

RESEARCH, EVIDENCE AND THE BEGINNING TEACHER

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Introduction

One of the central parts of the Initial Teacher Education course at Oxford is the dissertation. Students are expected to investigate an aspect of school life in order to help them to gain insights into the use of research in developing education. This approach is part of a wider concern that teaching ought to be a research-based profession (see Hargreaves, 1996). There are, however, a number of problems in this approach which may benefit from some philosophical analysis. This paper is concerned with two questions resulting from the empirical fact that there are different types of educational research - academic, teacher led, sociological etc.. The first is whether there is a means of establishing the importance of these different approaches for the work of teachers in schools. The second refers to the relationship, if any, between these different approaches.

I shall begin by drawing on the theme of 'diversity and identity'. It can easily be established that there are different approaches to educational research. If these approaches are simply different then we could in principle characterise the various approaches and look at some external relationships between them. I would suggest that this is commonly done by researchers (for example Cochran-Smith and Lytle, 1993). There is an alternative conception, that of educational research as not only different, but diverse. Consider the example of an interviewer who stops several people in the street and asks their opinion of a local politician. They might talk of getting a diverse set of answers, the answers are indeed different, but they are different answers to the same question. If there is diversity, then there is also an element of identity. So far I have not indicated whether diversity is good or bad. Consider my interviewer, and assume that they are interviewing in a place where all people are absolutely truthful. Their question about the local politician will be met with answers which emphasise that politician's personality, or policies, or family relations etc. In this way the diverse answers will enable a rounded picture of the individual to be developed. This might be important, but assuming that I want to know about the politician's policies, this other information is at best unhelpful, and perhaps confuses the issue. In this second case the diversity of answers is problematic.

The diverse set of approaches to educational research have an identity in that they are all concerned with education. It has yet to be shown that this diversity is helpful, and in particular helpful to beginning teachers (i.e. those on teacher training courses). There are, of course, many examples of poor research in all approaches, but that is not my concern here, rather it is to develop a greater understanding of this diversity and identity inherent in educational research.

At the outset it is worth making a remark on method. I am not concerned with establishing the relationship between different 'words'. This paper is not a matter of linguistic analysis, rather it is an attempt to provide a coherent analysis of the ideal activity of educational research. In doing so I shall be drawing on the sociological theory of Alasdair MacIntyre. MacIntyre (1985) is perhaps better known for his reconstruction of virtue ethics, but much of *After Virtue* is given over to developing a systematic framework which makes social activity intelligible.

The structure of the paper has three sections. Briefly I shall use Hargreaves' statement that teaching ought to be a research-based profession to look at the possible meanings of this phrase. In doing so I hope to identify the various different approaches to educational research which might be considered legitimate. The second, and major part of the paper will deal with MacIntyre's framework, and an analysis of some key aspects of the social activity of research. Finally I shall conclude with a few comments on the relationship between different approaches to educational research, and in particular the training of teachers.

A research-based profession?

Let us assume that a research-based profession is just that - a profession that is based upon research. Further let us assume that this means at least in part that teachers ought to intentionally base their practice on research evidence. In this I assume that the notion of a profession implies the intentionality of members of that profession in relation to the implementation of that profession's key characteristics.

A clear distinction between two different approaches to the notion of research-based professions is whether the members of that profession are to be consumers of research (what I shall refer to as an evidence-based profession) or are to be producers and consumers (a research-based profession proper). An evidence-based profession might involve being able to use evidence presented to the teacher - for example if it is found that offering sweets to pupils improves their concentration then the teacher ought to offer sweets to the pupils. The teacher is required to act on what he or she is told is the best research evidence. At the other end of the continuum is a view of the teacher as a more equal consumer where the teacher has access to a variety of research evidence and has an obligation to consider and judge that evidence which they see as being potentially useful to improve their teaching.

In seeing the teacher as a producer of research three distinct categories seem to develop.

The first is similar to that of medical practice where a limited number of teachers are also involved in research activities (perhaps supported and informed by non-practitioner research colleagues). The presumed advantage is that practitioners are more capable of performing the research requirements of the profession than non-practitioners. The second category is that teachers ought to be conducting research projects in their schools. In doing so they use research gathered from other projects, and perform some sort of systematic enquiry which brings solutions to some perceived problem in that school. This category seems in many ways similar to action research type projects. Finally, one could claim that teaching is essentially a research activity. Teacher Training Agency circular 10/97 requires:

'...those to be awarded Qualified Teacher Status must...demonstrate that they:... assess and record each pupil's progress systematically, including through focused observation, questioning, testing, and marking.' (Annex A:C:c).

