Nietzsche’s “Architecture for the Perceptive”:
From Sacred Space towards a Space for Reflection

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Architecture for the perceptive. There is and probably will be a need to perceive what our great cities lack above all: still, wide, extensive places for reflection; places with tall, spacious, lengthy colonnades for inclement or unduly sunny weather where no traffic noise or street cries can penetrate, and where a finer sensibility would forbid even a priest to pray aloud: buildings and places that express as a whole the sublimity of stepping aside to take thought for oneself. The time is past when the Church possessed the monopoly of reflection; when the vita contemplativa primarily had to be a vita religiosa; and yet that is the idea expressed in everything the Church has built. I do not know how we could ever content ourselves with its buildings, even stripped of their ecclesiastical function; they speak far too emotive and too constrained a language, as the houses of God and as the showplaces of intercourse with another world, for us as godless people to think our thoughts in them. We want to have ourselves translated into stones and plants; we want to have ourselves to stroll in, when we take a turn in those porticoes and gardens.

Friedrich Nietzsche

Architects invent spaces and shapes of buildings made out of stones, concrete, steel, and glass. The designing and constructing of spaces and shapes by means of materials is the praxis of building. There are also complementary efforts to the practice of building, namely theoretical attempts to define the principles of building, the discipline’s attempts for intellectual distillation of its own laws. Such promulgations are described as architectural theory. Friedrich Nietzsche is neither an architect of practice nor of the theoretical kind.
But Nietzsche is an “architect” nonetheless. Bruno Taut titled his utopian play of architecture, in a more or less overt reference to Nietzsche, “Weltbaumeister”, somewhat inelegantly translated as “building master of the world”. While the relationship between Taut’s play and Nietzsche’s philosophy might be of the typical appropriation of the philosopher’s thought for one of the many attempts to ground an architectural proposal for a renewed world, after the collapse of the old world order in World War I, with the seemingly necessary philosophical gravitas, it does provide, for the purpose of this essay, a way in which Nietzsche’s engagement with building and architecture can be understood.

Nietzsche’s proposal, then, is to build a world. It is not so much just his own world that stands in the foreground, not a megalomaniac and over-ambitious project in which Nietzsche would lead us to a perfect utopia according to his own taste, but more of a proposed conduct for every modern man. Nietzsche pointed the way for that modern man in his book Thus Spake Zarathustra: “The creative, the harvester, the triumphant will I want to join: the rainbow will I show them and all the stairs to superman” (Nietzsche 1980, vol. 4: 26; henceforth referred to as KSA). In that sense Nietzsche does not want to build one world, but he proposes to all of us to become architects, builders of our world. In other words, Nietzsche is the architect who constructs a world through representations and advises us to do the same for ourselves.

It is also important to establish from the outset of this essay an alertness that Nietzsche’s references to building and architecture are not entirely metaphorical, as he indeed points to aesthetics, art, and architecture as forms with which man closes the gap between reality and representation, so that the quest to uncover reality and the quest to build representations are, indeed, aspects of the same process. The essay will return to this often overlooked aspect when Nietzsche invokes “building”, “architecture” and “architects”.

Of course, Nietzsche is much more famous, or perhaps more notorious, for being the philosopher-architect who called for the building of an “architecture for the perceptive”, as he named it, for the new men treading the world in the epoch after God’s death. It is here, at the point of modern man’s metaphysical dilemma, that Nietzsche uses the act of building in its most fundamental way. It
is clear why he would do so if we witness what Nietzsche wrote about the absence of God. When Nietzsche seemingly proclaims the death of God, it reads much more like a sorrowful lament with an accompanying longing for a gravitational binding force for our lives than a joyous and triumphant proclamation that we have reached a nihilist state in our lives:

Where has God gone? What have we done? Have we swallowed up the ocean? What sponge have we used to obliterate the whole horizon around us? How have we contrived to erase the fixed, eternal line to which in the past all lines and measurements were related, by which all life’s architects did their building, and without which there seemed to be no perspective, no order, no architecture? Are we ourselves still on our feet? Are we not constantly tumbling? Hurtling down, back, sideways, in all directions? Have we not wrapped infinite space around us like cloak of icy air? And lost all gravity, because for us there is no up or down? And if we still live and enjoy light, seemingly as we always have, do we not do so – as it were – by the twinkle of stars that have ceased to shine? … God is dead! And we have killed him! This feeling, of having killed the mightiest and holiest thing the world ever possessed, has yet to dawn upon mankind: it is a monstrous, new feeling! How does the murderer of all murderers console himself, how will he cleanse himself! (KSA 9: 632f)

