specifically of the Higher Education, is crucial in contexts such as Angola given its poverty indicators. According to the National Institute of Statistics (INE, acronym in Portuguese), the poverty incidence rate is estimated at 54.0%, which means that close to 5 out of 10 people in the country are multidimensionally poor, which correspond to 14 million people in the country, during 2015–2016 period if we consider the population projection for the year 2020 and assuming that the incidence rate would be the same, this would correspond to 16 million multidimensionally deprived people across the country.

Another piece of data provided by INE to consider is precisely the unemployment issue, given that it is through employment that people are able to deal with the burdens inherent in the education costs, when free education is denied. According to data from this institution, “from March 2018 to February 2019, the unemployed population aged 15 or over was estimated at 3,583,143, of which 1,557,394 were men and 2,005,749 were women. The country’s unemployment rate in the referred period was 28.8% (information for the Sustainable Development Goal, SDG, 8.5.2), being 26.6% for men and 30.9% for women. The unemployment rate in the urban area (36.5%) is 2.2 times higher than in the rural area with 16.2%” (INE, 2019).

We understand that in the Angolan context, the discussion about education as a right embodies two distinct realities, namely the formal one that strives to comply with the supranational norms that involve the States in the recognition of citizens’ rights and freedoms, and the development of internal control, particularly the legal ones, for the recognition of the latter. There is also the rights effectiveness issue of these normative documents. This effectiveness always makes the governments create conditions through public policies conducive to the enjoyment of these rights. Thus, in the Angolan reality, the right to education is conditioned by the poverty and unemployment dimensions if we consider the fact that the total population enrolled in higher education remained at 308 309 in private universities and only 40% of them in public ones.

The economic elite as interest groups

The greatest revenue of the Angolan economy derives from the oil sector and it is there where the dispute occurs among the “great-men”, holders of political and economic power in Angola. A possible bankruptcy of the Angolan oil company would be fatal for the dominant group, but also for the population that lives on the «crumbs» of that resource exploitation. The drop in oil prices on the international market was alarming (2014-2017), more for the masses than for the business politicians who saw the crisis as an opportunity to accumulate capital inside the country and abroad, as they had easy access to international currencies.

From the social point of view, while the United Nations estimates (2010) stated that, in Angola, more than 19 million citizens lived in conditions of poverty, from the economic point of view, the data of that year showed that the country obtained from oil a thousand million US dollars. The report of the United Nations Programme for Human Development (UNDP) also placed, in that year, Angola in the “146th position in the world (out of 169 countries), although the per capita income of the country

(purchasing power parity) was ranked 117th globally (out of 229 countries)” by the Central Intelligence Agency *World Factbook* (Global Witness; OSISA, 2011:18). Despite numerous data indicating a less dignified social situation, Angola has shown itself to be a country of opportunities for large oil and diamond companies and for service providers linked to those sectors.

Since the government is the main promoter and manager of the oil revenues and considering that the national business community is fundamentally constituted by politicians connected to the regime, the operation of the business sector is hostage to the party ideology, as it conditions the access to businesses in the national market. Such situation triggers influence peddling relationships in dealing with labour situations and business investment, generating, therefore, a favourable environment to corruption.

In mid-2009, the Angolan government informed, through the Ministry of Oils «Activities Report of the Oil Sector, 2009», that Angola was producing 1.8 million oil barrels per day, which allowed it to be in the second position of oil producer, after Nigeria, in Africa. Data from the Ministry of Finance also ranked the oil sector as the largest contributor to revenue and national GDP. Data from the Angolan Central Bank (BNA, 2013) «Angola: evolution of the main economic and financial indicators between 2008 and 2012 and future perspectives» showed that, in addition to the oil sector, the diamond extraction sector contributed considerably to the national economy besides other sectors.

The years 2008-2012 were of greater Angolan economic growth and capital concentration by the political elite of that country's regime; in contrast to these data, there is the information from international organisations (IMF and WB) that placed Angola in a position of a country with severe corruption problems, lower human development index and high spending on the civil service.

In the similar period (2007-2012) BNA data indicated that Angola had considerable internal reserves for the national currency stability and for the economy, and moving at that pace, the country could have a positive evolution in its international reserves, and gain financial solidity. The positive evolution critical point of the economy presented by the BNA was the problem of corruption and the unleashing of individual interests which, through the group that controlled the regime, subjugated the interests of the State.

Any economic policy measure for Angola's present and future will depend, firstly, on how the government will use the oil revenues. Angola has the reputation of being a country with a high rate of corruption and its political and economic elite results from

this practice that contributes to opaque management, without transparency. A way of management that makes it difficult for the citizens and analysts, inside the country and abroad, to perceive the activities conducted and the type of management applied.

In 2005, the IMF warned the Angolan government for the need to implement humanitarian development policies since the economic growth projections provided by the increase in oil exploration, placed Angola in the line of countries with favourable economic potential in the medium and long terms. However, this institution also recommended that the government should establish policies to reduce civil service expenditures, establish subsidy cuts and encourage the development of the private sector (IMF, 2005:42).

Twelve years later, other recommendations, which resulted from the consultation of the board of directors of the IMF in Angola (2017), were presented. The IMF once again reiterated the need for the Angolan government to make efforts to increase non-oil revenues, implement cost containment policies, “avoid the wage bill growth, improve the quality of public investment, continue to rationalise subsidies by expanding, simultaneously, well-targeted social assistance for the poor” (IMF, 2017:2). The press release highlights the need for the Angolan government to strictly preserve the efficient operation of the banking sector and supervise activities through external assessment and audits, conduct quality studies on the banking financial assets and recapitalise those that prove to be weaker. Measures should also be strengthened with anti-corruption and private sector³² investment measures.

The recommendations that derived from meetings and consultations with international organisations were not taken very seriously by the regime’s elite. The more they could serve to highlight that country’s interest in continuing to dialog with international institutions and, thus, guarantee the needed trust for foreign businessmen, with their interests, to invest in Angola. However, the regime’s political elite remained firm in its policy and understood that the formal rules were aimed more at foreign businessmen than, properly, at the core of the national business community that controlled the regime.

Until the year 2002, the looting methods in the State accounts were easily justified by the war condition. This can be comprehended, for example, by observing the two reports by Global Witness, dated of December 1999 and March 2002, when the ques-

³² The IMF’s concern also expresses the organisation desire to see secured the positions of the institutions that serve its interests. Therefore, more than a pure concern with the Angolan national development, the IMF seeks to ensure that its capital invested in Angola have a return with the desired profits.

tion was repeatedly raised that the Angolan elite was pillaging oil revenues under the civil war cover that was occurring in Angola. After the termination of the war, another report, dated of March 2004, by Global Witness stated that “it was impossible to count more than one billion dollars a year in oil revenues in Angola’s public accounts” (Global Witness; OSISA – Fundação Open Society-Angola, 2011:7).

The Open Society Foundation, which has been operating in Angola since 1998 in the education sector and in capacity building for the society aiming at promoting transparency in the public assets management, has conducted analyses of the general state budgets (OGE, acronym in Portuguese) and disseminated results of its studies as a way of contributing to a better comprehension of the public revenues utilisation. The great difficulty this organisation encounters is the shortage of accurate data that derive from the Angolan government. There have been disparities in the data released between Sonangol³³ and the Ministry of Finance. For example, in 2008, the «taxes on oil income» released by the Ministry of Finance were 976.247 billion kwanzas, whereas the Ministry of Oils announced a lower figure, 883.328 billion kwanzas (Global Witness; OSISA – Fundação Open Society-Angola, 2011:33). According to the Act n.º 13/04, on the «Oil sector taxation activities», Article 68, the tax data are confidential matters. In 2008, there were also differences in the «Oil transaction fees received by Angola», while the Ministry of Oils spoke about 247 billion kwanzas, the Ministry of Finance announced 211 billion kwanzas.

“The reason for these discrepancies is not obvious and it is unclear whether it could be explicated by the distinction between the expected amounts for the tax and those finalised by the end of the year. These differences need to be explained and exacerbate the need for much clearer statements on oil income tax revenues by the Angolan government agencies” (Global Witness & OSISA –Fundação Open Society-Angola, 2011:34).

Differences found in the tax revenue data³⁴ released by the Ministry of Finance and the Oils may be related to: a) the fact that the same accounts are not audited by ex-

³³ According to the Act n.º 10/004, Sonangol E.P. – is a national concessionaire responsible for the management and monitoring of the oil sector related contracts. It encompasses the management of data from Public Companies acquired in oil concessions owned by the Angolan State (cf. <http://webgis.sonangol.co.ao/landingpage/>).

³⁴ Based on the Article 18 of the Act n.º 13/04, on Oil Activities Taxation, and on the data from the Ministry of Finance, 2008, it is understood that the labour income tax (IRT, acronym in Portuguese) is charged according to the companies’ income, in the oil related activities. It includes exploitation, production, storage, transport and export. It is the main revenue source after the concessionaire’s revenues (Global Witness; OSISA– Fundação Open Society-Angola, 2011:32).

ternal entities and evaluated transparently; b) the fact that this practice contributes to the misappropriation of the State public revenues. The report by Global Witness and OSISA – Fundação Open Society-Angola (2011) explains that it is difficult to verify whether the disclosed tax revenue amounts actually correspond to the amounts that should be paid since the data management policy applied lacks transparency. There is a lack of concrete data on the fiscal reference prices used in the oil taxation. If “the revenue data can be published, but the data on the factors that determine the scale of the oil revenues are confidential” (Global Witness e OSISA – Fundação Open Society-Angola, 2011:33), it is difficult to know the revenue accurate amount that should be presented by the Angolan State. Overall, the conclusions of the Global Witness and OSISA report of February 2011 highlight the following:

- ❑ Unlike Sonangol, the data presented by the Angolan government Agencies are not verified and audited by international institutions and there is difficulty in verifying the real oil production figures in detail. The data are still problematic because by not detailing the produce figures such as the condensed and natural gas, which can worth million dollars, it becomes difficult to understand the data presented by the ministries directly connected to the oil sector;
- ❑ The disclosed export figures present discrepancies between the two ministries (finance and oil) which reduces the credibility of the reports;
- ❑ Because the Ministry of Finance and the Oils are the main sources of the revenue for the Angolan State, it is worrying when the data presented in the reports of these institutions are contradictory –between the nominal value and the sales volume.

One of the examples referring to these contradictions can be found in the data related to the bonuses and dividends payment:

According to media reports, oil companies pledged signature bonus of over US\$ 3 billion in 2006, but a government revenue register through the finance the Ministry of Finance stated only US\$ 998 million in «oil bonuses and rewards. Sonangol asserts it paid US\$436 million in dividends to the state in 2007/8, but neither the Ministry of Oils nor the Ministry of Finance report dividend income on anything of that amount” (Global Witness e OSISA – Fundação Open Society-Angola, 2011:42)

The question to be posed is what was the destination of the mentioned amounts, if they were actually paid by the oil exploitation companies. Various documents

published by Global Witness³⁵ (1998, 2001 e 2002) show that the development and consolidation of data concealment systems relies on the collaboration of a plethora of institutions, which, in its turn, consolidates corrupt practices as they expand bribery and glove methods as a penetration and maintenance strategy in the domains of economic and political prominence, supported by parallel budgets of private business.

The serenity through which certain Western countries observe the situation, to safeguard their interests, leads to treating Angola, according to a comment in «*Le Monde*» (2000)³⁶, as a judicial no man's land that, on mutual political interests behalf, should continue to eternity as a land of unpunished crimes" while the "presidents' men have been cleaning their pockets in Angola – a third of the state budget for 2001 seems to have disappeared, and can perhaps be found in offshore laundries" (Global Witness, 2002:59). Among the oil companies operating in Angola, only BP adopted a transparent position, while the others, namely Shell, Norsk Hydro and Statoil simply demonstrated willingness and disposition but without actually acting, whereas Chevron-Texaco, TotalFinaElf and ExxonMobil deny providing data (Global Witness, 2002:59).

Any company operating in Angola can collaborate in the looting when it refuses to divulge its operation results, creating favourable conditions for the concealment of non-transparent practices while the population remains ignorant of the real data on the revenues collected by the Angolan government. However, it is also understood that any position taken by the companies (public and private, national or foreign) depends on the economic policy and management that the Angolan State implements and every State management policy is related to the game of interests. Therefore, the Angolan State is what it is because of what its public managers make of it.

What room for Education in the political-economic disputes scenario?

The scenario of higher education in Angola is close to the one described by Geiger (1987) regarding to mass private sector encouraged by the rapid expansion of social demand for higher education. In Angola, these social demands follow the increase of post-secondary graduates, but mainly the local labour laws, particularly those

³⁵ "A brutal Business – the role of companies and Governments in the Angolan Conflict" (1998), "Does control work? A review of the diamond control system" (2001), "The presidents' men – the devastating history of the oil and banking industries in Angola's privatized war" (2002).

³⁶ Commented by the editorial in *Le Monde*, on December 22nd, 2000 – quoted by Reuters, on December 23rd, 2000.

addressed to career mobility and the privileges pertaining to it. The “Licenciatura” (Bachelor) degree was the key to the top of the career as well as other sort of promotions a professional could fight for within the public administration, which is the larger employer and offers better career stability.

Due to this demand, the reality uncovers public institution unable to cover this demand; therefore, it has been permitted to overflow into private institutions. The following table shows the growth of students both in public and private institutions.

Students: public and private institutions

Year	Public Institutions	Private Institutions
1999	8 536	349
2000	8 499	521
2001	12 000	1 296
2002	16 000	2 917
2003	26 660	5 082
2004	34 520	9 692
2005	56 595	14 544
2006	58 132	17 397
2007	60 127	20 941
2008	70 759	35 331
2009	36 886	42 245
2010	31 173	146 368
2012	32 893	160 340

Source: Adelina de Kandingi, 2016

The idea revealed here is the growth of the number of students in private institutions as the move away from the centralized economy logic. Throughout the years, the increase of the investors in private sector of education, mainly by the building of new infrastructure, results in the increase of the number of students in this sector, overcoming the public institutions offer. After 2005, there is a growth within the public sector itself which is due to the establishment of new public institutions as a government programme to increase the offer of higher education. One can understand this increase of numbers sustained by the following factor: the emergence of new public

institutions, the legal scenario favourable to the private investment, and the entry of the business elite backed by current or former state officials into the business of higher education.

As per the development of the sector, we do still bring Geiger (1987) to add that, like the described realities, Angola has also witnessed the following pattern in the development of the mass private sector:

Rapid growth of number of secondary school graduates

The rapid growth of graduate and the labour laws are the key triggering factors behind the rapid growth of mass demand for higher education, considering also the younger age of these graduated. The past experience showed a considerable amount of adult workers graduating from secondary schools without enormous ambitions to pursue university degree for market reasons.

Applicant students to Higher Education

IES Nature	Registered Applicants		Total
	Admitted	Non-Admitted	
Publics	20 512	135 189	155 701
Privates	86 237	12 816	99 053
Total	106 749	148 005	254 754

Source: Higher Education statistical yearbook 2019

The above table shows the relationship between the secondary graduate seeking for enrolment at public and private higher education institutions and the offers available at them. One can understand the public institutions, due less in numbers than the private, receives more applicants due to its lower costs, the academic tradition and believed guarantee of quality education. From the total 155 701 applicants in public institutions, after the entrance exam, only 13% of them are admitted. The remaining population, have two ways, either they join the number of the applicants in private institutions, or they wait for the next year. As the difference in the number of non-admitted at public and the applicants to the private universities shows, it can be inferred that a considerable number of them do not enter university in a specific year. It is expected in a reality in which most families cannot afford the costs demanded at

the private institutions, and due to the scarce percentage of the subsidies through the scholarships from the government which are the unique formal students aid program available in the market. However, some of them, as soon as they get a source of income, decide to enter private universities whenever they fail the opportunity at public ones.

The freedom to offer higher education

In the case of Angola, as we mentioned in a previous paper (Scaff et al, 2018), the enthusiasm for privatization had its inception in the late 1980s when the country adhered to democratisation movements, overcoming the monopoly state and planned economy. Remembering that in this scenario, by law, education was determined as an exclusive reserve and monopoly of the State. Specific laws were then passed to meet this purpose, as well as the creation of conditions for the privatisation of a set of companies pertaining to the State, and at least formally, the elimination of barriers to access to the various sectors of the economy. Privatisation was presented as “the sale of industries and state assets and the encouragement of individual responsibility and private initiative (Duczmal, 2006).