This bears more than a passing similarity with Stenhouse's (1980) definition that research is 'systematic and sustained activity made public'. The made public is not clearly mentioned in the guidelines, but teachers readily talk to each other about pupil performance, in addition this systematic research into pupils' performance are made public through pupil reports on a regular basis. This is similar to the second category, but is perhaps most clearly distinguished by the intention of the teacher as they involve themselves in these different activities.

Having established these differences then one might be tempted to say that teaching ought to draw upon all of these activities. It seems historically true that these various ways of considering education as a research-based profession have produced fruit in the form of developing the educational experiences of pupils. Further they are not mutually exclusive, social scientists, former and presently practising teachers all contribute to the development of the profession, both through the generation of public knowledge, and through the development of their own personal practice.

In moving forward then it seems necessary to establish some way in which these various means by which teaching might be considered 'research-based' might be collected together into a comprehensive account. For this we need to move into considering the relationship between the activity of academic departments, and practitioners. In *After Virtue* (1985) Alasdair MacIntyre develops not only a moral theory, but also a set of analytic tools for dissecting and interpreting social interaction. In what follows I assume the truth of MacIntyre's analysis.

MacIntyre's approach

Teaching is a practical activity. Teachers are charged with enabling young people to develop. Develop what is a mute point. The traditional liberal curriculum has emphasised personal aspects such as autonomy (see White, 1990), or an understanding of knowledge (on the lines of Paul Hirst's 'Forms of Knowledge' thesis). More recently there has been a rene-

wal in the purpose of education to fit students for the economic necessities of the nation. The reality as always is a mixture of all of these, and other, concerns. Schools are institutions in which teaching occurs, in which basic social engineering occurs, in which preventative and reactive welfare occurs, and teachers are the adult agents within such a domain. At best teaching is about a coherent set of activities, but it is a mis-representation to see it as unitary. Further like all social activities teaching is unpredictable (see MacIntyre, Chpt. 8). Given such a characterisation it ought not to surprise us that educational research develops a fragmented and particularised account of educational practice, and fails to establish laws that allow for a scientific approach to teaching.

In *After Virtue* MacIntyre attacks an expansionist view of the 'bureaucratic manager'. The bureaucratic manager is deluded into believing that there are generalisable law-like truths in the social sciences that direct the manager's decision making. MacIntyre presents a critique which establishes the essential and logical unpredictability of human behaviour - humans simply don't and can't follow social laws. He is not claiming that such relationships as correlations, and explanatory stories can not reasonably inform decisions, but that predictive laws are inappropriate to this domain. MacIntyre sees this image of the bureaucratic manager as invading education to its detriment. Understanding the relationship between practice and theory in this way is to misunderstand the objects of study - that is people and their interaction. MacIntyre's thesis is one of reinstating a reasonable view of human persons and their interaction. Rejecting the ideal that there is some social reality to which human beings ought to conform (and non-conformity is problematic) he proffers the suggestion that we collectively create our social reality by making our activities intelligible. The organising principle of our social interactions is not a theoretical structure, but intelligibility. This is not a private world, but a corporate activity. The 'we' that makes the world intelligible is more than the 'I' and hence we do in fact have a social reality in which we can share. I understand your reasons for acting in this way rather than that because I understand how people like you and I act in such circumstances, though of course we might choose to act differently. In saying that another's activity is intelligible is not to claim that we would in the same circumstances act in the same way, but that the action is one that fits with how we in our community could act.

This last claim might be in need of clarification, we can appear to act unintelligibly, but we have categories for such action - humour or insanity are two. Consider the television cult series 'Monty Python's Flying Circus' classic humour for some, and for others 'completely stupid'. Much of the show was in real terms unintelligible unless one saw it as 'off-beat humour'.