Despite all the fierce rhetoric that certainly can be found throughout Nietzsche’s entire philosophical and poetic œuvre, often directed against the moral covenants of Christianity, it was never Nietzsche’s attempt to seek a nihilistic world devoid of metaphysical constructs (KSA 13: 225). He simply explains to the world – or at least for those who were willing to listen to him, and many were ready to do so – the increasing internal weakness of the present ethical compass of modern man. The observant reader of philosophy knows that Nietzsche is hardly alone in pointing out that fact, although none of his German humanist philosopher colleagues from Herder to Heidegger equalled him in his powerful and sometimes shrill tone of argument.

Nietzsche increasingly invokes “architects”, “architecture”, and “building” and their respective specific characteristics of that art-form for his argument. It is no surprise, then, that he eventually comes to the conclusion that conventional sacred spaces, ecclesiastical spaces, too, are obsolete. He labels these ecclesiastical spaces “as the showplaces of intercourse with another world” (KSA 3: 524). It seems that Nietzsche, here, presents a double meaning when writing that these spaces belong to “another world”. The first aspect of the critique could be described as a categorical disagreement on Nietzsche’s part with the ethical model propagated by the institutions of the Christian Church in
the nineteenth century. The second aspect is historical in the sense that the said moral construct of the church is apparently unable to sufficiently capture man’s imagination so as to afford him the necessary metaphysical grounding for his life. The ecclesiastical spaces once supported man in his quest to grasp, orient, and measure the position of each man in respect to the metaphysical world. Now they have lost their power to do so.

This condition does not exist only in the metaphorical appropriation of architecture Nietzsche offers us in his writings. Nietzsche is astute enough a student of architecture to know that the last great structure of the grand Christian church-building tradition, Balthasar Neumann’s church for the Benedictine convent in Neresheim, had been completed almost one hundred years earlier, namely in the late eighteenth century. In this respect, it is not just the condition of overly critical philosophers, like Nietzsche, declaring the Church a weakening patient. The decline of the building program of the Church itself is the physical manifestation that the Church lost its “monopoly of reflection” in the epoch of modernity (KSA 3: 524). Even more important as an example to demonstrate that Nietzsche operates in a context when he stipulates these changing conditions of the modern world is the fact that the curia in Rome itself admitted its changing position in the world. Perhaps the most significant change in terms of how the Church positions itself in modernity can be found in a single word, namely in the change from the phrase “the Church and the World” to the phrase “the Church in the World”. Ever since the Medieval age the Church described its relationship with the world as two separate entities, the celestial one and the earthly one. It is in Nietzsche’s lifetime that the Church officially recognises that it is a part of the world, and that it is indeed “in the World” and not above it. Again, it is important to understand that this context exists when Nietzsche declares the ecclesiastical space obsolete and calls instead for spaces for reflection, Denkräume, through which modern man can build himself and a world around.

Of course, it is needless to say that the Church would not have agreed with the Nietzschean interpretation of what transpires on the World stage with respect to the Church’s position in the modern world. But it is a truly grand, perhaps audacious attempt by Nietzsche, not to attempt any longer to centre
modern man’s life – which seemed impossible to him at that point in history – but at least to solidify it in the disorienting jungle of the modern world. Nietzsche’s project is to aestheticise modern life in order to give it back a stabilizing and binding force. In doing so Nietzsche declares life itself as the basic artistic phenomenon.

The act of building in Nietzsche’s project of an all-encompassing “will-to-art” – art’s task, here, is to produce a veil in front of the metaphysical abyss – assumes a supreme position in the philosophy of Nietzsche, in both a wider metaphysical sense and in a more narrow architectural sense. For Nietzsche, “building” is the fundamental process; building is a form-producing process with which man orders a basic system. Nietzsche coins this “the artistic base-phenomenon” and he characterises that phenomenon as “the building spirit” (KSA 11: 129).