It is in the 1990s that the licensing of private operators in education occurs, whose institutions were (and still are) financed with the resources from the provided services, that is, the sense of private in this inception stage of the private sector massification in education is summarised by the creation of Higher Education Institutions entirely supported by the students’ contributions. It is in this scenario that privatisation incept and creates conditions for its expansion, combined with factors already described with the demand and the inability of public IES to respond to it. This Angolan-style mass privatisation entails from the outset “the distinctive feature of mass private sectors that is the accommodation of a large portion of students in low-cost, low-selective, and usually low-quality institutions” (Duczmal, 2006, p.37).

Conclusions

The private higher education expansion in Angola expresses the will of an elite excited to delimit the domains and fields to explore as a consequence of the gaps the State itself presents – education policy fragility, strategic plans paucity for the integral development of the sector aggravated by the situation that the private actors are simultaneously public managers. Therefore, the commercialisation agents’ agenda,

far from designing education as a fundamental task of the State, as expressed in the «constitution» and the theoretical ideals of education, will be an agenda that meets the professional training market.

In this context, we can conclude that the Angolan State, as such, is complex, requiring analysis from multiple dimensions (power, economy, politics, etc.) so that its nature and specificity can be understood, since it goes beyond the established nomenclature of the political systems. The Angolan political regime has tendencies that are different from the simple comprehension of democracy or socialism. Merely stating that in Angola there is a transition from war to peace, from centralised socialist economy to a “liberal” market economy, and from a Marxist State, of the Leninist type, to a multi-party system, would leave aside what is the Angolan political regime that uses traditional nomenclatures to relate to its peers in the international arena.

The transition process has been managed to ensure the maintenance of the regime in power (political and economic) in the new context of “democracy”. As it is understood that the victory of the war pertains exclusively to the regime and, therefore, to the military, the satisfaction of the interests of the political-military elite involves the benefit and access to greater economic and political possibilities, the “appropriation of public assets, exploration licenses of diamond zones, maintenance of political positions in the party-state-governmental structure” (Andrade, 2009:44) while alluding to its right to impunity for its actions. Thus, the political action strategy translates into a mechanism for maintaining the spaces and positions that the elite and its collaborators, connected to the regime, occupy in the new context of “democracy” and the market economy, perhaps being unable to leave the commanding power positions.

The current State is the consequence of great political manoeuvres that generated social inequalities, permitted the existence of an extremely wealthy minority and a tremendously deprived majority, a regime that fed itself for many years on “harsh schemes, camouflaged and disguised, of repression and of dis-respect for human rights” (Andrade, 2009:44). Specifically, we have in Angola an elite and a regime that managed to move to a new context that is called democratic and free competition without internalising the need for change. Due to pressure, more external than internal, of the current global political and economic situation, we moved overnight from one political regime to another with the same political culture and actors, “who fell asleep as Marxists one day and woke up as Democrats next day, leading and controlling the entire transition process, its rhythm and contours for their own benefit in order to maintain their privileges” (Andrade, 2009:45). From this idea,

it can be concluded that corruption and influence peddling were strategies used by the regime to: maintain and conserve the political and economic power of the elite; nullify or reduce the power of its opponents through direct or indirect co-optation; combat social demonstrations that are unfavourable to the regime – Civil Society Organisations (OSC, acronym in Portuguese) «unfriendly to the government» (Macedo, 2009:66); promote individuals and OSC pertaining to the regime and convey the idea that there is no alternative for social and economic success or a career outside the regime.

Legitimacy is constantly sought in clientelism to the detriment of democracy in a deliberate and planned way. In February 2018, «Novo Jornal» published an article in which referred to «The Economist» magazine survey in which Angola appears with an average of 3.62 when in 2016 it appeared with 3.40 in a classification from 0 to 10. In the ranking «Index of Democracy 2017», which involves 167 countries, Angola is in the 125th position. Despite holding elections and talking about democracy, the study asserts that the authoritarian regime predominates in Angola.

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Financing and commercial technical rationality in teacher training programs in Angola: a study of the *Aprendizagem para Todos* Program – PAT (Learning for All Program) ☐

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1. Introduction

This chapter aims to analyse the construction and the consolidation of the agenda based on the technical mercantile rationality for programs of initial and on-going training of Angolan teachers in the 2010-2020 period. To this end, it focuses on examining the Education for All Project (PAT), in implementation since 2013, with funding and technical assistance from the World Bank and the *Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation*.

It is understood that commodification is inseparable from the State agency and, therefore, from the classes and local classes fractions and their links with the hegemonic capital fractions. In education, it is associated with the process by which facets related to school education are transformed into a niche market and the subsumption of education to entrepreneurship and global guidelines related to capital, such as international organizations (Motta; Andrade, 2020). In this process, actors who build, create, and implement educational policies emerge within the national borders. Among them, there are transnational private actors, research organizations, and entrepreneurs, who promote the educational policies they consider appropriate (Ball, 2014).

The research that underlies this text has a qualitative approach and was carried out from a bibliographic and documentary survey, whose documentary corpus was composed of PAT plans and reports, World Bank (WB) documents for the African continent, Angolan educational legislation, and other documents that support the right to education. It is organized into two main topics: the first deals with aspects that integrate the development of global technical rationality aligned to the New Public Management (NPM) and privatization elements, where one of the main disseminators is the World Bank with a teacher training project; then we examine the PAT as part of a mercantile agenda of skills, as an empirical representation of the perspective

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of the mercantile fundamentals under teacher training in Angola; in the end, we draw conclusions about the risks that the movement of technical mercantile rationality brings to the studied region.

2. Global technical rationality and its relations with education

Since the threshold of the 21st century, the world has been undergoing transformations involving the State's action in the search for efficiency and quality standards. One of the forms of this change has been occurring through the privatization of services and the economization of knowledge, accepting that, at the political level, the modes of regulation of educational policies are increasingly convergent and that, at the cultural level, common standards are trans-nationalized, that results from the recognition of principles about ways of being and living (Bortot, 2022). A characteristic of these standards is the rise of the discourse of good practices that place mercantile standards in education at the centre, an increase closely related to a global educational policy (GEP) existence (Robertson, 2012).

According to Verger and Normand (2015), in recent years, these elements have integrated the NPM and the GEP, both in industrialized and developing countries. NPM aggregates a set of private management principles that are indicated for services optimization within the public sector, which starts to incorporate values and market strategies to optimize its action with flexibility, efficiency, and low cost (Scaff; Souza; Paxe, 2018). Verger and Normand (2015, p. 614-615) affirm that "their discourses and instruments circulate globally but are reformulated and translated into national and local contexts in such a way that the policies developed can have very differentiated approaches".

The growing presence of non-state actors in public policy formulation processes contributes to redefining governance relationships and responsibilities in different spheres. The increased role of non-state actors must be understood in relation to the paradigm shift from government to governance, whereby the state loses exclusive control over policy formulation (Rhodes, 1994). In these terms, the State is influenced by capitalist rationality to adopt a new governance model, centred on the effective implementation of competitive logic to the detriment of the principle of public law and policies for the protection and promotion of social justice (Dardot; Laval, 2016).

In this scenario, under the discourse of efficiency and modernization from the global to the local, there is a vast openness to commodification and rationality, which also affected the educational field through the exogenous and endogenous privatization

of education. According to Ball and Youdell (2008), exogenous privatization is defined by the authors as that which involves opening public education services to the private sector through agreements based on economic benefit and the use of the private sector in the design, management, or provision of different aspects of public education. On the other hand, endogenous privatization involves importing ideas, methods, and practices from the private sector to make the public sector increasingly commercial. (Ball; Youdell, 2008). It is indicated that, for the most part, these types of privatizations tend to be intertwined and hybrid (Fontdevila, Verger & Avellar, 2023).

Based on Adrião (2022), Martins and Krawczyk (2016), and Fontdevila, Verger & Avellar (2023), privatization in education occurs on several fronts, whether through the educational offer, public education management, and curriculum. It ranges from the transfer of assets, creation of new markets, liberalization, and transfer of responsibilities from the public sector to the private sector, in addition to influencing, in the form of capital, the content of public education policies. Such actions are especially explored with the policies of institutions such as the OECD, WB, and IDB, as well as international private conglomerates, which focus, for this, on specialists and finance the government in the orientation of its educational projects to its objectives, whose education standards are defined internationally that originate quality education for all has been directly affecting teacher training. These discourses circulate among organizations and, later, among ministries and other actors as good practices to be followed.

This can be observed in Angola and Brazil when the WB finances and influences good practices and programs based on these characteristics for education, whose teacher training is one of its main fronts of action (Bortot, Brás, Scaff, 2022). Since the 1990s, teachers, in WB documents, have been seen as key players in improving student learning rates. Since *Prioridades y estrategias para la educación* (World Bank, 1996, p. 4), teachers are considered an educational input like so many others. More recently, in 2011, the WB launched the “2020 Strategy for Education: Education for All – Investing in People’s Knowledge and Skills to Promote Development”, built through consultations with governments, development partners, students, teachers, researchers, civil society, and business representatives from more than one hundred countries, according to the participation guideline adopted by the WB in recent years (World Bank, 2011).

According to the 2011 document, there is a gap between the years of schooling and the *knowledge and competencies* people need to develop to contribute to the economic growth of their countries based on the right to learning. In this sense, it is part of the Bank’s agenda:

[...] support reforms of educational systems. The term “educational system” typically refers to public schools, universities, and training programs that provide education services. In this strategy, the “educational system” includes the **full range** of learning opportunities that exist in a country, **whether they are provided or funded by the public or private sector (including religious organizations, non-profit or profit organizations)**. It includes formal or non-formal programs in addition to the full range of beneficiaries and stakeholders in these programs: **teachers, trainers, administrators, staff, students and their families, and employers**. It also includes the rules, policies, and accountability mechanisms that agglutinate an education system, as the resources and financing mechanisms that support it (World Bank, 2011, p. 5, emphasis added).

Years later, the World Bank (2017) listed dimensions of what it called a learning crisis, namely: unsatisfactory learning outcomes; a break of the relationship between teaching and learning; systemic causes of a political nature; “Teachers do not have the skills or motivation to teach effectively. Teachers are the main factor affecting learning in schools” (World Bank, 2017, p. 1-3, our translation). In this direction, in the following year, the WB published a new study entitled “*Informe sobre el desarrollo mundial 2018: aprender para hacer realidad la promesa de la educación*” (World Bank, 2018), highlighting that educational reforms allow countries to enjoy long-term economic development benefits, preparing people for work and life. It brings the concept of learning in its instrumental sense and dissolves the function of education, of the historically accumulated appropriation of culture and science. In this perspective, based on Libâneo (2012), the concept of learning for the WB expresses, once again, a restricted view when referring to minimum learning, that is, basic skills for survival, with teaching, and, consequently, learning, reduced in skills and competencies.

In this context, the WB is an important agent of a continuum of teacher training, based on “competencies, the definition of learning goals embodied by descriptors, external and census evaluation, technological intensification and the corresponding expropriation of teachers’ knowledge” (Leher, 2019, p. 8). From this perspective, the Bank’s technical rationality comes to organize, under the discourses of good practices and the importance of partnerships, the pedagogy of competencies, where the exogenous dynamics of privatization interact dialectically with endogenous technologies of political privatization strongly influenced by a global policy with “accountability relationships between the various actors and participants in the

education system so that this relationship is clear, consistent with functions, measured, monitored and supported” (World Bank, 2011, p. 6).

Recently in Angola, the reformist agenda of educational policies has been constituted in such a way that teachers are the centre of the programs and agendas modelled by the WB, which has been outlining funding goals and training content, mobilizing partners, and instituting the discourse of economics and social development based on market logic and skills, consistent with economic imperatives and educational management models focused on decentralization, evaluation and teacher accountability; to rationality and performativity (Paxe; Scaff; Souza, 2018; Marques, 2021). In this sense, with a view to professionalizing teachers, the following programs were implemented: in 2008, PREPA (Teacher Training Project for Primary Education in Angola), in 2009, SABER MAIS (Program to improve the teachers’ skills in Teaching Schools for the I Cycle of Secondary Education) and, from 2013, the PAT (Learning for All Project), which has the collaboration of the international business sector, namely: the World Bank and the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation (CGF).

In the next item, we seek to apprehend current teacher training policies in Angola and their articulation with the PAT to subsequently analyse the program’s mercantile agenda of competencies.


3. Implementation of the mercantile agenda of competencies in teacher training programs in Angola

Since 2007, with the approval of the Teacher Training Master Plan, the Angola Ministry of Education has implemented a set of training programs for teaching staff aimed at improving the efficiency of the education system, as provided for in the Integrated Strategy for Improvement of the Education System for the period 2001-2015, formulated by the Government of Angola, with the support of United Nations agencies such as UNESCO and UNICEF, after the 2000 Dakar Education Framework. Teaching professionalization focuses on training, mentoring, monitoring teachers, and evaluating their performance in the classroom, through short-term training.

PAT is a national program approved in September 2013 and managed by the World Bank. The Program is one of the actions created within the macro-political framework of the Angolan government, in partnership with the World Bank, namely the Long-Term Strategy Angola 2025 (Angola, 2007) and the National Development Plans 2013-2017 and 2018-2022 (Angola, 2012; 2018) which elected basic education and higher education as its main priorities, to promote human development and education of the Angolan citizen, which is based on education and lifelong learning.

The effective start of its implementation was in June 2014, with the objective of preparing, implementing, and testing a training program for basic education teachers whose activities directly impact teachers, school principals, and central and municipal education technicians (PAT, 2022). With the first phase ending in March 2022, it reached more than 15,000 teachers across the country, as can be seen in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Geographical Representation of Points where Pat was located in Angola



Source: World Bank – PAT, 2022.

The PAT integrates the actions of the Angolan government concerning teacher training, corroborating the objective of:

To ensure that, according to the quantitative needs of the educational system, teaching functions in preschool education, primary education, and in each discipline of the I and II Cycles of Secondary Education (general, technical-professional, and pedagogical) are ensured, in each province, by teachers who are properly qualified and well-performing (Angola, 2018, p.4396).

In Angola, the Legal Regime for the Initial Training of Childhood Educators, Primary School Teachers, and Secondary School Teachers approved in 2020 (Angola, 2020), is a foundation for regulating the structure and functioning of pedagogical secondary and higher education institutions. The teaching professional qualification

areas that each institution and initial teacher-training course certifies and enables are described in Table 1.

Table 1. Initial teacher Education Levels by Professional Qualification Areas

Teaching professional qualification area	Education Level	Courses of Study
Childhood Educator	College	Degree in Childhood Education
	High School	Secondary Course in Childhood Education
Elementary School Teacher	College	Degree in Primary Education
	High School	Secondary Course in Primary Education
Teacher of the I Cycle of Secondary Education	College	Degree in Teaching: (specific scientific areas of the I Cycle subjects - 7th to 9th Grade)
	High School	Secondary Course in Teaching: (specific scientific areas of the I Cycle subjects - 7th to 9th Grade)
Teacher of the II Cycle of Secondary Education (high school)	College	Degree in Teaching: (specific scientific areas of the subjects of the II Cycle - high school)


Source: Elaboration of authors based on the Legal Regime of Initial Training of Childhood Educators, Primary School Teachers, and Secondary School Teachers, 2022.

The initial education of teachers working in basic education (from preschool education to high school) occurs mostly in high school institutions, according to data from the National Institute for Training of Education staff (INFQE). This executive body of the MED points out the existence of 98 schools of teacher training at the secondary level in the 18 Angolan provinces, the so-called “Schools of Magisterium”, and at least 35% of them are in the municipalities of the interior and in the most remote areas of the country (INFQE, 2021).

As for continuing training, it takes place in educational institutions through seminars and other annual training actions, as well as programs and projects implemented and managed by INFQE, funded by the Angola Government and/or by international regulatory agencies, such as the UNESCO, the UNICEF, and the World Bank, as also pointed out Quimbamba (2021).

The PAT, in the middle of Angolan teacher education policies, is one of the main training initiatives with the Government of Angola. The budget approved at the beginning of the PAT was USD 80,000,000.00, of which \$75,000,000.00 was related to the financing of the *International Development Association* (IDA) and \$5,000,000.00 of Angola Government funding (GOA). Figure 2 illustrates the disbursement of the program in a historical series of 2015-2021.

Figure 2. Financial Implementation 2015-2021



Source: PAT, 2022.

Of this amount, a predominance of financing comes from the WB through subsidy. The Project directly integrates 18,846 education professionals, distributed among teachers, school principals, members of school boards, educators of the Pedagogical Influence Zones³⁹ and Teaching Schools, supervisors, inspectors, facilitators, provincial and municipal education coordinators, accountants, project technicians themselves, members of the Technical Group of the National Evaluation System and technicians of The Ministry of Education (MED) (PAT, 2021), subdivided as shown in Table 3.