The use of intelligibility as an organising principle for human activity is grounded in two beliefs about the human mind. Firstly, that the mind does attempt to make social activities intelligible; and secondly, that such an activity is informed by the norms of the community in which we live. The first seems consistent with design theories of the mind, whether these be religious invoking a deity, or from modern work on evolutionary psychology. Millikan (1993)

argues that the brain like other organs within the body has a proper function in terms of the development of beliefs and desires. Belief forming structures are selected for in as much as they advantage some individuals over other individuals. In a social community the ability to make the actions of other members of the group intelligible would potentially bring both survival benefits (is this person going to kill me or not), as well as directly reproductive benefits. The second belief follows at least in part from the nature of language, and the fact that much human interpersonal activity is socially established. The task for MacIntyre is to consolidate such a principle of intelligibility in some systematic way, establishing what are the sufficient descriptors of intelligibility formation, and the language to express such descriptors.

MacIntyre offers three analytic tools with which to make social activity intelligible: social practices; tradition; and the unity of the human life. Social activities are collected together into intelligible groups - social practices. Intelligible in two senses. Firstly, individual social activities are given a purpose in relation to the purpose of the social practice as a whole, kicking a football, or tackling another player only has meaning in relation to both each other, and other activities essential to football such as the scoring of goals. Secondly, the purposes of the activities are intelligible within the historical framework of this social practice. For example the game of football has a history, if one changes the 'off side rule' then one does so in the light of that history, and the type of practice that is football. If we were to include handling the ball by anyone in the 6 yard box then this would have a purpose and make sense to us, but it is no longer intelligible as football. The limitations on change are contained with the concept of 'a tradition' which MacIntyre defines as:

'A living tradition then is a historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition' (pg. 222).

Finally MacIntyre shows that to make an activity intelligible also requires knowledge of the individual engages who in that activity. This activity is part of my life, and I may engage in that activity for exercise, for glory, or to spend time with mates.

In addition to these three primary tools Martindale (1992) identifies MacIntyre's use of the concept tradition as in need of clarification, arguing that MacIntyre's later use of the word (MacIntyre, 1988) offers a different analytic tool. The tradition used in *After Virtue* is distinct from the view of tradition used in relation to traditions such as the western enlightenment, or Aristotelian. These larger traditions are what I will refer to as Macro-traditions. Such Macro-traditions limit the number of social practices and the views of the flourishing life available for the individual to appropriate for themselves. They are, in effect, definitive of the cultural and intellectual resources available for the community, and the individual, in making their social life's intelligible.

In conclusion, we are of necessity born and inducted into a macro-tradition which both provides the resources for us to make our social world intelligible and constrains the possi-

ble meanings that can be ascribed to that world. We have as a resource a series of socially established practices each with their traditions which show how these practices have evolved over time, and give direction to their future evolution as living traditions. These traditions are arguments, and the social practices arenas of human activity and as such require agent-interlocutors for their maintenance. The agent-interlocutors are necessarily both actors within the social practice and those who engage in the argument about the goods of that practice. In the same way as it is impossible to make a social practice intelligible apart from its tradition, you can not divide the interlocutor from the agent without degenerating the tradition of which they are part. I will argue, for example, that teachers as agent-interlocutors need to engage in ongoing argument which is the teaching tradition as a necessary part of their engagement in that social practice.

In the light of MacIntyre's work I wish to develop three points. The first is the implications of rejecting the imperialism of the bureaucratic manager; the second is to consider the distinctions between the academic and teaching tradition, and the third is to place a concept of research within this language game. I shall deal with these in reverse order. I shall then briefly discuss the interrelationship between this analysis of educational research, and the alternative possible forms of teaching a research-based profession. In conclusion I will consider the implications for ITE curricula.

What is research?

There seems to be two possible ways of answering this question. The first is to consider the type of 'language game' in which the word research makes sense, along with closely related words and concepts. Thus we might wish to define research as being 'systematic and sustained enquiry made public' (Stenhouse, 1980). Secondly, we might seek out what common sense sees as research-like activities and describe these types of activities. The first is perhaps more at home in linguistic theory, and the second is a matter of empirical enquiry. The approach, which I see as traditional to analytic philosophy, is to answer through a mixture of both pursuits. The approach is this, to use examples of research as a social activity to throw light on the meaning of the words and their relationship. In doing so I am concerned with clarifying the social activity, research, and am using language as a means to think about, and articulate this clearer understanding.