It is justifiable to assert that the modern tradition knows two large streams of aesthetic thought: one has its roots in idealism; the other one is analytic in nature. The latter, with its roots in British empiricism and logical positivism, as Clive Cazeaux has described, “is committed to the belief that a problem can be clarified or brought out into the open through the careful and rigorous analysis of concepts as we understand them today” (Cazeaux 2000: xvi). Nietzsche, on the other hand, belongs to a Central European tradition that “pays greater attention to the historically rooted and culturally constructed nature of ideas; philosophy is recognized as something which is made and written and, therefore, as something which cannot be divorced from the contingencies of language and tradition” and strives for a certain rooted-ness, in which the building metaphor plays an important role (ibidem). Moreover, Germanic aesthetics has had its greatest impact far beyond that particular branch of philosophy. From the later parts of the eighteenth century until the first half of the twentieth century, one can reasonably speak of an aesthetisation of how the world was perceived in all its aspects. The art historian Beat Wyss has subsumed this modern epoch’s striving as a “will to art” (Wyss 1997: 3).

The emphasis of aesthetics as a means for attempting to unlock the secrets of the world does not begin with Nietzsche. It is Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz who first counters René Descartes’ absolute rational concept of
cognition that estranges man from his natural world of apprehension leading him towards a loss of reality and finally to a discrepancy between rational and sensible relation to the world (Scheer 1997: 46-52). Alexander Baumgarten follows by asserting aesthetics as the science of sensible cognition (idem, 53f), before Immanuel Kant, “at a historic impasse, returns representations based in the senses to the discourse of philosophy” (Lacour 1999: 23). Claudia Brodsky Lacour further explains that Kant does this by making architectonics the only form within which sensory experience can be said to be known. Rejecting its exclusion a priori and a posteriori by dogmatic idealism and empirical skepticism respectively, Kant returns sensory experience to the realm of philosophically grounded science by making its representation an epistemological act. Representations are no longer conceived as error because they are first mediated by a mental techne. The means of this mediation are, of course, time and space, Kant’s purely schematic a priori forms, but even such fundamentally nonanthropomorphic representations would offer no basis for scientific knowledge if they were not subordinated to a systematic, overarching form. That form, with which Kant equates the “nature of human reason itself,” is “architectonics,” the ‘art of [building] systems’. (ibidem)

After Kant had laid out this foundation, less formalistically conceived theories of art made truth claims for art such as in the writings of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Arthur Schopenhauer. These writings preceded theories of art as so-called object-manifestations of truth with thinkers like Nietzsche and, later, Martin Heidegger, with his famous assertion that “poetically, man dwells on this earth” (Heidegger 1971: 218).

One of the more decisive steps in formulating such a sentiment of modern man is, then, of course, being found in Nietzsche’s thought, namely that creative thought, and “building thought” in particular, fundamentally determines the world: “(…) one ought to understand the artistic base phenomenon that is called life – the building spirit that creates under most unfavourable conditions (…)”, he writes (KSA 11, 129). A major step in this tradition of the aesthetisation of the world is the removal of the distinction of representation and reality altogether. The general thesis of this thought is that “the world is constructed through representation, that reality and representation are not in fact separate but mutually defining aspects of the same process” (Cazeaux 2000: xvi). It took very little time for art theoreticians such as Konrad Fiedler and Heinrich Woelfflin to follow this suggestion that the material with which we come into
immediate contact is, in fact, reality. But this position also led to misunderstandings in its appropriation that briefly need to be noted here, namely that the importance given to things that exist in the world lead to either a materialism, in which the material is taken without a further possible extension to a realm beyond the matter itself, or to positivist notions of aesthetics that have been developed towards the end of the nineteenth century in the works of Hermann Ludwig Ferdinand von Helmholtz, Gustav Theodor Fechner and others who had attempted to reduce the sense for beauty and art to a physiological response only. Opposing such materialist and positivist interpretations, Nietzsche stands in the tradition that views the modern world as constituted by a transcendental unity. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe describes this unity with the Faustian “Einsgefühl”, a feeling of oneness, and Novalis (Georg Philipp Friedrich Freiherr von Hardenberg) already shares Goethe’s sentiment of an absolute inward-certainty when he writes: “We search everywhere for the absolute, but we always only find things” (Hegel declares that appearance itself is essential for the essence because truth could not appear in the world otherwise. Oswald Spengler defines this world-view with the paradigm of “form and actuality” (Spengler 1996: iii). Heidegger later adds that there is no representation from which we could deduce what reality looks like but that it is the work of art itself that lets reality be present. What binds all of those and many other thinkers of the German tradition from Leibniz right up to Nietzsche, Ernst Cassirer, and Heidegger is their certainty that beyond the fleeting phenomena of our world exists a perennial realm that binds all existence. What distinguishes these thinkers from their pre-modern colleagues – and they stress this ever more forcefully – is that man has to respond to the divine creation, the divine creation being the artistic act of God himself, with aesthetic fabrications. Leibniz’s brilliant theory of the monads is the anchor for this tradition of thought, as the monad is this self-contained entity that holds, on one hand, infinite possibility, but on the other hand also encompasses everything. With modernity firmly in place since the philosophical tour de force by Kant, it is now the obligation of the artist to re-create the original creation through art. The artistic act demonstrates the manifold insights and the infinite variety of the world under
one idea. In other words, “art, in this tradition of thought, is no longer confirmed to surface impressions. Art becomes the process through which we shape the world” (Cazeaux 2000: 12).