³⁹ Pedagogical Influence Zone is a methodological support body that brings together a group of schools closer to each other from a reference school called the Headquarters School or Resource Center (Ministry of Education 2016, p.10).

Table 3. Pat Direct Beneficiaries

Group of direct beneficiaries						
Teachers	ZIP Educators	EM Educators	Supervisors	Provincial and municipal education staff	Accountants	PAT Staff
15.000	669	60	43	228	36	19
Facilitators	Inspectors	School Principals	School Council Members	ZIP Municipal Coordinators	GTSNA Staff	MED Technicians
30	18	842	1684	167	26	24
Total	18.446					

Source: Bortot, Brás & Scaff (2022).

The teachers who benefited from the project belong to the MED staff integrated into the teaching career in the different provinces and municipalities of the country and, as State employees; their remuneration is paid by the Angolan government. However, they still benefit from a subsidy paid by the World Bank for their participation in the activities of the PAT, that is, during the frequency of training and evaluations of the project. The same occurs with the MED technicians, school principals, inspectors, supervisors, and educators that, being in the machine of the State, receive subsidies from participation in the activities and tasks of the PAT. From these beneficiaries, school board members do not receive any grant directly from the project, bearing in mind that the project only supports its creation and operation by providing support materials for regular activities, such as working meetings.

In addition to the direct beneficiaries, PAT indirectly benefits 500,000 elementary school students through “a higher quality education in the subjects of Portuguese Language and Mathematics, taught by teachers better prepared from a didactic point of view” (PAT, 2021, p. 9).

The concern with the education typology of teachers who work fundamentally in basic education constitutes a constraint to guarantee the improvement of the quality of teaching, pointing out the need to provide teachers with “opportunities for the development of professional competencies, predominantly focused on the improvement of practices in the classroom and pedagogical coordination at school” (Angola, 2018, p.4399). To this end, programs should be implemented to update and strengthen

professional knowledge and competencies for teaching practice, so the PAT seeks to respond to this purpose of the teacher training policy in Angola.

A concern that has been reinforced by the MED data from 2019 that point out that, of the 202,724 teachers who worked in public schools that school year, 22.9% (which represents 46,562 teachers) have no pedagogical training, whether high school or higher (Angola, 2019). Therefore, the PAT, by being configured as a program for the continuous training of primary school teachers in Angola, using a cascade training methodology, since 2016, allows the training of at least 15,000 teachers in the areas of Portuguese Language, Mathematics, Pedagogical Assessment in the classroom (EGRA - Early Grade Reading Assessment and EGMA – Early Grade Mathematics Assessment), Special Education and Pedagogical Differentiation.

3.1 Influence of partner subjects in PAT

The PAT, while a Teacher training program that integrates Angolan educational policies since its formularization, counts on the competition of international institutions partnering with the government of Angola, with emphasis on the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation (CGF) – a perpetual institution of Portuguese nationality for charitable, artistic, educational, and scientific purposes – created in 1956 by the will of Calouste Sarkis Gulbenkian, a philanthropist of Armenian origin (Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, 2021). This European foundation has implemented development partners in Africa, in the five Portuguese-speaking African countries (PALOP), namely Angola, Cabo Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tome and Principe, with gross operating costs of 2.9 million Euros.

In Angola, the Foundation intervention in the PAT results from an invitation made by MED:

Following the work carried out under the PREPA – Teacher Training Project for Primary Education in Angola -, which consisted of training educators, producing guides and training modules, and equipping and organizing an Educational Resources Center at the Primary School in Benguela, the Gulbenkian Foundation was invited by the Ministry of Education of Angola to present a proposal for the continuous training component of teachers of the Education for All Project (Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, 2021).

Consequently, in response to the invitation, CGF took over the functions as the manager of this initiative created under the World Bank's *Learning for All* fund, and hired in 2016, to carry out the project, the technical support services of the School of

Education of the Polytechnic Institute of Setúbal (Portugal) who has been since the beginning of the implementation of the project in charge of “coordination at various levels – geographical, skills of trainees and trainers, disciplinary, training and training supervision” (Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, 2018). The School of Education of the Polytechnic Institute of Setúbal team consists of about “20 teachers and involves an overall budget of around 1.2 million euros” (Polytechnical Institute of Setúbal, 2017). These teachers coordinate the training in the five training centres linked to the project, namely in Luanda, Saurimo (Lunda Sul), Lubango (Huíla), M'Banza Congo (Zaire), and Huambo, advising about 800 ZIP trainers who, in the following May and August, will ‘rationalize’ this training in about two hundred places, for primary school teachers (Polytechnical Institute of Setúbal, 2017).

Under the terms established by PAT, the strategy of management, evaluation, and monitoring of teacher training, the design and elaboration of pedagogical support manuals and school management orientation guides, such as the elaboration of the school educational project and the functioning of the Zones of Pedagogical Influence (ZIP) are assumed by the teachers of the Superior School of Education of Setúbal. This submits Angolan education professionals, from tutelage technicians to teachers, a regime of subalternation and dependence on their driving axis, configuring not only the importation of an educational policy but the subjugation and tendency of intellectual domination of Portuguese specialists over Angolan professionals and as leading to the privatization of education.

3.2 The pedagogy of competencies as a continuum PAT formative

Considered a project to reinforce and train staff in the Education sector developed by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Angola, with the support of the BM, PAT has as its areas of intervention “Teaching Skills and School Management, Assessment of Student Learning and Project Management” (PAT, 2021, p. 9). To this end, the following components are established: Improve Teacher Skills and School Management of Primary Schools in Designated Project Areas; Establish a Student Learning Assessment System and is expected to support the Ministry of Education in its efforts to improve the Student Learning Assessment System; Support the Project implementation by strengthening the management capacity at the local level and supplying resources to support the PAT Management Team.

Strengthening teachers’ competencies and reforming initial teacher education (PAT, 2022) are central axes for achieving these objectives established in the compo-

nents. These competencies of teachers and school management are linked, directly and exclusively, to the learning competencies to be measured on a large scale, where Portuguese and Mathematics stand out with training activities arising from Manuals that are a “set of training materials (modules), for scientific and pedagogical updating of teachers, and a set of sheets (pedagogical kit) for use in the classroom with their students” (PAT, 2019).

Therefore, the idea of improving teacher training for their better professional performance stands out and should imply a better classification of students in the evaluation of a large school to be institutionalized with a national pilot exam in 2022. The issue of measuring the quality of education through large-scale evaluation, which is based on a set of Manuals for the learning of Portuguese and Mathematics, in addition to aspects related to management through Pedagogical Supervision manuals that seek to develop teaching, learning and schoolwork effectively “in a flexible way taking into account what seems to be most useful for student learning” (PAT, 2018, p. 22). Therefore, pedagogical work leads to the development of useful competencies for learning specific disciplines. For Sudbrack, Fonseca (2021) is a new orthodoxy of reforms that is part of the neoliberal ideology:

“[...] which is transmitted worldwide, regardless of the pattern of economic and social development of nations. During the announced Reforms, the measurement of the quality of education via large-scale tests has been considered an appropriate mechanism to indicate educational quality, in the sense that, since they are quantifiable, they would be more “concrete” (Sudbrack, Fonseca, 2021, p. 9).

This project adopts a methodology focused on six training modules “aligned with the MED learning goals: (i) Portuguese Language; (ii) Mathematics; (iii) Pedagogical evaluation in the classroom; (iv) Pedagogical differentiation I (v) Pedagogical differentiation II; (vi) Inclusive special education” (PAT, 2020, p.14). In these terms, a training design values the pedagogy of competencies, a more practical training where teachers’ experiences are valued to the detriment of a more theoretical training” (Pansardi, 2011, p. 137).

The pedagogy of competencies would constitute a teaching that is effectively useful, “[...] what counts is being able to read the use manual of a device and be able to use it. (Maués, 2003, p. 107). This training bias for competencies in the context of the PAT extends equally to the idea of improving school managers’ performance. In this regard, Sudbrack and Fonseca (2021) consider the following:

Supranational regulation operates by conveying a discourse in which the manager is a problem solver, the learner, and the decision maker who governs with and through monitoring. The categories that are elected echo what Fonseca (2011, p. 225) alludes to, that is, that we were overflowed with concepts that go through “quality”, “accountability”, and “competence”, among others, in their ambiguities of management matrix (Sudbrack; Fonseca, 2021, p. 10).

By directly promoting a teacher training project to increase the number of teachers in the country, the Bank influences the quality of training. It presupposes a large-scale intervention in teacher training mechanisms in the country (World Bank, 2013). Quality involves, from the perspective of the World Bank (World Bank, 2011; 2013), the adequacies of training to new skills that were required of the worker, in general, to “make schools and teachers more responsible for results, especially learning outcomes” (World Bank, 2011, p. 141).

This is present in the project because it aims to indirectly train “500,000 primary school students benefited from a higher quality teaching in the subjects of Portuguese Language and Mathematics and taught by teachers better prepared from the didactic point of view” (PAT, 2021, p. 9), with a view to reach and measure the quality of training through “National Evaluation 4th and 6th classes, Pilot of National Exams and Specialization in educational evaluation” (PAT, 2021, p. 16).

The results of the PAT based on the Information Bulletin of the MED points out as intermediate and final results of the project until 2019, “better-qualified teachers in pedagogy and teaching methodology of the Portuguese Language and Mathematics, socialization of good practices, improved reading and writing skills of students, as well as improvements in the fulfilment of school curricula” (Quimbamba, 2021, p. 80), highlighting the perspective of improving the professional performance of teachers and the search for better school results of primary students in Portuguese Language and Mathematics. Therefore, the diffusion of good practices is associated with the need to evaluate its impacts, which corroborates the Bank’s educational project, an experimentalist policy, and methodology that can be characterized as technical, more practical, and focused on the competencies of know-how, such as PAT, focusing on the evaluation of the results, and not exactly on human development, in its broad sense, by education.

In this direction, the *teaching, based on the continuum formative* of efficiency and effectiveness of the results, became a key element to improve student learning rates, aligning with the World Bank guidelines since the 1990s. Thus, “framing global poli-

cies” (VERGER, 2018, p. 8) in local contexts to develop teaching competencies to integrate a major project of harmonization of teaching and management for greater control and effectiveness of teaching, aimed at the *right to learning*.

In this mercantile conception, the right to learning implies that subjects have no right to the set of other rights that composes educational quality but those measured by the mechanisms that integrate efficiency and school competence. Therefore, the special focus of the Project is dedicated to the training of teachers and managers under the justification of efficiency and modernization of a country with delay in schooling. However, this trend indicates the influence of a matrix based on technical rationality in the formative processes to the detriment of a foundation based on critical rationality, in which:

The proclaimed right to education becomes the right to learning and within the limits of the school, for then to become right to the basics, limited to reading and mathematics learning. Transmuted in the right to learning, are equally excluded all other dimensions of training other than cognitive, especially reading and mathematics, and the other disciplines and areas of training take light forms (for example, projects and areas) where the content is secondary, so that the student can focus on learning reading and mathematics, that is, the disciplines present in the tests (Freitas, 2014, p. 55).

This logic reiterates a formulation that takes the formative curriculum of teachers and education in a limited sense as a taxonomy that prioritizes the prescription of learning objectives and emphasizes an aspect of the cognitive dimension that can be measured. Thus, this logic secondaries more complex aspects of this dimension, in addition to contributing to disregarding other aspects of human formation, of an intellectual, ethical, and aesthetic order.

With PAT, the WB organized a software called TEACH to measure the components of pedagogical practices related to the “Quality of teachers’ teaching techniques that help develop students’ socio-emotional and cognitive capacities; Time devoted to learning” (PAT, 2022), being a classroom observation tool that evaluates teachers’ efforts to promote students’ skills. It is a classroom observation tool that was clearly designed considering the realities of low and middle-productivity countries for classroom monitoring and to evaluate ideas to improve further teachers’ teaching techniques (World Bank, 2019). Mediating teaching skills through applications from the pedagogical practices originated from the Project is a form of association with performance and with the emphasis on practice, the use of tacit knowledge acquired during the work, and the consolidation of mechanisms capable of scaling this productivity and exercising greater control over work activity (Silva, 2019).

The perspective that stands out on the direction of the PAT is characteristic of the educational projects financed by the WB since 2013. As Silva (2019, p.221), analysing multilateral cooperation in the context of teacher training policies in Angola, states that for the WB to achieve its learning for all mission, it has two strategic directions “reforming education systems, at the country level, and building a high-quality knowledge base for educational reforms at the global level,” since the PAT integrates the Institution’s actions focused on good practices.

Such elements have increased in developing countries, particularly in this article for Angola, the organization of regulations and standards about teaching skills through International Organizations for teacher training, through “technical programs that suggest (impose) diagnoses, methodologies, practices, solutions (often uniformly) that end up constituting a kind of ‘ready-to-wear’” (Barroso, 2018, p. 1083), based on studies and practices formulated by them. In addition to the projects, these institutions create comparison instruments, which become “[...] an instrument of political persuasion and a criterion for the formulation of judgments (of quality, effectiveness)” (Barroso, 2018, p. 1083).

The PAT and a continuum formative establishment demonstrated rationality through endogenous and exogenous routes, where international institutions promote the installation of interdependence by drawing national plans from global agendas to deal with problems that require international cooperation and/or alignment of national policies (Bortot, 2022). According to Peroni and Scheibe (2017), this occurs in teacher training, in the monitoring of educational systems, in the sponsorship of international assessments, not only through direct financing but through endogenous privatization, whose public management is governed by market rules, producing new technical rationality in education in the principles of efficiency, effectiveness, and teaching control to the principles of NPM in Angola.

The global technical rationality, led by the WB, frames by the NPM elements, and announces as trends of policies, between endogenous and exogenous aspects, to meet the very agenda aligned with the countries to develop, according to the Bank itself, “a high-quality knowledge base on the reform of the educational system” (World Bank, 2011, p. 6). In this sense, we understand that it is necessary for the context of Angola to think of a teacher training model that responds to the real needs of teachers, and national education professionals should assume a proactive role in the implementation of policies and programs, not being hostage to partner institutions and global agendas of education privatization.

4. Conclusions

Increase the number of teachers and, at the same time, align training with the global project of mercantile rationality. The PAT in Angola expresses this movement, which unites teacher professionalization with the competitive logic instituted worldwide through extensive assessments of scale, efficiency, and control of teacher training, aligned, to a large extent, with the strategies of the political influence of the private sector in the country rural educational sector, as indicated by Fontdevila, Verger & Avellar (2023). Thus, it is concluded that the common thread of this global education project integrates a larger task of harmonizing teaching and management in developing countries for greater control and effectiveness of teaching, which brings risks to the consolidation of critical teacher education and the consolidation of the right to quality education in the region. This can be verified when, according to the precepts of the NPM, the PAT directs the initial and on-going training of teachers and managers towards the international project of the right to learning and the regulation of education.

This demonstrates that the conceptions of performativity commodification and education by competencies, focused on transforming learning, imply the creation of a new culture of teacher education. The PAT has adjusted to the teacher training policies in Angola since 2011 but corresponds to a project centred on the pedagogy of competencies based on the paradigms of international organizations, on the subordination of education to standards of behaviour adopted a priori that must be evaluated and validated. This aligns with what Sudbrack and Fonseca (2021) analysed from programs of a new reformist orthodoxy, part of neoliberal ideals and NPM. Therefore, there is an external control that aims to produce a well-defined teaching subjectivity for market standards, where the formation of teaching skills focused on standardization mechanisms has become one of the objectives and objects of mercantile technical rationality of a training continuum that aims to model the individual according to market demands.

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– Is the State a credible provider of basic education services? The case of the Democratic Republic of Congo ☐

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Introduction

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is the largest country in Sub-Saharan Africa. It has a fast-growing population, reaching the threshold of 100 million inhabitants in 2020 and is projected to grow to 200 million by 2050. Forty per cent of the population lives in urban areas, with a high concentration in the capital city. Under 15-year-olds represent 48% of the population.

Before the COVID-19 outbreak, 77% of the population lived below the international poverty line of US\$1.90 per day⁴³. In 2020 the DRC was 175th out of 189th on the HDI.⁴⁴

In 2021, the DRC was the 5th most fragile country in the world, with a deterioration in specific indicators related to the State's legitimacy, human rights, social groups' demands, and the elites' fragmentation⁴⁵. It is 47th of 54 African countries in the Ibrahim Index on governance and was ranked 170th of 180 countries in the corruption index in 2020⁴⁶. Finally, due to important population movements, the Great Lakes subregion's highly volatile political and economic context continues to influence the humanitarian situation in general and the educational situation (Government of DRC, 2022).