This approach assumes: (i) that there is a social reality independent of language; (ii) that careful, and reflective consideration of the way we talk about the social practice will give insights as to the nature of the practice itself. The first assumption is inherent in MacIntyre's sociology. We are in fact making sense of a social reality, though a reality which we are collectively constructing. Our creativity in psychological construction is not unbounded, but is expressed in the ways that we are able to use the intellectual and cultural resources of our tradition to make innovative interpretations of social action. The second is explicit in the work

of Millikan and other evolutionary psychologists. The development of language is one which is primarily concerned with the understanding and expression of the internal world (of thought), and co-ordinating the external world of physical and social actions. This does not undermine the possibility that once language has been developed it can not be used for other activities such as crossword puzzles, but that this use of language has in a normally functioning brain at least these operational characteristics.

In this section I wish to argue that MacIntyre's concept of tradition is identical to the notion of research. When we talk about engaging in research we are talking about developing and enhancing the social practice of which that research is a part. Let us assume that there are some limitations on what is to count as research such as the necessary criteria of systematic and sustained enquiry mentioned above, and elements of self-criticism and reflection. This makes a distinction between research and say simply looking or thinking. Research is however a social activity, and as such, has a purpose - we perform research for a reason, or a collection of reasons. Some of these reasons will be purely personal reasons. I am an education researcher at least in part because after graduation I started to work with young people, and because I like to think about things etc. I might be researcher because I can make money this way (perhaps because I find it easy, or because it is preferable to manual labour). There is a personal purpose to research which is part of the unity of the researcher's own life. There is of course another aspect to understanding the social practice of research, and that is the history of that research itself - a history which is independent of the particular individuals who are presently engaged in that social practice. This is the case whether I am engaged in designing faster cars, the responses to a new advertising campaign or increasing the knowledge of animal hibernation. This history is one which provides the intellectual resources of the social practice - its dominant theories, and their means of refutation; key questions; experimental tools and approaches etc.. What is the role of the researcher in such circumstances? It seems clear that the researcher is to take on the challenge of developing theoretical insights, of refutation, of developing and refining key questions, and of designing better experimental tools. This is what MacIntyre means by a tradition. The researcher is engaging in argument with others, and with the tradition itself. This argument is in part about what the purpose of the social practice actually is, but includes an argument about how it is to realise its purposes.

In each research activity there will be virtues derived from the type of social practice that it is, but there will be virtues inherent in all research activity such as courage, persistence, desire for truth etc. which reflect the sentiments of Stenhouse above. This view of research has a number of implications, but for the moment I shall draw out one. There are some social practices which are defined in terms of the research activity itself - say sociology, or materials technology, and there are others - say teaching, of which research is a part. I shall refer to the first type as 'academic traditions/social practices' that is ones who esteem knowledge for its own sake, and whose primary purpose is the development of knowledge. The second group is

more difficult to name generically, and since I am concerned only with teaching I shall refer to it as the 'teaching tradition/social practice'.

It is to the further analysis of these traditions that I turn.

Teaching and academic traditions

What seems like a simple distinction to make, that between teaching and academic traditions, does on further analysis become intolerably complicated. In a recent paper (Davies, 1997) I tried to bring some clarity to this area. Here I shall skim over some of those points, and leave only a minimum of argument. There are two principle difficulties. The first is that neither the teaching or academic traditions are simple traditions in the MacIntyrean sense. Secondly, the analytical tools of social practice and tradition are more versatile than the manner in which I sketched them out above.

The teaching tradition

I have referred to a school as a 'geo-social space' by which I mean it provides a place in which the same individuals in the same geographical location engage in a variety of social practices. In the case of the football club the social practice of football is definitive of the activity going on, the same it not true of a school. Rather the school provides an opportunity for young people to be inducted into a variety of social practices which the society considers in some way valuable. These are the social practices of academic disciplines, citizenship, employment etc.. The school is the institution in which the basic abilities necessary for engagement in these practices is reproduced in the next generation. In this I am denying that there is a social practice of education, education is a description of the process, rather than the product. The educated person does not engage in a social practice of education, but shows their ability to develop a life of balanced engagement in a wide range of valuable social practices. In teaching different social practices the teacher engages in the same type of activity, but it is given slightly different meanings within the different social practices - teaching health, and Newtonian mechanics often require similar educative skills etc., but have different meanings. Health education is intended to encourage students to take care of their physical and mental abilities, and prevent unnecessary illnesses, on the other hand Newtonian mechanics is about the means by which scientists mathematically model the real world.