Nietzsche decisively contributes from the outset of his philosophical work to the understanding that artistic productivity (*poiesis*) becomes a theory of being (*Dasein*). Nietzsche’s unpublished texts leading up to “The Birth of Tragedy” and, of course, the “Birth of Tragedy” itself already emphasises the necessity to build an aesthetic veil. Cazeaux explains: “Gone is the conventional notion of truth as the ‘correct’ representation, the one which best corresponds to reality, since knowledge here is no longer understood as a binary relation between representation and object”, as Hegel still had conceived of it. “Instead, perception and understanding are akin to the creation and appreciation of art. In the absence of an external source, values and truths have to be made” by men (*idem*, 14f). However, Nietzschean thought never leaves the world behind. A “coherent theory of experience (…) still has to account (…) for the counter-pressure the world throws up against consciousness” because there is no Schopenhauerian escapism in Nietzsche’s world conception. Life needs to be asserted. The possibility to assert our existence in the world we find in artistic production, for example when an architect constructs a building, a pure invention of the human intellect without model in Nature. “It is to these ‘leaps’ in artistic creativity and to the demands they impose on interpretation” that modern man looks for “understanding of the tensions and resistances that constitute the individual’s experience of the world” (*ibidem*).

Kai Hammermeister in his book *The German Aesthetic Tradition* has listed how subsequent contemporary thinkers, theoreticians, and artists refer to Nietzsche’s attempt to construct the world through representation, in other words, for the artist to build worlds. We read of Heidegger’s essay “Building Dwelling Thinking” in which the philosopher famously uses the example of a bridge to demonstrate how a work of art “organizes the space around it and transforms it into a world. In other words, art lets us see something that remains hidden from view in our quotidian life” (Hammermeister 2002: 180). It is also Heidegger who asserts that “the work of art not only lets us see those things that have remained hidden so far; it also makes visible the world in which these
individual objects occur” (*ibidem*). The painter Paul Klee also uses the Nietzschean viewpoint when he “famously declared in exactly the same spirit that art does not reproduce the visible, but renders visible” (*ibidem*). And the aforementioned Konrad Fiedler formulates in Nietzschean terms the following: “We will cease to want to see nature through art; rather, we will submit to art so that it teaches us to see nature” (*ibidem*).

It is this valuation of the fundamental act of building that allows Nietzsche to distinguish the artistic as the original-creative (*das Ursprünglich-Einheitliche*): building creates worlds. Building becomes a metaphysical and an epistemological act that each man and woman is asked to participate in order to assert him or her a place in the world. Nietzsche reacts to an entirely new world in which modern man is asked to operate with the present detachment of religiosity in the fundamental structure of that world. Modern men and women, through their creative work and the beauty of their products, are the initiators of self-transcendence, of the growth of the self towards its utmost possibilities.