Religious networks have managed approximately 80% of public primary schools since the 1970s through an agreement⁴⁷ signed after an almost total collapse of state provision. Public education has thus been in the hands of non-state actors for the last 50 years, leaving the Government with minimal power to direct the governance,

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⁴³ 2019 Global Multidimensional Poverty Index

⁴⁴ 2020 Human Development Index

⁴⁵ 2021 Fragile State Index, Fund for Peace

⁴⁶ 2020 Ibrahim Index on African Governance

⁴⁷ 1977 Convention between state and main religious networks, which has been reviewed in 2022.

management and performance of the education sector aside from its normative role. Faced with a fast-growing population and a reduced budget, the DRC cannot meet the demand for free,⁴⁸ inclusive, quality public education. In the more densely populated areas, the absence of public schools leads to a rapidly growing low-cost private education sector to fill the gap. Private schools dominate Lubumbashi (over 70%) and Kinshasa (80%), providing an alternative to public education for disadvantaged families or families looking for what is perceived as quality education.

Free education provided by the Constitution and finally implemented by President Tshisekedi in 2019 was hardly prepared and suffered from a lack of finance, technical vision, proper planning, management and control mechanisms.

Parents still pay illegal fees for the education of their children four years after the launch of Free Education. Free education has also highlighted the contradictions and tensions within the religious networks that manage most public schools and own most private schools, creating power struggles and alliances (Hill and Jochim, 2009).

Based on studies and data from the ACCELERE! programme (a UKAID/USAID-funded education programme in DRC⁴⁹), along with academic and grey literature, this chapter sheds light on the challenges faced by the State in managing the education sector and delivering quality basic education services.

As part of the ACCELERE! implementation team, the authors have focused on improving governance of the education sector, and by doing this, have gained a comprehensive understanding of the educational landscape and challenges, which are reflected in this article.

This paper shows who the leading non-state education providers in the DRC are, how and why they are engaged in providing core education goods and services, how they are funded, and how the State is managing them. We describe how these arrangements impact education delivery and quality and propose critical points for consideration if the State is to regain credibility as the guarantor of free public education for all.

⁴⁸ Free primary education was introduced in 2019.

⁴⁹ ACCELERE! Had four components: ACCELERE!1 focusing on early-grade learning in mother tongue, ACCELERE!2 focusing on governance in the education system, ACCELERE!3 focusing on girls' education and ACCELERE!4 in charge of monitoring, evaluation and learning. This chapter uses evidence produced by ACCELERE!1 and 2.

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I – THE DRC EDUCATION SYSTEM: A HYBRID SYSTEM WITH BLURRED LINES BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC ACTORS

A fragmented public education system with a significant role for religious networks.

One key particularity of the DRC education system is that most public schools are managed by faith-based networks. Public pre-primary, primary and secondary public schools are usually divided into two types: 1) state-run public schools (called ‘*non-conventionnées*’) and 2) public schools run by faith-based networks (called ‘*conventionnées*’). State public schools are managed and funded directly by the State. Faith-based public schools are managed by a private religious entity which has received a mandate from the State for this work but is funded directly by the State (school staff salaries and monthly school allowance).

During the colonial period, Catholic and Protestant churches played a significant role in the DRC education. Aiming to spread Christian values and convert the population, they created education centres to raise Congolese children in the Christian faith and became the primary means of formal education. However, in 1974 President Mobutu nationalised all religious schools to reaffirm the State’s power and control student protests against his regime. Mobutism⁵⁰ removed religious symbols and instruction in schools, leading to the National Episcopal Conference of the Congo becoming one of the prominent opposition figures during the Mobutu regime.

Nonetheless, without the support of religious networks, the entire education system collapsed. Amid a generalised economic crisis with extremely high inflation, teachers were no longer paid, and school infrastructure quickly deteriorated. In response to the chaotic situation, Mobutu required the churches to resume managing public schools as formalised by the 1977 Convention. This agreement established a state-regulated education system where the State and four main churches (Catholic, Protestant, Kimbanguist⁵¹, and Muslim) jointly managed public schools. Religious classes resumed, leading to the Catholic Church emerging as an almost equal partner with the State in managing the education sector.⁵²

⁵⁰ Mobutism was the state ideology of Zaire during the latter half of the 20th century, under the ruling of Mobutu and the Popular Movement of the Revolution.

⁵¹ Kimbanguism is a Christian new religious movement professed by the Church of Jesus Christ on Earth founded by Simon Kimbangu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) in 1921.

⁵² Since 1977, the Ministry has recognised 19 religious’ networks, some very small, through the signing of creation decrees for their public schools (Brandt, 2020).

In 2022, a new Convention was signed, strengthening the presence of faith-based public schools. They now make up 80% of all public schools, with Protestant schools accounting for 41%, Catholic schools accounting for 20% and state schools accounting for 20% of all public schools (DRC MEPSP, 2020). Although smaller, several faith-based networks have been added to the 2022 Convention. As a result, this has led to an unprecedented number of faith-based actors with over a hundred different networks involved in education provision. As in many other countries, the large share of enrolment in faith-based has an important influence on Faith-based organisations (FBO)' governance and accountability (Wodon, 2021a).

A growing number of low-cost private schools, especially in highly populated urban areas

Since the 1990s, against a backdrop of high demographic pressure and persistent economic crisis, the public education system in the DRC has suffered from a shortage of schools, poor existing education infrastructure, low remuneration of teachers, and weak school management, unsurprisingly leading to poor education quality. As a result, the number of private schools has grown to respond to parents' demands. More than 101,000 schools (Government of DRC, 2022) provide general education services at the preschool, primary and secondary levels. Seventeen per cent of them are private schools. But there are critical geographical discrepancies. According to the latest statistical yearbook (Government of DRC, 2019), two educational provinces account for more private than public schools at the primary level: in the educational provinces of Kinshasa and Haut Katanga, private primary schools account respectively for 66.4% and 54.8% of all primary schools (Government of DRC, 2019). Private schools are managed by a private school owner (an individual or a legal person). The functioning of these schools relies on funding from different sources, mainly parents' contributions and the school owner's funds. Most religious private schools also receive support from the Church they belong to, either nationally or from other countries.

However, school creation is not aligned with education needs

The official procedure for creating or establishing new public and private schools requires a needs assessment at the local level, based on an accurate school mapping, and a request to create a new school originating from the sub-division with approval at the provincial and central levels.

However, this approval process is currently bypassed at all levels by private school owners, state administrative offices and the Ministry. School creation is used for patronage, partially explaining the rising number of schools (Brandt, 2020).

All schools should have a decree signed by the Minister of Education confirming their accreditation and enabling them to be officially opened. Nonetheless, 30% of schools and education offices have no existing decree confirming their existence – and an estimated 11% of the existing decrees are fake (MEPST, 2020). For private schools only, a recent pilot evaluation in Kinshasa undertaken by the Directorate for the Administration of Private Education showed that 49% of the private schools visited either did not have an accreditation decree or had an incorrect one (DAPE, 2022). Moreover, when there is such a decree, in many cases, the number of classrooms and teachers does not match the reality, as schools have allowed themselves to grow bigger without any authorisation, having used school fees collected from parents to fund this expansion.

The lack of oversight by the State makes it easy to transform private schools into faith-based public schools and falsify school accreditation decrees (Titeca & de Herdt, 2011). Private schools on their side may be tempted to join a religious network in the hope that the State will provide a monthly allowance and cover their teachers' salaries. Communities may also take the initiative to create a community school which may be acquired later by new religious school networks. School trafficking also exists between religious networks (Cambridge Education, 2016). The networks may transfer their 'schools in the bank', meaning schools with a legal administrative licence but no existing infrastructure, to any other network willing to pay for it.

Private schools sector regulation exists only in theory

According to Government regulations, all private schools must be registered or accredited by the Ministry of Education (Government of DRC, 2014). The Education Framework Law sets the criteria and process for establishing private schools. Private school owners submit their application files to the central Directorate for the Administration of Private Education (DAPE). Once approval is granted, private schools become integral to the national education system and should function according to the *Law*. These schools must follow the national education curriculum, have a school management and parent committee, the teachers recruited must have a recognised diploma, etc. In return, the MoE should provide textbooks and owes supervisory services to these schools through regular inspections and support to teachers' continuous professional development (DAPE, 2022b).

Within the central Ministry of Education, the DEPA has no representation in the Provincial or sub-provincial education administrations. As a result, the Directorate does not have reliable data on the different private schools, nor visibility on their governance or the teaching and learning conditions in these schools. Moreover, it is very poorly staffed (DAPE, 2022). Providing oversight for the accredited private schools in the country is thus almost impossible. Private school owners are represented by several associations that operate nationwide. But these associations' oversight is also very weak, and private school owners are not all members. A union also represents private school teachers, and there is a union for parent associations in private schools.

Similar teacher qualifications and experience in public and low-cost private schools

To be employed as a teacher in primary schools in DRC, candidates need to have a *Diplôme d'Etat en pédagogie générale*, which is one of the most popular options for the secondary school leaving diploma; therefore, many young people qualify as primary school teachers.

An annual data collection was undertaken in 2019 (Cambridge Education, 2020b) by the ACCELERE!1 project in 715 low-cost private schools in Kinshasa. It confirmed that all teachers employed in the targeted schools had the diploma required. Regarding teacher qualification, there was no significant difference between public and private schools in Kinshasa at the time of the survey. However, this might change over time, given low-cost private schools' rapid and uncontrolled growth.

Regarding the seniority and experience of teachers, the ACCELERE!1 annual data collection of 2019 shows that private school teachers had a similar level of experience and age compared to teachers in public schools. Low-cost private schools have the reputation of having a significant turnover in their workforce. Our 2019 data shows that 30% of the private school teachers in this sample had only spent one year in the school or had just started. On the other hand, another 30% had 5 to 10 years of seniority. So, while there is a turnover of teachers, it does not seem to be at a critical level.

In conclusion, chapter II shows there are blurred lines between private and public actors in a generalised context of weak oversight by the State for public and private school. The education system in the DRC is fragmented, with a significant role played by non-state actors in the form of religious networks. These networks manage public schools with a wide degree of autonomy.

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II – DRC EDUCATION SYSTEM: A COMPLEX NETWORK OF INTER-TWINED INTERESTS IN WHICH EDUCATION SERVICE DELIVERY IS NOT A PRIORITY

A complicated and top-heavy public-school administration

According to the Constitution, education is decentralised to the Governor and Provincial Ministry of Education. However, it remains highly concentrated due to the dual administrative structure involving state and faith-based organisations (FBOs), resulting in a fragmented system. In practice, faith-based public schools are managed by both religious and state administrative offices at the provincial or sub-provincial level, leading to complex management and a top-heavy education system organisation. Furthermore, whether state administrative offices have authority over faith-based offices is unclear. As a result, the latter often bypass state actors, communicating and reporting directly to their church hierarchy without providing the necessary information to the Ministry of Education and its ‘deconcentrated’⁵³ structures.

These blurred lines between different actors (Zancajo et al., 2021) make it difficult for the Ministry of Education to implement central-level measures. Catholic public schools, for example, do not use the official curriculum for the Family Life education subject and prefer to use their curriculum based on conservative values, refraining from discussing contraception or sexuality for example (CENCO, 1970). Furthermore, there is little communication between the central level and the provinces and between state actors and religious networks (Titeca and De Herdt, 2011). This allows FBOs to find practical arrangements regarding education management with local and provincial authorities depending on their sphere of influence and balance of power.

In addition, due to a highly concentrated system and the temptation to create new jobs for patronage, the central administration continuously creates more administrative offices to administer schools. Over the past seven years, the central MEPST has created dozens of new educational provinces (from 27 in 2015 to 60 currently), resulting in hundreds of state administrative offices and thousands of additional civil servants. Some of these administrative offices manage as little as ten schools each.

⁵³ Refers to the delegation of administrative powers and functions to provincial or local authorities that are directly managed by central authorities.

Consequently, the number of administrative staff has multiplied by 16 in 30 years, while the number of teachers was multiplied by three only⁵⁴

In reality, few of those offices have the resources and technical capacity to support schools. However, they attract a large proportion of state funding and receive a share of school fees paid by parents, as detailed in the next section.

Education funding: between opacity and absence of accountability

In 1992, as the Mobutu regime was falling apart, Congolese teachers went on strike demanding payment of their salaries. To avoid a lost year of schooling, the Catholic Church and the parents' associations offered to complement teachers' salaries by creating a salary top-up system called a 'motivation bonus' paid directly by parents. While this was supposed to be a temporary coping mechanism, it became an institutionalised practice. The State and religious networks raised fees to cover costs, unpaid teachers' salaries, school repairs, officials' school visits, etc.

Free primary education was enshrined in the 2006 Constitution, but even then, the education system was still mainly financed by parents, who covered around 80% of the costs (Verhaghe, 2017). School fees were levied at the school level and redistributed to all system levels. Parents financed the education system for decades through legal and illegal school fees. In a sample of Catholic schools surveyed in 2015, 20% of the school fees raised at the school level were transferred to the general Church budget (Verhaghe, 2017). There was no state control over the level of fees charged to parents, and discussion of this matter was largely taboo.

In 2019, the Government decided to enforce free primary education and officially end all school fees requested from parents for primary education. However, this practice continues unofficially as a mechanism to cope with the lack of a state budget and low teacher salaries. In many cases, teachers, who either earn a small state salary or no salary if the State has not officially registered them, ask students in their classroom to pay for some small things, photocopies, a correction of their work, a better grade, etc. The State has little oversight of school management, leaving school staff to their own devices (Bourges, 2022).

For the other levels of education, Early Childhood Education (ECE) and secondary education, school fees are still legal for all public schools and can be high, ranging from 70 to 190 USD/year, depending on the grade and the network. The provincial

⁵⁴ Data from the Teachers Payroll Department- SECOPE, 2019. Unpublished document.

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Governors fix a maximum annual amount (170 USD in Kinshasa for 2021/2022), but schools can request a special authorisation to charge higher fees.

School fees are also a complicated and opaque matter for private schools: the Ministry of Education has no control over how much the schools request from parents. Data collected from 731 private schools in low-income neighbourhoods in Kinshasa under the ACCELERE!1 programme⁵⁵ shows a considerable variety of amounts, ranging from 8 USD per year to several hundred dollars. Only recently, the Minister and the associations of private school owners agreed to share fees: 10% allocated to the school, 30% to the school owner, and 60% to pay for teacher salaries (Directorate for the Administration of Private Education (2022).

Accountability and transparency in school management are still lacking

According to the law, accredited private schools have the same obligations as public schools: they should have a Parent Committee (COPA) and a School Management Committee (COGES). The COPA president should systematically participate in the COGES, which should be a pivotal piece of the decision-making process at the school level: it must develop the annual operation plan and the annual school budget accordingly. Both private and public schools are also meant to hold quarterly General Assemblies with parents.

In the past, the concept of accountability and parental participation in school management has been closely linked to the payment of school fees: the general idea was that parents had the right to know how the school fees they were paying were used. However, there is less justification for parents asking for accountability in the new context of free primary education in public schools.

According to a parent perception study undertaken under the ACCELERE! project (Cambridge Education, 2020b), all parents surveyed in private and public schools said they had already participated in a general assembly for the on-going school year. 48% of private school parents said they knew how the school fees were used. However, 82% of parents in private schools said they had never seen a report on how funds were spent. They admitted that meetings were held to fix the amounts at the beginning of the year but that nothing was done to report on using the funds at the end of the school year. Interestingly, half of the parents in private schools believe that the school owner is the unique proprietor and that parents have no right to interfere with the management and expenditure of school fees. Despite being the primary funding

⁵⁵ ACCELERE!1 (2015-2020)

source, parents feel they lack the authority to ask for accountability and transparency in school and financial management (Cambridge Education, 2020b).

III – HOW PARENTS VIEW PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ACTORS

The reasons for choosing private or public schools are diverse. Privileged families opt for private schools paying high fees for quality education. Some religious networks utilise schools with poor-quality education to showcase their development among the communities offering an option to poor parents who want to educate their children. In poor urban neighbourhoods, low-cost private schools are often the only option, offering proximity and affordability and meeting the community's needs.

Private schools as a choice to access quality service delivery

Private schools in the DRC offer an alternative to public education for many poor and vulnerable families, especially in densely populated urban and peri-urban areas where the State has not kept up with demand. These schools charge low fees and are thus affordable to impoverished households.

Given the little difference in quality between public and low-cost private schools, how parents' decisions to send their children to private schools can be explained? This question is even more relevant now that education is supposedly free: low-cost private schools imply a higher financial burden than public schools. The demographic context and insufficient public offer do not fully explain the current situation in provinces like Kinshasa or Haut-Katanga.