In arguing for this rejection of education and teaching as social practices I am aware of a terminological problem. I have referred to a 'teaching tradition' which teachers are to uphold and maintain as a living tradition. It is terminology which I shall continue to use for the sake of brevity, but I wish to clarify what I mean. Teaching is an activity within all social practices, but some practices are established as parts of the school curricula and teachers are expected to be involved in their transmission to pupils. The teacher is involved in all of these chosen social practices and traditions. In particular they have a special responsibility for en-

gaging in those arguments which pertain to the induction of new people into these social practices. By maintaining the teaching tradition I am charging teachers with an involvement in the various traditions and social practices which are an essential part of their practice as teachers, and in particular the induction elements of such traditions.

The academic traditions

The complexity outlined above results from the rejection of teaching/education as a social practice. In terms of the social practice of academic research the complexity arises from the 'Russian doll' like nature of social practices. It is possible to visualise social practices in the form of a Venn diagram. If I kick an opposing player in a game of football then it is, within the social practice of football, a foul, but within the social practice of the law, it is Grievous Bodily Harm. The same action is part of two different sets of activities - that is two social practices. In Venn diagram form this displays itself as two overlapping circles, the action of kicking being within the overlap. In regard to an academic social practice I want to hold that such a practice makes sense, but that contained within it are a whole plethora of different social practices relating to individual academic disciplines. Further within each discipline there may be a number of smaller social practices. Thus one can consider Science as a social practice, within that Physics, and within that two distinct social practices of traditional (Newtonian based) and new (quantum, relativity based) physics. Similarly one might talk of the social sciences and within that psychology, and within that both cognitive and social psychology as two distinct social practices. In Venn diagram form we see circles within circles.

We have therefore a notion of academic social practices, and the traditions that inform those practices and plot their evolution over time (turning our 2 dimensional Venn diagram circles into 3 dimensional tubes).

Given this complexity it seems necessary to look at the widest social practice - that is of the academic social practice as a whole to consider what intellectual resources can be used to intelligibly consider the place of academic educational research. If one considers the types of academic research there is it seems one clear distinction between disciplines such as psychology, physics etc. and others such as engineering. The disciplines such as physics are defined by the basic theories of the physical universe, these may be described as 'theory tracking' areas of academic research. Engineering on the other hand is not of this sort. Engineering begins with particular practically circumscribed problems which define the area of research, and then both conducts appropriate experiments and draws on a wider variety of theoretical perspectives to develop an approach to the problem. Research on gas flow in high temperature pipes for instance will require insights from metallurgy, thermodynamics, fluid flow, wave theory and others. Nevertheless such research is academic, it is concerned with the development of knowledge and understanding, not with the transformation of engineering practice - though the insights gained may occasionally have this effect.

Research such as this is not 'applied research' in the sense that a theory from physics might be applied to a particular issues - this is more like 'technology', rather it is an approach to the development of practical knowledge about the arena in which human action depends upon and interacts with natural phenomena (the design of the pipe is only necessary because we - i.e. human beings - want a pipe of this sort).

This distinction between 'theory tracking' and 'practice tracking' types of academic research is evident in the different approaches to educational research actually performed. In most departments of educational studies you will find some empirical researchers who are concerned with the application of a particular theoretical perspective to an educational context - this paper would be such an example. It is also easy to find researchers who are concerned with specific aspects of practice, say the classroom activity of biology teachers, and use case study or ethnographic methodologies to gain an understanding of such activity.

There is much that could be said about these various relationships between teacher research and different types of academic research, but in this paper I am concerned primarily to sketch out the nature of their diversity, and the elements of identity. Before drawing these ideas to a conclusion, I wish to briefly point out the implications of rejecting the bureaucratic manager approach to education.

Rejecting the bureaucratic manager.