It is the fundamental world-angst caused by the recognition of men’s own minuteness that is redirected into a sublime creative power. Nietzsche labels that power (*Kraft*) as “Grand Style” and contemporaneously establishes architectonics, architecture, and the architect to its elevated, not to say exceptional position, by declaring in his “Twilight of the Idols”:

The actor, the mime, the dancer, the musician, the lyric poet, are closely akin; in their instincts they are ultimately one. But they have gradually specialized and separated from each other – to the point of mutual contradiction. The lyric poet longest remained at one with the musician; the actor with the dancer. The architect represents neither a Dionysian nor an Apollonian state: what impels him to art is the great act of will, the will that moves mountains, the ecstasy of the great will. The mightiest men have always lent inspiration to architects; the architect has always lived beneath the mental sway of power. In a building, pride, the defeat of gravity, the will to power must manifest themselves. Architecture is a kind of eloquence of power conveyed through forms: now persuasive, even cajoling; now starkly commanding. The supreme feeling of power and assurance is conveyed by that which possesses the *Grand Style*. The power that has nothing left to prove; which disdains to please; which is oblivious of any onlooker; which unconsciously thrives on the existence of opposition; which remains self-contained, fatalistic, a law of other laws: *such* power speaks for itself as the Grand Style. (KSA 6: 118)

Here, the “I” comes to know himself as superior against the totality of being (*sein*). Nietzsche is not writing about *egomania*; for him this is metaphysical and
epistemological necessity in order to find men’s possibilities in a godless world. In his plea that the world is in demand of form, he writes: “... to see and calculate forms is our biggest joy – it is also our oldest practice” (KSA 11: 94). Nietzsche does, in fact, propose a metaphysical solution for modern man by means of art, and the art-form of architecture in particular. The exact transition from Nietzsche’s high esteem of the art-form of architecture to what it potentially can do for men’s existential quest to assert himself in the world is beyond the scope of this essay but is discussed in the book Der bauende Geist. Friedrich Nietzsche und Architektur.¹

Artistic work becomes, for Nietzsche, a function of the logical that stands prior to every existing world and as such reserves in that sense priority against the world of ideas and science (Welt der Begriffe und der Wissenschaft). Although Nietzsche himself still calculates the world along the paradigm of truth in the idealistic tradition, he denies the possibility that the search for truth in the sciences leads to the meaning of the world, following Novalis’s dictum pointed out earlier in this essay. Against the scientific discourse, Nietzsche prioritises an aesthetic “sense of form” for obtaining a meaningful existence in the world. By means of constructing works of art, man is building an original-unified (ursprünglich-einheitliches) understanding of the world that stands prior to a division into man and world, prior to the distinction of object and subject, prior to all theoretical assumptions and concepts, and prior to the praxis of an operational understanding of the world.

That “sense of form”, which now resides at the center, prefers the fundamental act of building against inward thinking (Selbstdenken). For this, with Nietzsche, the artistic and contemporaneously metaphysical work becomes a veritable building of Zeichen, a term that can alternatively mean sign, mark, omen, or landmark. What is important is Nietzsche’s claim that there is an artistic ordering at work that he recognises as the oldest and most fundamental human task and, if achieved to our own satisfaction, brings to us our biggest joy: “Men is a form-shaping and rhythm-shaping creature; there is nothing in which he is not better trained and there seems nothing that gives him more joy than the creating of form (KSA 11: 608).” While this “creative power” (KSA 11: 203) operates according to criteria that Nietzsche calls “Physiology of Art”, an
apparatus that bases aesthetic judgment on an inherent “body-order of all-encompassing reason” (*Leiborganisation der grossen Vernunft*) rather than on a moral order exclusively (*KSA* 11: 509), the primary task of building is of ontological nature, namely to document the form of the life-execution (*Lebensvollzug*) itself. This reality of the world is to be found in its formality. The “mastery of the chaos … the becoming of form” is an aesthetic object-becoming (*ästhetisches Objektwerden*) that Nietzsche designates with his famous paradigm of “will to power”. That “will to power” is in regard to all comprehension of the world one of building: men are building “to master something” (*KSA* 12: 140).

Once the characteristics of Nietzsche’s “Grand Style” are understood, one will have to set the famous aphorism 280 of his *The Joyous Science*, titled “Architecture for the Perceptive”, into a correct framework. Aphorism 280 reads as follows:

> Architecture for the perceptive. There is and probably will be a need to perceive what our great cities lack above all: still, wide, extensive places for reflection; places with tall, spacious, lengthy colonnades for inclement or unduly sunny weather where no traffic noise or street cries can penetrate, and where a finer sensibility would forbid even a priest to pray aloud: buildings and places that express as a whole the sublimity of stepping aside to take thought for oneself. The time is past when the Church possessed the monopoly of reflection; when the *vita contemplativa* primarily had to be a *vita religiosa*; and yet that is the idea expressed in everything the Church has built. I do not know how we could ever content ourselves with its buildings, even stripped of their ecclesiastical function; they speak far too emotive and too constrained a language, as the houses of God and as the showplaces of intercourse with another world, for us as godless people to think our thoughts in them. We want to have ourselves translated into stones and plants; we want to have ourselves to stroll in, when we take a turn in those porticoes and gardens. (*KSA* 3: 524)