To better understand this issue, the parent perception survey mentioned above investigated the reasons behind parental decisions when choosing private or public schools; it sought to identify what features of a school are essential to parents and influence their choice and what knowledge parents have about the teaching and learning conditions in the school their children attend (access, safety, cost, education quality, school management, etc.). Specific attention was given to the financial aspect and understanding of how parents compare private to public schools.


Important academic literature discusses school choice, especially in public vs. private schools (UNESCO 2021). However, while this literature discusses demand-side and supply-side factors at length, it does not consider parents' perceptions of the alternative options available to them in making school choices (Ahmed, H, Amjad, S, Habib, M and S. Ahsan Shah 2013). As parental perceptions are rarely based on evidence, as school performance data is often unavailable to parents, these perceptions

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tend to be overlooked. They can, however, provide interesting insights into the dynamics of the school market.

The primary perception of the parents interviewed in the DRC was that private schools provide ‘better quality’ education. How quality is perceived, however, differs from one context to another: the quality of teachers is often put forward but is not necessarily linked to their qualifications. Another critical factor is the number of students per classroom. A further widespread perception is that private schools are better managed and have stronger leadership (and that this is related to less teacher absenteeism). On the other hand, public schools are often regarded as less reliable regarding teaching quality, infrastructure, equipment, or availability of learning materials.

Figure 5: Main features listed by parents to explain their school choice




Source: Parent perception survey (Cambridge Education 2020b)

Better information management in private schools

The survey in Kinshasa included a question inquiring whether parents regularly get information from the school. All parents in private schools confirmed this was the case through regular meetings, communication bulletins and regular visits to the school.

On the other hand, 55% of public school parents said it was difficult to get information. Mainly because the communication booklet used by the teacher and school director to pass information was no longer used. Since the inception of free primary education, parents reported that no budget had become available to purchase these booklets—another reason being the increased number of students in public schools preventing personalised monitoring.

Figure 6: Parents' knowledge of school performance



Source: Parent perception survey (Cambridge Education 2020b)

When asked whether they regularly get information on their child's progress in school, all private school parents confirmed this was the case against 12 out of the 20 public school parents. The other eight had been requested a fee before handing over the school report.

Negotiating school fees to remain no matter what in private schools

Until 2019, before free primary education, the average amount asked for in public schools in Kinshasa was around 95 USD per year (Verhaghe, 2017), much more than

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in many of the low-cost private schools in the city. Some schools seem to function with as little as 8 USD per year.

Out of the 29 private school parents interviewed, 11 reported having difficulties paying the school fees. Although most parents mentioned that they could negotiate with the school directors to find an alternative for delayed payments, these data show that choosing a private school represents a financial challenge for many families. All parents in Kinshasa mentioned that private school owners put measures in place to accommodate parents with payment issues. School principals declared that they usually ask for school fee payments by quarter. However, they all mentioned that they allow payments in small amounts whenever money is available and in instalments until the end of the school year. Forty per cent of private school parents reported that their child had been excluded because of a failure to pay the school fees during the last school year. This measure, known as ‘children hunting’ was frequently used in public schools before free education launched. Private school owners show more flexibility as they have a greater personal interest in keeping the children in the school and ensuring that families will pay even if this is late.


The broader impact of the free education policy on education access and quality is yet to be determined. However, first evaluations show a significant increase in the number of students in public schools, especially in the first grades. Even though school fees are not always affordable for the parents who choose to keep their children in private school, their negative perceptions of the public sector school might prevent them from switching even if their child will miss a few school days until they can pay again.

IV – CHALLENGES FACED BY THE EDUCATION SYSTEM IN THE DRC: WHAT ROLE CAN THE STATE PLAY?

The DRC is facing current and forthcoming key challenges impacting its ability to meet the demand for quality education.

Meeting a growing demand for education: The demand for education will likely increase sharply in the future: the Education for All campaigns have already brought many children to school in the past decades, and high demographic growth in the DRC means these figures will increase rapidly. School-age population projections show that there will be around 7 million more school-age children in 2026 and around 5.7 million more children enrolled in school.

Figure 7: School-age and schooled population projections



Source: INS and A12 school-age population projections.

The analysis of the current teaching workforce shows that it is ageing.

As the number of children increases, new teachers must be budgeted for, recruited and trained to fill the gap. This need will increase sharply from 2025, reaching an additional 300 000 teachers by 2040 (IIEP, 2022). In addition, more than 50,000 new pre-primary, primary and secondary schools will also be required by 2040. The State alone will not be able to cover this additional cost. That means ensuring free primary education will only be possible if preschool and secondary education remain paid for, if public expenditure on education significantly increases, and if the education system can also count on many private schools to accommodate this growing demand (Peano, 2021).

Growing inequalities in the education sector: The variety of education providers and the lack of oversight by the state lead to significant provincial differences in the school system. Some wealthier provinces like Haut Katanga and Lualaba have private mining companies that invest in their future employees' education and have good-quality private schools. Provinces with fewer resources have almost no private schools,

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and their public schools require investment. Only a few provinces have some of the so-called 'prestigious schools' in the large cities, which are public Catholic or Protestant schools that benefit from a larger state allowance. These schools usually provide quality education but are extremely expensive for secondary level parents.

Meanwhile, as highlighted earlier, in the highly populated parts of the fast-growing Congolese cities, parents do not have any choice but to send their children to a private school as there is simply no public school available.

In addition, the DRC has been suffering from multiple complex emergencies and protracted crises, either due to conflict, epidemics (Ebola, etc.) or natural hazards. In general, the education system has not been able to cope well with these crises. There is no education in emergency strategy, and education in crisis-affected provinces is primarily left to non-state actors, whether development partners, local communities or civil society. This situation has resulted in an unequal education system, with a rural-urban divide and significant differences between provinces (UNESCO, 2022).

The quality of education service delivery and learning outcomes are lower than in other sub-Saharan African countries: According to the 2019 PASEC⁵⁶ assessment, on average, at the beginning of their schooling, 41.6% of Congolese students reach the minimum proficiency level in literacy, which is three points lower than the average of countries assessed through PASEC. Moreover, the gap widens during primary schooling, and in grade 6, 73% of students do not achieve the minimum proficiency levels in literacy, against 52% on average for all PASEC countries (UNESCO, 2022).

With a growing school-age population and an education system already delivering poor quality with limited learning, the State cannot be the guarantor for free public basic education for all children in the near future – and probably not in the longer term, either. The country will need private and faith-based public schools to answer the significant demand for basic education.

Considering those challenges, below are key points to switch perspectives to support better the state's capacity to offer quality education across the country.

Consider national education rather than public and private education: The DRC Education Law (Government of DRC, 2014) provides an interesting perspective as

⁵⁶ PASEC is the regional standardized learning assessment managed by CONFEMEN, the Conference of the Ministers of Education of Francophone Countries. It assesses learning outcomes in literacy and numeracy at the beginning and at the end of primary education.

it states in the introductory paragraphs that public and accredited private schools provide national education. The State oversees this education provision and guarantees access to the same education services for public and private students.⁵⁷ The oversight and governance lacking in the current management of the education sector should be a priority entry point to regain credibility for national education provision. The DRC education sector has a legal framework and tools in place⁵⁸ for the education actors at a central and ‘deconcentrated’⁵⁹ level to control education provision. These need to be implemented and used to hold education actors at the school level to account (Baum et al., 2018).

Enhancing education governance: promote accountability and transparency in private and public education: As described, private education provision is an integral part of national education provision in DRC and fills a gap that public education providers will not be able to cover in the near future. Public schools run by private actors (FBO) represent the largest part of public education provision. It is thus vital for the DRC Government and its technical and financial partners to support the efficiency of education provision by improving governance in the education system for both private and public schools. All schools need to be held accountable by the State through improved education sector management based on reliable data. The existing legal framework, norms, and standards must be accompanied by control mechanisms reinforcing all actors’ transparency and accountability. The State should play an oversight role, ensuring private actors and faith-based organisations respect the existing rules that regulate the education system.

Building a coordinated steering system for National education. Promote a shared vision of ‘national education’ to foster robust partnerships and a sense of unity within the education system. A shared vision will create an enabling environment that enhances ecosystem collaboration, leverages stakeholders’ synergies, and strengthens the overall system. Furthermore, if concrete tools such as school mapping and comprehensive monitoring and evaluation processes are implemented at all system levels, evidence will be generated that can support decision-making and planning. There is also a

⁵⁷ Ibid. introduction.

⁵⁸ Minimum criteria for quality schools, regulations for school administration, for oversight by education offices at district and regional levels, etc.


⁵⁹ Refers to the delegation of administrative powers and functions to provincial or local authorities that are directly managed by central authorities.

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pressing need to work with all relevant actors to strengthen synergies and reduce the power imbalances. From that perspective, a key step would be the implementation of genuine decentralisation with a strong governance framework.

ANNEXES

Figure 1 Distribution of public schools and students per network



Legend: ENC: State public schools, ECC: catholic public school, ECP: Protestant public school, ECI: Islamic public school, ECK: Kimbanguist public school.

Source: DRC RESEN 2022/ DRC MESP Statistical Yearbook 2019-2020

Table 1: Number of schools, 2019-2020

	Public schools		Private schools		Total
	n°	%	N°	%	
ECE	4192	51%	4058	49%	8250
Primary school	52092	87%	7895	13%	59987
Secondary schools	27535	84%	5252	16%	32787
Total	83819	83%	17205	17%	101024

Source: DRC RESEN 2022

Table 2: Distribution of primary schools per management mode in each province from the Annual Statistical yearbook 2017-2018

Province	Public								Total Public	Total Privé	Total Général	%
	ENC	ECC	ECP	ECK	ECI	ECS	ECF	Autre				
Kinshasa	246	404	544	74	28	51	21	125	1493	2950	4443	8,3
Kongo-Central	330	603	502	242	13	80	23	68	1861	523	2384	4,5
Kwango	585	431	616	91	13	1	2	52	1791	5	1796	3,4
Kwilu	520	952	1347	280	31	6	1	52	3189	40	3229	6
Mai-ndombe	448	345	624	118	77	7	1	36	1656	11	1667	3,1
Equateur	482	427	706	119	206	2	40	40	2022	53	2075	3,9
Tshuapa	299	322	392	133	70	2	0	26	1244	18	1262	2,4
Mongala	352	312	418	82	76	47	3	25	1315	64	1379	2,6
Sud-Ubangi	422	353	550	186	67	3	8	21	1610	99	1709	3,2
Nord-Ubangi	327	236	243	58	20	9	0	16	909	77	986	1,8
Tshopo	322	342	702	176	21	50	12	66	1691	347	2038	3,8
Ituri	330	832	775	29	8	0	4	62	2040	140	2180	4,1
Haut-Uele	166	461	259	13	2	0	0	14	915	80	995	1,9
Bas-Uele	128	293	229	18	1	1	0	12	682	26	708	1,3
Nord-Kivu	480	868	1450	67	65	3	5	275	3213	712	3925	7,3
Sud-Kivu	377	678	2135	86	28	5	5	149	3463	707	4170	7,8
Maniema	255	345	706	125	147	3	0	17	1598	95	1693	3,2
Kasai-Central	413	623	791	146	93	19	2	501	2588	108	2696	5
Kasai	610	513	1034	222	90	6	4	152	2631	170	2801	5,2
Kasai-Oriental	131	161	161	45	48	0	1	56	603	388	991	1,9
Sankuru	328	369	308	113	78	0	0	110	1306	26	1332	2,5
Lomami	448	422	577	56	29	0	0	6	1538	123	1661	3,1
Haut-Katanga	140	374	323	17	2	5	2	195	1058	1282	2340	4,4
Lualaba	190	178	293	65	0	0	1	101	828	335	1163	2,2
Tanganyika	362	354	680	35	9	3	2	117	1562	83	1645	3,1
Haut-Lomami	336	364	1303	65	0	2	1	93	2164	39	2203	4,1
Total	9027	11562	17668	2661	1222	305	138	2387	44970	8501	53471	
%	16,9	21,6	33	5	2,3	0,6	0,3	4,5	84,1	15,9	100	

Legend: ENC: State public schools, ECC: catholic public school, ECP: Protestant public school, ECI: Islamic public school, ECK: Kimbanguist public school. ECS: Eglise Chrétienne du Salut.

Source: DRC Annual Statistical Yearbook 2017-2018

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Public policies and the privatisation of education in Burkina Faso ☐

Marie-France Lange⁶⁰

Introduction

In this chapter, the process of the privatising education in Burkina Faso will be examined on the basis of an analysis of public policies. Firstly, it should be noted that the degree of privatisation in the education sector varies from one level of education to another. For pre-school education, 79% of children are enrolled in non-state structures, and at this level, only a very small proportion of children of pre-school age is enrolled (6.6% in 2022-2023)⁶¹. In the primary education sector, the private sector experienced a distinct trajectory. Initially, it exhibited significant growth during colonial times and continued this trend throughout the first decade of independence. However, it witnessed a steep decline following the nationalisation of Catholic schools. In 1960, 38.4% of primary school students were enrolled in private schools; by 1970, this percentage had dropped to 2.8%. Thereafter, there was a notable increase in the proportion of children enrolled in private schools, particularly between 2009-2010 and 2022-2023, reaching 29.8% of all primary school students. Since this new phase of privatizing primary education, the distribution of enrolments between the different types of private schools has changed considerably. Catholic schools will never regain their former levels, and in 2022-23, private Muslim and secular schools constitute the majority of private school students, making up 82.95% of the total private school student population.

For a long time, secondary education was accessible to only a small minority of young people in Burkina Faso. Recent changes have, to some extent, been influenced by the growth of the private education sector, although it has not ensured widespread accessibility. It was only when the State, in collaboration with local authorities and

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⁶¹ The indicators, percentages, etc. cited in this chapter were calculated by the author using school registers and other documents produced by the ministries responsible for education. These documents are available online, Burkina Faso being one of the few countries in French-speaking Africa to respect its commitments regarding free access to official public documents. For pre-school, primary and secondary education: http://cns.bf/spip.php?id_rubrique=14&page=publdetails; for higher education: http://cns.bf/spip.php?id_rubrique=15&page=publdetails

associations, made substantial investments in the construction of public schools did lower secondary education become more accessible to a larger number of boys and girls. In contrast, upper secondary education has not yet received sufficient public funding. Despite the significant presence of the private sector in both levels of secondary education, (approximately 39% for the lower level and 49% for the upper level), the overall enrolment of young people in primary education in Burkina Faso is relatively low, with a gross enrolment rate (GER) of 49.9% in 2022-2023 and only 20.7% for secondary education. This lack of public investment has resulted in limited access to secondary education for most young people.

Higher education has also experienced a trend towards privatisation: in 2004-2005, 16.39% of students were enrolled in a private institution. This proportion has fluctuated over the years from year to year, increasing to 21% in 2019-2020 and then decreasing to 18.1% in 2021-2022. It is worth noting that private investments in higher education are primarily focused on the provision of shorter courses.

In this first section, we examine the integration of private education into public education policies, assess Burkina Faso's reliance on financial and technical support from donors, analyse the roles of education providers, and scrutinise the policies governing the recognition of private schools. The second section looks at the categories of private educational institutions, the objectives of interventions by private operators and conflicts with the State. This part also outlines the challenges faced by authorities in Burkina Faso in monitoring private schools and universities, and highlights the substantial presence of unregistered, illegal, or clandestine schools.

In terms of methodology, this study used scientific literature, along with legal texts that outline the rights and obligations of private education operators. It also incorporated education plans, sectorial policy documents, and materials from the websites of the ministries overseeing education. Additionally, documents from UNESCO and other international institutions were consulted, as were online articles from Burkina Faso's press, which frequently address issues related to private institutions or their affiliated teaching staff.

1. The role of private education in public education policies

In the first instance, the conditions of Burkina Faso's financial reliance on international financial aid will be examined. This dependency limits the choices available to Burkina Faso government regarding its stance on private education and its decisions concerning investment in the public sector. Subsequently, the economic

significance of private education providers, and the legislative instruments that govern their operations, shaping the landscape of private education, will be reviewed.

1.1. Burkina Faso's financial and technical dependence

International aid is important and even crucial to the development of education in certain countries of the South, despite the relatively modest amounts involved. Assistance may be in the form of grants or loans. Over the past ten years, Burkina Faso has primarily received grants, with the exception of 2016 (Directory 2019-2020: 433).