I shall assume that in the normal course of events we expect teachers to act reasonably. By this I mean that we expect them to act on reasons which they can justify, and that these reasons justify the action that they have taken. There are of course limits on this, no professional can ever justify every action they take, but there are classes of action - such as seating arrangements, or reading books chosen, which are in greater need of justification than a choice to write on chalk or white board. This of course pre-supposes that there are good reasons to act one way rather than another. In his attack on emotivism MacIntyre offers three options for those who reject the possibility of good reasons for acting and yet are still required to make decisions. One can act on personal preference (what I like I choose to do); what the system says ought to happen; or by interpersonal agreement. In each case the means of making the decision is valid if that is the best way of deciding. For example if I am choosing between buying a chocolate bar or some jelly sweets this is a matter of personal preference, if we are choosing to go on holiday together it is a matter of interpersonal agreement, but if we are teachers or policy makers developing a compulsory education system then these approaches to decision making can not be sanctioned.

The bureaucratic manager does what the system says ought to happen, and this is the more difficult of the options to dismiss. If there are no good reasons to act in one way rather than another, then let us perpetuate the system by becoming more effective in how we do things. Much of the recent work in 'school effectiveness' research in the UK is this type of work.

The basic claim of research as I have described it, that is as the development of the living traditions (academic and teaching) is at odds with the view. The living tradition is not a perpetuation of the status quo, but an argument about what are the goods of the tradition. If there are no good reasons to act one way rather than another, then this paper is dead in the water - it can not subscribe to the hard line relativism implicit in 'emotivism' and survive.

Conclusions

In this paper I set out to consider the nature of a research-based teaching profession. The language itself implies a limited set of meanings that could be attached to the term, but this takes us only so far in establishing guidance for ITE courses. The difficulty being that although we can see the value of each of these different aspects of an 'evidence-based' and 'research-based' profession it tells us nothing about their relationship.

Teachers are to be part of a wide variety of traditions which reflect the society of which they and their pupils are part. As members of those traditions they play a role in both inducting younger members into them, and engaging in the ongoing debate about what it is that those social practices are about. The teacher as citizen is engaged in the work and life of the local community, as well as political debate, and it is into this 'argument' that pupils are to be introduced. Teachers as members of academic communities are inducting pupils into the historical ongoing debates of those communities etc.. As a member of those traditions the teacher is to continue to be engaged in the ongoing argument of that practice - as a physics teacher perhaps by reading and talking about articles in 'New Scientist' or 'Scientific American' or 'Physics Review'. However, in particular, teachers are those practices 'experts' in inducting new, young members into the practice, and this too is an aspect of being part of these traditions. In all cases the criteria for 'success' is a greater engagement in the traditions by both teacher and pupil, and a greater understanding of the goods that each traditions offers.

Research in the academic tradition is concerned with the development of public knowledge, and with the methodological understanding of the tradition. It can manifest itself as applied research (taking insights from the academic disciplines and applying them to educational situations) or, like engineering, by taking legitimate practical situations as the starting point for systematic analysis, academic research.

How then can teacher research, and academic research be brought together? I would like to suggest three ways forward. Firstly, that we recognise that academic research ought not to be directly relevant to the practice of teaching. Such a simplification blurs the contributions that can be made. In particular the complexity of academic research related to teaching, and the complexity of teaching itself forces us to have a multifaceted understanding of the relationship between different types of academic research and the different traditions which form the heart of teaching. Secondly, that research in both academic and 'teaching' traditions involves the personal transformation of the practitioner. This results from the personal interaction

of the practitioner with other member of the practice (both living and dead). Academic research can transform the teacher through their interaction with articles and discussions - and through the transformation of the teacher such research impinges on the development of teaching practice. Finally, that teachers are encouraged to see their role in the advancement of teaching practice, in co-operation with, rather than in competition to, academic research.

Finally then the implications for ITE. Beginning teachers are being educated, and inducted into the teaching profession. Although some will become academic researchers the primary goal must be to develop the skills and abilities necessary to teach and to engage in the ongoing traditions that inform teaching practice. As it stands there seems to be little research on researching within the teaching tradition, although often work on 'pupil assessment' or 'professional development' will contain, unnoticed, work with a research basis - this lack of empirical work limits what can be said at this time. Further beginning teachers will need to learn to engage intelligently with academic research, looking for the clues which give indications of the validity and reliability of the research - learning what it is that they can trust and what is 'dross'. Finally, beginning teachers will need to practice research in the context of teaching, looking not only to 'formal' data gathering procedures but informal conversations with colleagues, tutors, and pupils. In doing so they must look to the development of not only their practice, but the development of the teaching tradition per se.

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