The aphorism presents us with an important glance into how Nietzsche creates that monumental sentiment that anchors a metaphysical existence of modern man in the world – a world in which he or she is faced with a fundamental metaphysical world-homelessness after “having killed the mightiest and holiest thing the world ever possessed” – by means of a new program for “building” at large and for the architecture of Modern man in particular.

There is no doubt here that Nietzsche does pronounce the end of ecclesiastical architecture. In spite of this, the fundamental task of building is not purely profane. On the contrary, the proposed “Architecture for the
Perceptive" overcomes, with its own pathos, the religious architecture that it just proclaimed obsolete. This new pathos comes alive through Nietzsche’s attempt to “translate” the “godless” into “stone and plants” directly. He postulates the most radical object-becoming (Objektwerdung) that is imaginable with this turn: the human soul itself – his or her passion and thinking – ought to be manifested in stone. While he criticises his contemporaries whose passion seems unable to attain any kind of form by relentlessly criticising the state of Gründerzeit architecture as a “jumble of all styles” (KSA 1: 163), Nietzsche wants a new architecture that is built as an image of man whose primary quality he describes as being “solid” (KSA 3: 596).

Nietzsche points in the same aesthetic direction as does Kant’s theory of the sublime stating that “we have made a world for ourselves in which we can live” (KSA 3: 477). It is this deeply felt and irrevocable opposition between the known and the brittle unbeknownst from which the elemental agony of a fundamental world-homelessness awakens in all of us. But it is exactly this deep world-angst, the angst of all things foreign, which carries man to his greatest achievements. The awe of the unknown, the timidity we experience towards the independent, the limitless, and chaotic is the source of all elemental form-giving.

This emphasis on the aesthetic mentality in Nietzschean thought is – as becomes increasingly clear - by no means a resignation from metaphysics. With his “seeing and calculating of forms”, his “sense for forms”, existing not in some world beyond but “in our world”, Nietzsche discovers the highest metaphysical power which each human being can not only experience but, moreover, participate in its creation.

This is the way modern man can overcome the death of God and the nihilistic modern world. If religion, teleology and purposefulness step aside with Nietzsche, then, this should not be understood as a loss of our known world but as a gain towards our actual world: a step towards the “Beyond Good and Evil”.

This is the reason why Nietzsche demands architecture for the “perceptive” with “extensive places for reflection” in which those perceptive human beings can “stroll” in “porticos and gardens”, and by extension, figuratively, in stone-become-themselves. The demand for this new architecture
is even higher than for those who visit “the showplaces of intercourse with another world” because there nothing had to be built by man. Man could visit the church for a brief time but he did not have to build his own thought-space (*Denkraum*). The act of building was only available to God himself. Now the “perspective” is not only visitor of a liturgical spectacle but he can build himself and a world around. At this instance we recognise the potential elevation of the individual to God-like creative stature. The objective power of the “perspective” is to build space for himself in this world – not exclusively but foremost by means of architecture. Building, in this case, becomes a sacred and remedial act and – understood in this sense – it is something liturgical as such.

“Quiet, wide, extensive places for reflection; places with tall, spacious, lengthy colonnades” ought to be built by the modern architect according to Nietzsche’s almost pamphlet-like wording of what is yet to be built by architects of the new epoch, “buildings and places that express as a whole the sublimity of stepping aside to take thought for oneself”. He goes on the demand: “We want to have *ourselves* translated into stone and plants; we want to have *ourselves* to stroll in, when we take a turn in those porticos and gardens.” These are the most grandiose of building-thoughts.

The shapes of built-up stone, steel or glass, for Nietzsche, ought to insure man against his fundamental world-homelessness, because only “along such beauty made out of stone can the longing heart cool down” (*KSA* 13: 567). Even if it is not serving religion directly any longer, architecture cannot be more mythical: it guards the “I” against the consciousness of his own weakness.

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**Note**

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