International aid plays a decisive role, although it is largely influenced by the allocation of budget items within the States' own resources. Most of their own resources are earmarked for teachers' salaries. Such allocation does not make it possible to devote sufficient financial resources to operations and investment, which explains the substantial influence of donors in determining school investment policies including aspects such as location, construction type, and the targeted education levels. In countries experiencing rapid demographic growth, addressing both the rise in the school-age population and the necessary development of various levels of education for universal basic education requires an inevitable increase in the overall total payroll. In Burkina Faso, the total payroll of the Ministry of National Education, Literacy and the Promotion of National Languages (MENAPLN) increased from 73,890,516,000 CFA francs in 2010 to 364,856,213,000 CFA francs in 2020 (Yearbook 2019-2020: 433), i.e. a fivefold increase in ten years.

However, the proportion of the budget allocated to salaries can vary considerably from one year to another. This variability is due to the diverse teacher recruitment policies that, influenced by certain international partners such as the World Bank (Altinok, 2005; Lauwerier, 2013), have aimed to reduce teachers' salaries. Subsequently, due to pressure from trade union movements, governments were compelled to raise these salaries or integrate certain categories of 'voluntary' or contracted teachers into the civil service (Lange, et al., 2021). Thus, as in other French-speaking African countries, Burkina Faso has experienced the recruitment of inadequately compensated young graduates, such as those hired under the Presidential Youth Employment Programme for National Education (PEJEN). The first intake of teachers was recruited in 2016. After a period of suspension, the programme was relaunched in 2021, only to be halted again later.

Contracts were for one year, renewable twice. Upon completion of the three-year period, an examination was scheduled for the "PEJENs" to join the civil service; however, many candidates failed the examination (Libre info, 1 March 2021). The

recruitment of PEJENs was criticised in the Annual Monitoring Report 2018 of the Strategic Development Programme for Basic Education (PDSEB) carried out by MENAPLN (2019). The report outlines some of the recruitment challenges indicating that the recruitment rate over the first three years (2016, 2017 and 2018) only reached 78.5% of available positions. Moreover, these teachers experienced notably high turnover, with a retention rate of only 62.2% in January 2019, without clarification on the reasons for the disappearance of many PEJEN teachers. The difficulties inherent in recruiting low-cost teachers therefore seem to be significant in both public and private schools. The COVID-19 crisis highlighted some of the issues faced by private teachers, often lacking employment contracts (Lange et al., 2021). From a public policy perspective, attempting to control the cost of teaching staff appears to be futile.

Despite various attempts to reduce teachers' salaries, they accounted for 83.19% of MENAPLN's total expenditure in 2020 (Table 1). Investments accounted for only approximately 6% of the budget, a highly inadequate percentage that hampers the Government of Burkina Faso from constructing new public schools in crucial areas, such as impoverished urban outskirts (Boly & Lange, 2022) or in isolated villages lacking public education infrastructure. This meagre budget is also insufficient to cover the upkeep of schools. The other highly inadequate budget line is that allocated to operations, which includes, amongst other things, fuel costs for the inspectorates. In fact, most inspectorates lack the necessary budget for conducting essential visits to monitor schools, particularly those in the private sector.

Table 1: State funding for education (in thousands of CFA francs and as a percentage) from MENAPLN per budget item in 2020

MENAPLN budget items	CFA francs ('000)	%
Salaries	364 856 213	83,19
Operational costs	24 900 482	5,68
Transfers	22 583 013	5,15
Investments	26 254 901	5,99
MENAPLN Total Budget	438 594 609	100,00

Source: Author's calculations based on data from 2019-2020 Directory: 433.

On the one hand, the percentage of the budget earmarked for investments is insufficient, but, on the other hand, as the data in Table 2 shows, the majority of MENAPLN's investments are funded by external sources (over 66%). This is where the donors intervene to steer public policies towards the priorities they impose⁶². The purchase of schoolbooks financed by aid also presents a challenge: donors, through imposing large, bulk orders, effectively sideline national publishers. Since the various independence movements, UNESCO reports have consistently emphasised the necessity of addressing the issue of the schoolbook published in sub-Saharan Africa. However, in 2003, Jean-Pierre Leguéré still referred to it as a 'monopoly market' (Leguéré, 2003: 22). Despite efforts by the Government of Burkina Faso to assert control over the publishing, production, and distribution of schoolbooks (MENA, 2017), the matter of private suppliers remains unresolved. This is one aspect related to the involvement of private businesses, usually international, in the education sector that has received minimal attention.

Table 2: Proportion of government funds and external financing for MENAPLN's capital expenditure in 2020 (in thousands of CFA francs and as a percentage)

MENAPLN Investments	CFA francs ('000)	%
Government funds	8 793 068	33,49
External funding	17 461 833	66,51
Total investments	26 254 901	100,00

Source: Author's calculations based on data from 2019-2020 Directory: 433.

Donor influence can also be exerted through the imposition of certain conditions. For instance, the elimination of grants for secondary school students (subsequently

⁶² For example, a Minister of Education in Burkina Faso was refused funding to provide housing for teachers in remote rural areas. His argument was that, in some villages, it was impossible to assign teachers due to a lack of suitable accommodation; the donors' counterargument was that teachers' accommodation was often also used by other civil servants in rural areas who also had no accommodation (Field surveys, 2001-2005, M.-F. Lange). In fact, at the beginning of the 2000s, a Minister of Education had no decision-making power if he or she had access to external funding.

reintroduced in 2018) was imposed in this manner, as the governing policy aimed to prioritise the development of primary education while making cutbacks in other educational levels. However, the low level of funding earmarked for public secondary education resulted in the rapid growth of the private sector, and the discontinuation of scholarships had minimal impact on increasing secondary school enrolment.

Interactions with donors, referred to as “technical and financial partners” (TFPs) (Lange, 2003), are expected to be governed by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008). However, in 2017, the Directorate-General for Cooperation (DGCOOP)⁶³ had to reiterate the rules that should have been in force since 2005 (DGCOOP, 28 February 2017). Frequent reminders of the rules set out in the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action suggest that they may not yet be fully implemented in practice. Certain points have been put into practice, such as appointing a representative of Burkina Faso authorities to lead education clusters or aid coordination units, a practice uncommon in Burkina Faso in the early 2000s⁶⁴. However, the on-going reliance on external funding to ensure the development of education makes it difficult to achieve complete independence in implementing public education policy guidelines. There have been attempts by the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), a global fund for education⁶⁵, to impose collaboration between the country’s authorities, TFPs and civil society organisations. Thus, to secure funding for the 2017-2030 Education and Training Sector Programme (PSEF), an endorsement letter had to be signed on 5 June 2017 by the TFPs and civil society representatives before being sent to the Director General of the GPE Secretariat⁶⁶. This endorsement letter asserts that the “*strategy development process was carried out by leveraging national expertise, without recourse to foreign technical assistance*” (page 1). It is worth noting that, until a few years ago, African education policy plans were often drafted by foreign experts. Burkina Faso now seems to be taking charge of the technical components in the development of its education policies, with some exceptions (see Universalia reference, 2018). Despite this shift, certain international consultancy firms still play a role. The endorsement letter, issued by both the TFPs

⁶³ A directorate that ensures the coordination and effectiveness of public development aid. https://www.dgcoop.gov.bf/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=16&Itemid=181&lang=fr

⁶⁴ Field surveys between 2001 and 2005 (M.-F. Lange).

⁶⁵ <https://www.globalpartnership.org/>

⁶⁶ <https://www.globalpartnership.org/sites/default/files/document/file/2020-11-Burkina%20Faso%20-Endorsement.pdf>

and representatives of Burkina Faso's civil society, could only be drafted and signed once a consensus was achieved. This notion of consensus has faced criticism from numerous authors studying the dynamics of these partnerships. They have shown that it is often a vague consensus (Palier & Surel, 2005) that fails to allow the diverse of demands of civil society to be adequately expressed (Grégoire *et al.*, 2018).

1.2. The economic significance of private and non-state education providers

In Burkina Faso, as in other African nations, gauging the economic significance of private businesses in the education sector proves to be notably challenging. A comprehensive understanding of the motives driving the privatisation and commercialisation of education necessitates an analysis of financial investments, turnover and profits. Some information can be found in the National Institute of Statistics and Demography's (INSD) database of private companies which categorises businesses by branch of activity and illustrates changes in their numbers (RSE/INSD in MCIA, 2019: 29). However, only a handful of private businesses within the "education" sector are included, due to the prevalence of schools that are either unregistered or legal but are not declared as private businesses. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that in 2016 the "education" sector ranked fifth out of 21 categories, trailing behind trade, construction, specialised activities, and manufacturing activities. The count of teaching businesses recorded a significant increase between 2014 and 2016, with a particularly noteworthy surge between 2010 and 2016, as this branch of activity was not ranked in 2010 due to its minimal size at that time.

Also not included in this list of commercial education activities are private not-for-profit establishments, such as denominational primary, secondary or higher education institutions, community or association schools and certain non-profit international schools. Financial and budgetary perspectives also overlook the activities of international NGOs operating in the education sector in economic statistics. Despite contributing to the development of Burkina Faso's education sector, NGO funding poses a financial burden on the State as these non-profit structures benefit from various tax, customs, and non-financial advantages (DGCOOP, Thursday 13 January 2022). Similarly, small, unrecognised private entrepreneurs who fail to declare their teachers to the tax or social security authorities (Lange, et al., 2021) represent a loss of income for the State and social security funds (health, retirement, etc.). While educational plans and other State education policy instruments often emphasise the essential role of private or voluntary sector investment, the economic and financial impact as well as the cost in terms of lost revenue for the State, are not always fully understood.

Since 2015, MENAPLN has been trying to compile a list of all private non-profit NGOs/DAs (non-governmental organisations/development associations) and foundations. The most recent directory, published in December 2022, does, however, acknowledge the difficulties associated with conducting such a census: *“they mainly concern: the reluctance of some NGOs/DAs and foundations to complete the data collection forms, the submission of incomplete forms, particularly the section relating to the budget [...], the non-exhaustive identification of all the NGOs/DAs and foundations working in the fields of education, literacy and training”*. (MENAPLN, 2022: 4). While the Government of Burkina Faso recognises the crucial financial role played by NGOs/DAs and foundations in the development of education, it also acknowledges that these private institutions often hesitate to provide information about their activities and, more specifically, their budgets.

How can public education policies that are independent of the various non-state players be defined and supported? It is only recently that the 2012-2021 Education and Training Sector Programme (PSEF, 2013) has addressed the issue of the State's own resources, emphasising that *“The tax burden helps determine the State's capacity to mobilise its own resources [...] The Fast Track Initiative's framework sets the tax burden rate at between 14% and 18% for developing countries such as Burkina Faso that do not have oil resources [...] Burkina Faso is still a long way from reaching this minimum threshold, since the tax burden rate was 13.80% in 2012”* (PSEF, 2013 : 21). A discernible shift in perspective is evident when comparing the perspectives articulated in this 2013 document with those of the Ten-Year Basic Education Development Plan 2000-2009 (MEBA, n.d.) produced approximately a decade earlier. Reaffirming the States' role in shaping public policies (Grégoire & Lange, 2018) requires a reflection of the means to finance them, specifically considering the State's own resources, enabling greater autonomy in the choice of public actions.

1.3. Regulations and policies for the recognition of private education

The first legislative texts governing private education date back to the presidential decree of 14 February 1922 (Coulibaly, 1997: 109-110). After independence, regulations were still based on the colonial texts of 1948, and thereafter private education was governed by numerous legal texts, agreements, and conventions (Lange *et al.*, 2021). Between 1979 and 2021, some 27 legal texts were published (laws, decrees, collective agreements) (Boly & Lange, 2022: 132-135). All these documents provide guidelines concerning the mandatory declaration of private schools or universities, including the

necessary conditions (completion of forms, submission of documents, etc.), adherence to infrastructure standards for schools and universities (building, classroom size, playgrounds, etc.), the qualifications required for school directors and teachers and curriculum guidelines applicable to both public and private, denominational or secular institutions. Since 2019, the management of private primary education in the private sector has been overseen by the Private Education Directorate (DEP) (Burkina Faso, 2019). The Permanent Secretary of the National Commission for Private Secondary and Higher Education is responsible for private secondary and higher education. Both these entities report to MENAPLN and the Ministry of Higher Education, Scientific Research, and Innovation (MESRSI) respectively.

With regard to Catholic education, an initial agreement was reached on June 13, 2000, between the State and the Catholic Church. This agreement involved the Burkinabé government transferring state-owned primary schools back to the Catholic Church, which had been nationalised in 1969 (Baux, 2006; Compaoré, 2003; Coulibaly, 1997: 193-196). Since 2014, the government has consistently entered into five-year agreements with the Catholic Church including those in 2014, and 2019. The latest agreement aims to cover a portion of salaries of teachers in Catholic schools. For secular private education, an agreement was signed on May 13, 2016, following five years of discussions, and building upon the convention signed in 1979 (Lange *et al.*, 2021). Although the regulations for private establishments appear to be grounded in precise legal texts and agreements today, the primary issue revolves around non-compliance with signed conventions, both on the part of the government and the leaders of private schools or universities. For instance, the State has often been indebted to private schools and has not honoured the agreements it has signed⁶⁷. Simultaneously, the heads of private schools do not always comply with applicable rules and are sometimes forced to close by the educational authorities.

Thus, implementing the decision to fund private education for lower secondary education to compensate for the lack of places in public education spaces is proving challenging. This decision is in line with the public policy on the educational continuum, aiming to promote enrolment from primary to lower secondary education. Indeed, “*according to the legal framework, basic primary and post-primary education is now compulsory for children aged 6 to 16*” (Ministries in charge of education and training, 2017: 39). However, entry into the first year of lower secondary school is

⁶⁷ <https://www.burkina24.com/2016/05/27/issa-compaore-letat-doit-environ-un-milliard-et-demi-de-fcfa-a-lenseignement-prive/>.

dependent on passing a competitive entrance examination, with limited places in the public school system (the admission rate was 26.2% in 2019). Unsuccessful students in the entrance exam have the option to enrol in private schools, which may or may not be under state contract (Ministries in charge of education and training, 2017: 39). This system of state delegation to private secondary school establishments presents a number of difficulties with “*the main one being the delayed payment of school fees. [...] Another issue related to managing these students is the reliability of their payment status. By way of illustration, an inspection carried out in 2019 revealed four thousand and twenty-three (4,023) fictitious students for whom the promoters had requested payment of school fees amounting to approximately two hundred and five million (205.000.000) CFA francs*” (MENAPLN, 2021: 74). This system of state delegation has led to a high incidence of fraud, incurring substantial costs for the state in terms of both organisation (drafting of contracts with establishments, making payments, verifying the existence of listed students, etc.) and financial misappropriation.

To conclude this section, it is worth noting, as already highlighted by various authors (Braun *et al.*, 2006; Henaff *et al.*, 2009; Kitaev, 1999), that the growth of private education is a consequence of both the lack of public schools and universities and the deterioration in teaching conditions in the public sector. This pattern is evident in Burkina Faso, affecting pre-school and secondary education as well as primary education in urban areas. In these urban regions, the State has virtually stopped building schools and leading to a rapid expansion of the private sector, whether legal or illegal. The influence of international organisation in the decision to prioritise primary education at the expense of other levels of education has prompted the State to withdraw from certain areas, fostering the rapid development of private secondary education. The decision to focus on the construction of public schools in disadvantaged rural areas has resulted in the neglect of impoverished urban outskirts, which, in reality, have limited access to public schools (Boly & Lange, 2022).

2. The varied landscape of education providers and State oversight

The educational landscape has become increasingly diverse since the 1990s, as various types of educational institutions have emerged alongside the more uniform public schools and universities (Lange, 2001; 2003). The private sector, in particular, presents a wide array of choices, ranging from private, secular, and denominational establishments to those with associative or community-based affiliations, and distinctions in profit orientation. These institutions may or may not be financed

and officially recognized by the State. This section explores the different categories of private establishments, shedding light on the challenges encountered by the State in their identification and oversight.

2.1. The diverse contexts of private religious educational institutions

Private religious establishments may or may not be legally recognised and may or may not be operating under contract with the State. There are three categories of religious establishments that are officially recognised and have their respective representatives: the entire network of Catholic schools is represented by the National Secretariat for Catholic Education (SNEC), Protestant schools are represented by the Federation of Evangelical Churches and Missions (FEME) and private Muslim institutions are represented by the Federation of Islamic Associations of Burkina Faso (FAIB). According to the Ministry of Education, “*the Federation of Islamic Associations of Burkina Faso (for Franco-Arab schools) receives subsidies, as do the federations of Catholic and Protestant denominational schools (SNEC, FEME) and the association of secular private schools (UNEEP-L)*” (MENA, 2017: 36).

Regulations governing the relationship between the Government of Burkina Faso and private Catholic schools have evolved since the 1960s. Initially funded by the State, these schools underwent nationalisation and were subsequently handed back (Baux, 2006; Cissé *et al.*, 2019; Compaoré, 2003). They are now officially recognised, and the government has committed to providing financial support, particularly in response to the teacher recruitment crises they experienced arising from low salaries (Lange *et al.*, 2021). Catholic education is well-structured, with SNEC accreditation being a prerequisite for a school to be deemed Catholic: “*A school is said to be Catholic only if it is administered by the competent ecclesiastical authority or a person who is a legal public ecclesiastical entity or recognised as such by the ecclesiastical authority through written documentation.*”⁶⁸ Despite government funding, both private Catholic and secular schools, which partially depend on school fees, continue to face difficulties. The COVID-19 pandemic underscored the vulnerability of these private schools, whose financial sustainability relies to some extent on family contributions (La Croix, 22 June 2020).

Private Muslim schools also underwent major changes during the colonial era and post-independence, primarily aimed at modernising the curriculum. This led to the transformation of some Koranic schools into Medrassas (Cissé *et al.*, 2019) and their

⁶⁸ <https://www.educationcatholiquebf.org/index.php/a-propos/presentation-de-l-education-catholique>

subsequent official recognition by the Government of Burkina Faso. Muslim education is highly diverse and relies on a wide range of individual, national, and international private funding, whether affiliated to different religious institutions or not. Unlike Catholic education, Muslim education do not have a single convention. However, several associations, such as the FAIB, have intervened to represent and defend the interests of private developers of Muslim schools. The Muslim Cultural Union (UCM) had already opened educational institutions in Burkina Faso in the late 1950s (Cissé *et al.*, 2019: 201). Subsequently, the Upper Volta Muslim Community (CMHV), which was created in 1962, took over from the UCM in terms of the development of these private Muslim institutions (Cissé *et al.*, 2019). From the 1970s onwards, financial aid from Arab countries “*Saudi Arabia, Libya, Egypt, Kuwait, Syria, Algeria and Morocco*” (Cissé *et al.*, 2019: 222) helped to modernise Arab-Muslim education. More recently, the Government of Burkina Faso has become more involved in the recognition and structuring of Arab-Muslim education and has provided financial support. The “*programme document submitted to the Global Partnership for Education for the implementation of the 2017-2030 Education and Training Sector Programme*” specifies the provision of “*support for Franco-Arab schools*” (MENA, 2017: 36) and a relationship between the State and Franco-Arab schools. The document also outlines international partnerships (Islamic Development Bank) and current achievements, such as the construction of school buildings, the strengthening of initial and in-service training for teachers, school directors and educational supervisors, and the creation of an Arabic-speaking department at the National College for Primary School Teachers (ENEP) in Loumbila (MENA: 2017: 36).

The problems posed by Arab-Muslim education have been identified by various authors (Cissé *et al.*, 2019; Compaoré *et al.*, 2022). These issues encompass a lack of genuine standardisation in training and qualifications, an inability to apply curricula in numerous establishments due to the low calibre of teachers, and the subpar quality of supervisory staff who should undergo training to carry out inspections in these establishments, among other issues. As Issa Cissé, Maxime Compaoré and Marc Pilon point out: “*These are major problems that have always been associated with Islamic religious education, especially in Madrassas. Yet, their numbers continue to grow, and the social integration of students trained in them remains an unresolved concern*” (Cissé *et al.*, 2019: 208).

Private Catholic education spans all levels, ranging from pre-school to higher education, whereas Arab-Muslim education is predominantly found at the primary level and has minimal representation at the secondary and higher education levels.

As Maxime Compaoré, Amadou Kaboré and Bouakaré Gansonré have observed: “*the limited growth of private Franco-Arab secondary education, due in particular to a lack of infrastructure and a shortage of teachers, makes it difficult for students to continue their studies after primary school*” (Compaoré *et al.*, 2022: 16). There are, however, a few private Muslim colleges and higher education institutes, such as the Burkina Polytechnic University Centre (CUPB), the Al Houda Higher Institute, the Al Moustapha International University, the African Institute of Islamic Finance and Management (IAFIG) in Ouagadougou and the Al Fourquan Higher Education Institute in Bobo-Dioulasso. Some of these institutions are part of international networks financed by foreign investors. Indeed, there is growing trend towards Islamic higher education and some of these Muslim Private Institutions of Higher Education (IPES) have been recognised and accredited (MESRSI, 15 July 2021), inspected and rated (MESRSI, 2021). Nevertheless, a major concern is the non-recognition of numerous private Arab-Muslim primary and secondary schools (Cissé *et al.*, 2019; Compaoré *et al.*, 2022; Universalia, 2018: 6). A variety of estimates have been made, both by researchers and by the education authorities, without it being known whether these estimates are close to reality or not. In contrast, a historical analysis of school statistics shows a rapid increase in the number of Arab-Muslim primary schools in recent years, indicating that these private schools are gradually gaining recognition.

2.2. The uncontrolled growth of private secular schools

The rapid growth of private secular schools, especially since the 2000s, has posed challenges for Burkina Faso’s authorities to effectively regulate this growth. Certain private secular schools are officially recognised and affiliated with the National Union of Secular Private Education Establishments (UNEEP-L), which was set up in 1975 and covers education from pre-school to university, including vocational and technical education. This union brings together the founders of legal private secular schools and boasts 1,300 members (*Burkina 24*, 10 February 2022). While most of these officially recognised private secular schools and universities operate for profit, they are keen to provide education, for example at the primary level, in urban areas where the State presence has diminished. In general, the promoters of private secular establishments never express any other objectives than the provision of education, either to address the inadequacy of other schools, including low-quality state schools, or due to the absence of state schools. Nevertheless, the Government of Burkina Faso is finding it difficult to identify all the private secular schools and “*there are also issues relating*

to the so-called ‘unrecognised’ schools [...]. It is therefore reasonable to believe that the proportion of schools in the private sector is underestimated in official school statistics but to a degree that is difficult to quantify” (Cissé *et al.*, 2019: 199). Certain schools and universities are not officially acknowledged either because they are unregistered or do not meet established standards, leading to closures. The incidence of clandestine or illegal schools seems to be increasing nationwide, though quantifying their numbers is challenging due to their lack of legal recognition.

For the city of Ouagadougou, Dramane Boly (2017: 170) has shown that the number of unrecognised private primary schools rose sharply between 2007 and 2013: “the percentage of unrecognised private schools rose from 0.6 % in 2007 to 29 % in 2013” (Boly, 2017: 170). This explosion in unofficial private secular primary schools can be explained by several factors. Firstly, the State’s failure to construct public infrastructure in underdeveloped areas of towns and cities, including those in the capital, plays a significant role. This lack of priority is justified by the already high level of school enrolment in comparison to other regions. The second factor is the rapid and poorly controlled urbanisation of the city of Ouagadougou (Ouattara, 2005). Thirdly, the basic education districts (CEBs) tasked with overseeing primary schools lack sufficient financial resources to monitor and supervise the proliferation of both authorised and unauthorised private primary schools due to insufficient funding for transportation and fuel (Boly, 2017). For private secondary schools, as mentioned earlier, the public policy of the *educational continuum* has enabled the rapid development of private secular schools due to the limited availability of places in the public sector. These private schools receive state funding to cater for lower secondary students after signing a contract with the State.

2.3. The difficulties associated with registering and monitoring private schools

Burkina Faso’s school statistics are undoubtedly the most comprehensive and the most reliable in French-speaking sub-Saharan Africa. They are also published regularly and are accessible online. However, the explosion in the number of private schools, many of which are illegal, makes it difficult to both identify and monitor these schools. The Permanent Digital Map of Schools in Ouagadougou (Pilon *et al.*, 2021) sheds light on the complexities of documenting all primary and secondary schools in the city. To compile this map, “primary and secondary schools were geo-referenced with the aid of the global positioning system (GPS) in 2015 and 2020” (*Idem*: 7). The authors observed that it was difficult to identify schools because of name or location changes, and that “some

schools operating in the field were not listed by the Ministry [...]. This means that statistical records are not regularly updated by schools, especially those that are not officially accredited ('illegal' schools). There are establishments that are open but not listed or authorised by the Ministries. Furthermore, any establishments that are closed remain on the lists (Idem: 7). Lastly, the authors observed "a large amount of missing data, including certain schools that were geolocated but could not be traced in the Ministries' education databases: 312 of the 954 geolocated primary schools and 66 of the 392 secondary schools [...]. This lack of information varies considerably depending on the type of school. While all Catholic schools are documented, over half (53.8%) of Muslim schools are not. This lack of information also applies to 31.8% of Protestant schools, 40.6% of private secular schools and, surprisingly, 7.7% of public schools (!)". (Idem: 7-8). In fact, it is almost impossible to know the exact number of private schools (except for Catholic schools).

For pre-school, primary and secondary education, annual visits by education authorities have resulted in closures: in 2020, 134 unauthorized schools were shut down (MENAPLN, 26 August 2020); in 2021, 233 schools (pre-school, primary and secondary) were also closed.⁶⁹ With regard to higher education, MESRSI conducts "monitoring and surveillance visits to private higher education institutions (IPES)" and publishes a report in which these institutions are rated and ranked according to an official matrix (MESRSI, 2021; 2023). The regular assessment of IPESs by the General Directorate for Higher Education (DGSUP) encourages these institutions to comply with state regulations. A favourable ranking gives them greater visibility and makes them more attractive with some IPESs incorporating the results of the DGSUP results in their promotional campaigns. At this level of education, the Government of Burkina Faso seems to have the problem of expansion under control, and has even been able to evaluate it, even though the instability of these private educational structures poses a problem. In 2023, following an audit carried out by MESRSI in August 2023, of the 95 universities or higher institutes assessed: five, "operating illegally", were forced to close, four "had only obtained authorisation to set up, but had not been authorised to open", four "were being restructured following previous controls", 36 had closed and seven had suspended their activities (MESRSI, August 2023: 4), i.e. 49 private higher institutes out of the 95 assessed were no longer operational. A similar pattern of instability can be seen across the other education levels, although the government's limited capacity to survey all primary and secondary schools

⁶⁹ <https://burkina24.com/2021/08/19/burkina-faso-liste-des-ecoles-et-etablissements-non-reconnus-a-fermer-pour-lannee-2021-2022/>

makes it impossible to measure this phenomenon as accurately as it can for higher education.

Frequent conflicts arise between private operators and the State, primarily due to the non-payment or delayed payment of owed sums by the State and the private operators' failure to adhere to legislation, regulations, or ministerial directives. According to the latter, an abundance of decrees, orders, specifications, etc., further exacerbates these issues, as some texts are perceived to be contradictory. It seems that the Government of Burkina Faso is consistently trailing the initiatives and energy of private operators, necessitating continual efforts to regulate the rapid privatisation and commercialisation. These efforts aim to supervise and control the process, mitigating its potentially detrimental impacts. For higher education, an example is Order No. 2017-530/MESRSI/SG/DGESup of 12 December 2017, which regulates the activities of teacher-researchers, university hospital teachers and public researchers in private higher education and research establishments. This decree was issued relatively late compared with the decrees and orders published in the 1990s concerning private education. During the 2021 inspections, the monitoring and control report on Private Institutions of Higher Education (IPES) highlighted that "among the many shortcomings, nearly all IESR [Public Higher Education and Research Institutes] teachers employed in IPESs lacked a teaching contract (or leave of absence) and lacked a documentation confirming their availability for various administrative positions" (MESRSI, 2021: 7). In fact, private higher education establishments (as well as secondary schools) make use of teachers from the public sector who, in some cases, are no longer able to effectively perform the tasks required of them in the public establishments that pay them. As a result, these teachers contribute to the further decline in quality in the public sector and encourage the development of the private sector.

2.4. The uncontrolled growth of private teaching-training centres

When the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) were introduced, many teacher training colleges were closed in sub-Saharan Africa (Lange, 2021), whether in Mali, Senegal (Barro, 2009; Lauwerier, 2013) or Togo (UNESCO, 2014: 57-58). In Burkina Faso, the duration of teacher training was reduced (André, 2007) and, since the SAPs, there have been no consistent policies for teacher training, due to the constant changes in decisions taken, as well as an increase in the number of teacher categories, including PEJEN teachers, who only received three months' training before taking up their positions (*Le Faso.net*, Tuesday 27 November 2018).

Burkina Faso has State-operated teacher training colleges for primary education, known as *Écoles normales des enseignants du primaire* (ENEP), offering both initial and in-service training for primary school teachers. Since 2010, private counterparts, referred to as *Écoles privées de formation des enseignants du primaire* (EPFEP), have also been established. The education sector policy document (2014-2023) acknowledges their presence, stating, “*In addition to these public ENEPs, a number of private teacher training institutions also exist, all of which increase the training available for primary school teachers*” (Burkina Faso, PSE, 2013: 35). Secondary school teachers receive training at the Teacher Training College in Koudougou, while higher education teachers undergo training at the university. The authorization for the creation of private teacher training colleges for primary school teachers was granted through Decree no. 2010-358/PRES/PM/MEBA on June 29, 2010. Although the ministries overseeing education regularly update lists of accredited private schools (pre-school, primary, secondary, and higher education) or schools facing closure, there seems to be no equivalent for teacher training colleges for primary education, with the most recent available list dating back to 2017.

The proliferation of new EPFEPs appears to have spiralled out of control. In 2012-2013, Étienne Ouédraogo identified 20 such establishments, a number that increased to 32 in 2014 (Ouédraogo, 2016: 73). By 2017, *Laborpresse.net* published a list featuring 148 recognised EPFEPs, some of which has received ministerial authorisation for their opening (*Laborpress.net*, 2 September 2017). This dramatic increase in the number of EPFEPs, from 20 in 2012 to 148 in 2017 raises the question about the identities of the private promoters engaging in this activity. An article published online by *Le Faso.net* announced the opening of one such EPFEP in June 2015. The promoter, Mr Zéphirin Paré, was presented as “*the developer of several companies [...], Managing Director of Arc en Ciel Services and IMS sarl. and promoter of the Bientama Group based in Toma in the province of Nyala, which is a consortium of businesses (bakery, distribution of Brakina beverages, manufacture of ice cream bars, dry cleaning and, very soon, an hotel complex of international standard) and the Bientama Private Training School for Primary Education Teachers (EPFEP)*” (*Le Faso.net*, Tuesday 23 June 2015). While the promoter highlights the social aspect of his teaching training venture providing initial and ‘quality training’ for primary school teachers in a region lacking such facilities, it is clear that he considers this activity as an economic pursuit, suggesting that the movement to privatise education is intertwined with a process of commercialisation. While this example of a private businessman may not be representative of all founders of private teacher training

colleges, insufficient data hampers a thorough investigation into the reasons behind this rapid proliferation of EPFEPs.

2.5. International schools and universities

International schools, recognised by the authorities as private institutions, are authorised to provide tuition and in some cases to award foreign qualifications. This includes overseas French establishments operated by the French Agency for Education Abroad (*Agence pour l'enseignement français à l'étranger*, AEFÉ). These French institutions target children of French nationality, bi-nationals (French-Burkinabè) eligible for scholarships, or Burkina Faso nationals from affluent families due to the notably high cost of schooling. Although Burkina Faso students, along with French students, enjoy preferential rates compared to students of other nationalities, children of other nationalities (non-French and non-Burkinabè) are subject to higher fees. Typically, such students come from privileged backgrounds, or they may be international executives or diplomats whose employers cover their tuition fees.

In Burkina Faso, there are two French schools—one in Ouagadougou and another in Bobo-Dioulasso. The Saint Exupéry Lycée Français (LFSE) in Ouagadougou caters to students from nursery school to the final year of secondary school. Annual fees for 2023-2024 vary from approximately €3,000 for nursery school to €4,500 for high school⁷⁰. In Bobo-Dioulasso, fees at the International André-Malraux Lycée Français range from around €2,250 for nursery school to €4,600 for upper secondary school⁷¹. Other private international schools, such as the International School of Ouagadougou (ISO), a private non-profit school, offer foreign qualifications⁷². The fees are much higher than those of the international French schools, ranging from €3,059 to €5,303 for nursery school, to around €16,012 up to grade 5 (primary equivalent), then €17,549 and €18,112 respectively for grades 6 to 8 and 9 to 12, which correspond to lower and upper secondary school levels. It is the only nursery, primary and secondary school in Burkina Faso accredited by the American government, awarding American diplomas and facilitating enrolment in American or English-speaking universities. One of the advantages of these international establishments is that they can guarantee

⁷⁰ <http://lfse.org/> On 29 June 2023, the Guaranteed Minimum Professional Wage (SMIG) was increased to 45,000 FCFA (68.61 euros) per month. The cost of one year at an international school equates to several years' earnings on Burkina Faso's SMIG.

⁷¹ <https://www.ecolefrancaise-bobodioulasso.com/>

⁷² <https://www.iso.bf/>

their students enrolment at North American or European universities. The rationale behind these schools is the quality of education and exam results, the French or American curriculum, but they also place a great deal of importance on the cultural or national ‘diversity’ of the children and young people who attend them. The aim is undoubtedly to show that these schools are not simply ‘transplants’ of foreign school systems, but that they are situated in a world of ‘diversity’ (LFSE) or within a context of ‘globalisation’ (ISO).

These schools now face competition from private schools run by international businesses, exemplified by ‘Enko Education’⁷³. This entity has progressively established its presence in various French-speaking African nations, including Douala in Cameroon and Abidjan in Côte d’Ivoire (in 2016), Dakar in Senegal (in 2017), and Burkina Faso and Mali (in 2018) (Lange, 2021). To establish themselves in these countries, they often form partnerships with existing private schools or acquire local institutions, aligning with established internationalization practices (Lange & Henaff, 2015). Targeting affluent social classes, these schools typically charge tuition fees of approximately US\$4,000 per year, which is lower than the expenses associated with both French and American schools. In Burkina Faso, Enko Education operates Enko Ouaga, a private school offering a comprehensive curriculum from primary school to the baccalaureate level. The institution emphasizes its distinctive features on its website, aiming to provide an international African school that is more culturally aligned with students compared to French or American schools, which adhere to the national curricula of their accrediting countries. Emphasis is also placed on the fact that classes are limited to 24 students and that students are bilingual (English and French), which is designed to prepare them for a more globalised world. The target clientele is the affluent social classes who sometimes cannot access other international private schools due to their high costs or difficulties securing a place for their children. The rationale for enrolment in lower and upper secondary school is based on the same elements as for primary school, with emphasis on the possibility of preparing for the International Baccalaureate: “*this is the first school in Burkina Faso to offer the International Baccalaureate (IB) diploma programme*” (Enko Ouaga, **website**). These private international schools boast strong moral values and forget to mention, in the case of privately funded schools, that they are profit-making and that private investors expect to make a profit.

⁷³ Enko Education was founded by Cyrille Nkontchou from Cameroon (who set up the Enko Capital Investment Fund in Johannesburg in 2007) and Éric Pignot (Lange, 2021).

Currently, these private international schools in Burkina Faso serve a limited student population, exclusively accessible to children from highly privileged backgrounds due to their exorbitant fees. Nevertheless, they contribute to the evident hierarchy within private schools and reinforce the social segregation dynamics between the globalized elite and the broader population of the country.

Other aspects of the privatisation of education, which are not dealt with in this chapter, concern attempts at public-private partnerships, most of which have proven unsuccessful in Sahelian nations due to insufficiently solvent populations that hinder profitable investments (Lange, et al, 2021). This includes the rapid growth of additional courses, tutoring or support services financed by families, paid educational programs during school breaks, and other educational sectors that can be overseen by the private sector, such as the production of textbooks and manuals. As a result, private operators are intervening in a variety of ways, and the privatisation process is becoming increasingly complex. The model of these private establishments is very heterogeneous. The methods of commitment are very diverse, the hierarchy of these establishments is ever more pronounced, and each type of establishment caters for specific groups characterised by their faith, and their social and economic situation. Private profit-making establishments claim to have moral values or a role to play in replacing the State, which is seen as incapable of meeting the social demand for education, while they are often perceived as being motivated by profit (Sankara, 2020). However, details concerning their revenue, profits, and the investment funds on which they depend has yet to emerge.

Conclusion

The primary aim of this chapter was to examine the influence of education policies on the privatization process. This involved assessing the role of private education, focusing on Burkina Faso's reliance on financial and technical support from TFPs, scrutinizing the key legal frameworks regulating private schools and delineating their rights and responsibilities, and dissecting various types of private establishments. The expansion of private education, especially in pre-school and secondary education, and in primary education in urban areas where the Burkina Faso government has nearly halted school construction, is attributed to the absence of public schools, fostering the rapid growth of private alternatives.

Legislation and education plans officially recognise and encourage the development of the private education sector. While the rights of private operators are clearly set out, as

is the case for non-profit associations, the oversight of their compliance with obligations is inconsistent. Government supervision of private schools and universities remains inadequate, particularly for primary and secondary education. The decentralised departments within the education ministries often lack the resources required for essential inspections, which encompass ensuring student safety, monitoring training standards, and overseeing the salary conditions of private-sector educators. Many of these private education businesses operate beyond both Burkina Faso's legal framework and the jurisdiction of the relevant education ministries. Furthermore, the recruitment of public-school teachers by private education entities raises significant issues. While the Ministry of Higher Education is attempting to address this issue, there appears to be a lack of attention from the Ministry of Secondary Education. The extent to which private secondary or higher education institutions could function without the involvement of teachers from the public sector, who are already remunerated by the government for their work in public institutions, remains an underexplored question, largely due to a dearth of statistical information. Likewise, the assessment of school programs and the evaluation of education quality are not consistently conducted.

Finally, the high number of unrecognised private schools raises questions about the Government of Burkina Faso's ability to address this issue. Resolving this challenge necessitates increased oversight and investment in public education facilities to meet the social demand for education. Private operators that fail to adhere to standards often cannot fulfil the educational needs of the most disadvantaged, and the government may find it challenging to enforce closures in the absence of public alternatives. This predicament is evident in the case of the private profit-making primary schools on the outskirts of Ouagadougou.

Private schools are mainly located in urban areas, where parents are perceived to be more financially secure. In primary education, during the 2019-2020 academic year, 14% of rural students were enrolled in private schools, while the figure stood at 48% for urban students. At the secondary level, encompassing both lower and upper secondary, 28% of rural students were enrolled in private schools, compared to 66% of urban students. The privatisation of education primarily impacts urban areas and the more affluent regions of Burkina Faso, with the proportion of private primary school pupils varying from 4.8% to 67% depending on the region. Ensuring quality education for all, especially children from socially and economically disadvantaged families, is imperative for the State.

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Conclusion ☐

Abdel Rahamane Baba Moussa⁷⁴

This book on the privatization of education comes at a time when two major issues are at stake. Firstly, the World Summit on Transforming Education, to be held in New York in 2022 at the United Nations Summit of Heads of State and Government, which testifies to the importance of education more than ever in resolving the significant challenges facing the world: widespread learning poverty, peace and security concerns (various conflicts based on identitarian withdrawal or religious extremism, the Covid-19 health crisis, etc.), the demands of scientific and technological progress (the rise of artificial intelligence, including in education), diverse inequalities (notably gender ones), climate change, and so on. In organizing this Summit, the heads of state of the United Nations recognized the importance of transforming education's form and content to give everyone access to the learning they need to meet today's global challenges. The second issue in the current educational context is that we are almost five years away from the 2030 deadline set by the international community for taking stock of progress towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly those of SDG4 relating to education. Given this, one of the major concerns is the extent to which countries will be able to achieve the SDG4 targets by 2030.

Against this backdrop, it is useful to explore the contribution that this book can make to shedding light on the issues at stake in the transformation of education from the point of view of the governance of education systems, and in particular, the relationship between public authorities (guarantors of equitable, quality education for all) and the private sector, often stamped with the seal of profit-seeking.

Generally speaking, privatization is defined as “the development or transfer of assets, functions, responsibilities or management operations that were previously in the hands of public actors, first and foremost the public authorities, and which are entrusted to private actors” (Chevaillier & Pons, 2019, p. 29). According to Ball and Youdel (2008), this generally takes two forms: “endogenous” privatization (from within the public sector) through specific public policies (supply-side liberalization or private-inspired management measures within public provision); and “exogenous” privatization, by the market, which refers to the authorization of a competitive supply

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⁷⁴ Conference of Ministers of Education of States and Governments of the Francophonie, Senegal

of market-like, for-profit educational services by private companies within the public education service. However, in addition to Ball and Youdel's (2008) endogenous/exogenous duality, Chevaillier and Pons (2019) highlight a third form of privatization, which takes into account individual private interests and aspirations and which involves specific, original responses to individual educational needs (family schooling, tutoring, shadow schooling, etc.).

Regardless of the form privatization takes, a major issue that consistently arises is the question of compatibility between the promotion of private interests and the public mission of education. This tension is evident both in the tripartite relationship that connects students, teachers, and knowledge through which education achieves its purpose of 'methodical socialization' of new generations (Ball & Youdell, 2008), and in the governance of the educational system, which is crucial for achieving this goal.

On this basis, we believe that the present work can shed light on the expectations of states in resorting to privatization, the effects of privatization on learning and the management of education systems, the constraints associated with the articulation of the logic of public service education with that of the private sector, and the possible perverse effects that may result.

1. The challenges of privatization: what do governments want?

The abundant literature on the privatization of education, and the polemics it sometimes provokes in relation to the commodification of education and the governance of education systems, are indicative of the scope of this phenomenon in recent years, especially since 2015 (see the chapter by Rui da Silva and Theresa Adriaio in this book). The observation made in the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (2000-2015) review that very few countries had achieved the targets set for education suggests that the interest shown by education systems in the private sector could be an expression of a desire to call on the operating logic of the private sector to compensate for the inadequacy of public intervention in certain aspects of education. In the literature, the importance of research into families' educational choices outside the traditional public provision confirms the need to access or explore alternative forms of learning. Is the time of "education trapped in the school form," long explored by some Francophone authors such as Guy Vincent, about to be over after a transition marked by variations highlighted by other authors (Seguy, 2018)? This question makes perfect sense in the face of the adjustments imposed by the Covid crisis, which has often led us, in this case in sub-Saharan Africa, to look outside the school for other places, other

actors, and other modalities (including digital), or even other transmission/learning times to ensure educational continuity. This confirms the importance of rethinking the future of education through “a new social contract for education.”

Opening up to the private sector seems to us to be an integral part of this transformation process and one of the issues at stake. Indeed, despite growing interest in privatization, whatever form it takes, several issues remain at stake for education systems. The first is the need for the state to play its role of “regulatory control” to prevent the uncontrolled development of private educational provision from generating inequalities: regulation by the state with the aim of harmonization (Chevaillier & Pons, 2019, p. 29). The second would refer, on the one hand, to the inclusion of the private sector in educational policy and the operation of the education system and, on the other hand, to the interplay of mutual influences that may result (Fondevilla & Verger, 2019) as well as the impact (positive or otherwise) this may have on the overall configuration and transformation of education (content, pedagogy, organization and governance).

2. Does privatization really meet the expectations of governments?

The developments in this book and in the literature suggest that, in general, governments are using privatization in its various forms to meet the challenges of quality education for all by improving the quality of learning and ensuring more equitable access for all. While data on this issue are unevenly available in the literature for Anglophone and Francophone countries, one thing is certain: overall, studies show that there is a difference in success between students attending private and public schools. More often than not, and overall, the former perform better than the latter, despite the measures taken as part of endogenous privatization to support learning and reduce inequalities. The comparative effect is, therefore, generally more favorable under exogenous privatization, but this is not without controversy, firstly because of the consequences in terms of inequity in the education system, and secondly because of the mixed nature of the correlation between learning outcomes (measured in PASEC assessments, among others) and whether pupils belong to the private or public sector (see the chapter Houngpodoté & Lauwerier)⁷⁵. Analysis of the successive PASEC evaluation reports, confirming the existing literature on the subject (including several articles in this book), reveals the mixed effects of private education

⁷⁵ We refer to the various PASEC evaluation reports (2014, 2019).

provision on the quality of learning compared to public provision since the integration of private sector logic into education more often translates into organizational, management and marketing innovations than into real transformations in didactic, pedagogical or curricular matters. What's more, the development of poorly controlled exogenous privatization can have a segregating effect on schools, depending on their immediate geographical environment (urban/rural), the socio-economic situation of the populations attending them, and the level of demand they place on the quality of educational goods and services. What is more, exogenous privatization is not always a rational choice on the part of governments, integrated into their educational policies and strategies. It is sometimes a societal response to the inadequacy of public action to ensure access to quality education for all: where the state fails, the private sector and civil society take over. As a result, this "de facto" privatization, which is often tolerated, can lead to lower-quality educational provision. Furthermore, families are not equally well placed when it comes to choosing private schools, with urban families from high socio-economic backgrounds often having a better grasp of the quality criteria for private schools and the financial conditions for accessing them than their rural and/or lower socio-economic counterparts, who more often than not play the proximity and affordability card rather than the quality of provision.

3. The challenge: reconciling public service and private sector logics, reducing perverse effects

While the first two forms of privatization defined above are generally more easily addressed by the state in its regulatory role, the second form (exogenous privatization) deserves particular attention insofar as the state's regulatory role may sometimes be confronted with the incompatibility of the public service logic of education with that of the market (market logic), in which certain actors may reduce the importance attached to pedagogical factors or teacher remuneration to maximize profits. In some sub-Saharan African countries, such as Côte d'Ivoire, the state calls on the private sector as part of a public-private partnership to help it carry out its mission of educating and training young people, and in particular to achieve its secondary school enrolment targets. However, this strategy has its pitfalls in low-income neighborhoods, where the need to minimize costs often leads schools to cut back on investment in teaching and learning materials and teacher salaries (sometimes on precarious contracts with poorly qualified people), resulting in lower-quality teaching (Zamblé & N'guessan, 2019).

Similarly, the drift from privatization to marketization is more complex in the third form of privatization, linked to individual choice, which is less easy for public authorities to grasp, and is seen by some as privatization by default, or “shadow education”. Bray and Zhang (2019), for example, note that in some countries in the South, private tutoring is developing, supposedly as a complement to and on the fringes of public provision, but which in reality constitutes a form of “privatization by default” (see also Bray’s paper in this book).

In short, the state, often the initiator of endogenous privatization, is supposed to have control over it. As for exogenous privatization, a regulatory framework can be found in the systems of rules that structure public-private partnerships, as is the case in several countries. On the other hand, the regulation of privatization linked to individual choices, which more easily falls within the scope of shadow education, is more complex and less obvious. The extensive literature that is developing on this form of privatization deserves particular attention in order to draw out the relevant information needed for decision-making.

Finally, while it is true that the state must regulate, we must bear in mind that state regulation is not free of bias, since the state’s regulatory stance can sometimes be torn between “recognizing” the usefulness of the private sector and the need to control its perverse effects, which sometimes leads to counterproductive restrictions. This can be seen, for example, in the dilemmas faced by the French state in the face of the emergence and development of the particular form of educational deprivation that is homeschooling (Bongrand, 2019), or in the difficult regulation of early childhood education and protection (cf. chapter by Anna Cristina D’Addio in this book), or even in the propensity to turn a blind eye to the proliferation of shadow schools in certain sub-Saharan African countries.

4. Finally: promote research, and share experience and best practices

Privatization is now a reality in most education systems, but it cannot be considered a panacea for ensuring quality and equity in education. This is an issue that still needs to be better understood so as to provide those involved in education with relevant and useful information for decision-making. Scientific and comparative research in education can provide an opportunity in this respect. Similarly, given the biases that privatization of education can entail, the state’s regulatory role is crucial in guaranteeing the quality and equity of educational provision. This presupposes that decision-makers and political actors can identify and regulate in order to mitigate the

perverse effects of too much autonomy of private education provision (precisely the so-called “shadow education”), which could escape the control of public authorities. In addition to the contribution of research, opportunities to share experiences and best practices can be inspiring in supporting public action by decision-makers in this area.

The overall paucity of studies on privatization in education – especially monographs - in French-speaking countries compared with English-speaking ones probably reflects a belated awareness, or even an inadequate use, of scientific data to steer education systems. Action is needed to raise awareness and encourage research structures to take an interest in privatization in education. An intergovernmental institution such as the Conférence des Ministres de L'Éducation de la Francophonie (CONFEMEN) could be the appropriate framework to support member states and governments in this endeavor. CONFEMEN's Programme d'Analyse des Systèmes Educatifs (PASEC) could better integrate into its evaluation methodology the issue of measuring the impact of privatization – or even shadow education (Bray & Baba-Moussa, 2023) – on learning, to produce evidence-based data on this subject. As for CONFEMEN's Programme d'appui au changement et à la transformation de l'éducation (PACTE), the prospective studies carried out following the PASEC evaluations would complement the evidence base for decision-making, and the sharing of experience and innovation carried out, specifically through KIX Afrique 21 or at meetings of the institution's governing bodies, would serve as a framework conducive to political dialogue to strengthen the decision-making and action capacities of states to take better account of the issue of privatization in education.

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